Respecting corpses: the ethics of grave re-use

Abstract

The paper argues that grave reuse cannot be ethically evaluated simply by adverting to cognate issues, such as archaeological and medical ethics, since grave reuse comprises a very specific type of disturbance. Whilst there is no general ethical prohibition against disturbing the dead, a more detailed analysis is required in the case of English Victorian ‘perpetuity graves’. It is argued that, even granted that posthumous harms exist, on a proper understanding of what motivated purchase of perpetuity graves, their reuse does not constitute a prohibitive posthumous harm. Objections to grave reuse on the grounds of the well-being of the living are then considered. Repugnance towards grave reuse is grounded in solicitous attitudes towards the dead and ontological anxiety about the fate of our own and our loved ones’ bodies. Nonetheless, repugnance should not be a weighty consideration in the policy debate. Finally, major pragmatic considerations in favour of grave reuse are reiterated. In sum, arguments against grave reuse are weak, and pragmatic arguments for grave reuse are strong; so, reusing graves is ethically permissible.

Keywords:

• Burial
• corpse
• ethics

Notes

1 Although much of the ensuing discussion focuses on England, as already stated, shortage of burial space and grave reuse are issues in many other countries. Some of the arguments in this paper can be directly applied to other jurisdictions, others can be adapted to suit other contexts or, at least, the sort of considerations discussed can be raised elsewhere. But of course policy evaluations must be context specific and culturally sensitive, and it might be that some of the discussion in this paper is too Anglo-centric to be applied directly to other jurisdictions.

2 See http://www.cremation.org.uk/ for regularly updated statistics.

3 See http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN04060/reuse-of-graves. Licences permitting disturbance of human remains are often granted for reasons other than grave reuse, such as to facilitate forensic investigation.

4 Decomposition rates vary, making it difficult to accurately anticipate the state of interred remains; nonetheless, the policy in question would only apply to remains that had clearly had sufficient time to naturally decompose: ‘Remains must be in skeletal form only – they must not be offensive in any way; as with cremation we do not want to disturb remains until there is no human tissue remaining’ (Hussein, 1994). As a rule of thumb, reuse would be permitted only after a period of at least 70 years since the last interment.

5 Arguably, Christian theology would not preclude disarticulation or re-siting bodies anyway. The ‘sacred’ nature of the soil in which people are buried carries no spiritual benefit. Consecration is a legal and ritual act, but Protestant denominations do not hold that this action has consequences for the fate of the soul. Certainly by the nineteenth century, it was unlikely that grave reuse was regarded as having eschatological significance. England in the nineteenth century was overwhelmingly Christian, and comprised mostly Anglicans and Nonconformists (Snell & Ell, 2000). These denominations did not carry a strong belief in whole-body resurrection, and no adverse spiritual outcome was anticipated in the event of bodily disarticulation. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that eschatological beliefs vary within and between religious frameworks.

6 ‘Pauper’ graves constituted a third type of burial. It often remained possible for ‘unpurchased’ graves to have some kind of monumentation, and a highly complex quirk in the legislation meant that an unpurchased grave could in some circumstances be reserved for the use of a single family, (Rugg, 2013).

7 Wilkinson is aware that this move threatens to make posthumous harms trivial; after all, how important can merely logical changes be? But he points out that the significance of a change does not depend on how it comes about; harms due to real causal changes can be minor, whereas some harms of the sort described as logical can be very serious.

8 For classic discussions of posthumous harms, see Feinberg (1984), Levenbook (1984), Pitcher (1984) and Fisher (2001). More recent advocates of posthumous harms include Papineau (2012), Scarre (2006) and Wilkinson (2002, 2011). For a more sceptical treatment, see Belshaw (2009).

9 In contrast with our discussion, much of the debate about posthumous harms in the philosophical literature avoids this messy business of reconstructing the relevant ante-mortem desires or interests, by positing scenarios in which the individuals’ wishes are very straightforward, such as to have a book manuscript published or a business thrive, or that one’s children flourish or specific infelicities remain undiscovered.

10 One might think grave reuse is objectionable because the bereaved would be upset by the disturbance of their loved ones. But, to reiterate, grave reuse would not occur until a period of at least 70 years, so the effect on the bereaved should be inconsiderable. Nonetheless, safeguards could be built into ethical and regulatory frameworks to avoid reusing graves in a way that would cause any distress to relatives.

11 The ongoing debate over defining and determining death – see, e.g. Belshaw (2009); Holland (2010) – is not germane since the solicitude for the corpse we go on to describe is undertaken after death has taken place on any account.

12 Gareth Jones (2000, p. 57) recognises this solicitude as a respect for the ‘intrinsic value’ of a cadaver, quoting May as recognising that ‘while a body retains a recognisable form, even in death, it commands the respect of identity’.

13 ‘The dead’ are not perceived as a static entity, in that the identity of the person who has died does not remain fixed; as time passes, relatives and acquaintances who knew the dead individual will themselves die; the vast majority of people who die will in time become forgotten.

14 For a direct parallel to this line of thought, see Kass (1992) who describes and explains our repugnance and, in turn, ethical qualms about uses of body parts to argue against a market in transplant organs (see also Kass, 1997).

15 Arguably, extended delay in the production of ministerial guidance in this area might be taken to suggest that although the permissibility and policy of grave reuse ought to be addressed through philosophical debate, irrational intuition continues to hold a good deal of sway. Of course, political expediency is likely to be a factor too.