![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Few studies have focused on coalition formation in the Italian Ordinary Status (OS) regions. Studies that implicitly considered this issue have tended to highlight its nationalized features, particularly the congruence of pre-electoral coalitions and the absence of region-specific parties. Yet these studies have overlooked the intra-coalitional dynamics of regional party systems, ignored the post-electoral dimension of coalition formation, and failed to explain regional variations in the intensity of inter-coalitional party competition. This article incorporates these dimensions of analysis to argue that coalition formation in the Italian OS regions displays strong territorial features, which are directly linked to the “format” and “structures of competition” (Sartori, 1976) in regional party systems. These dual structures of regional party competition are heavily affected by the heterogeneous distribution of electoral support for state-wide parties, the presence or absence of non-state-wide parties (Northern League, Udeur), the diverse coalitional behaviour of Italian parties, and the distinctive patterns of electoral hierarchy in regional governing coalitions. The introduction of a new regional electoral system (proportional representation with majoritarian bonus) has also produced distinct coalitional incentives, leading to ‘perfect’ patterns of inter-coalitional bipolarism. Regional elections in Italy are confirmed as vital processes of national coalition testing.
Notes
The other regions in Italy are Special Status (SS) regions. These cover the large Islands of Sicily and Sardinia, as well as the small bilingual northern regions of Val D'Aosta, Trentino-Alto-Adige (divided into the Provinces of Trento and Bolzano) and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. These regions possess different systems of government, varying levels of competences and resources, different electoral systems and unsynchronized regional elections. This article therefore focuses on the mainland OS regions, which possess identical systems of government, identical regional competences, very similar electoral systems and hold concomitant regional elections.
The only strong regionalist parties in Italy are located in Special Status (SS) regions: Sudtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), in the majority German-speaking province of Bolzano, and Unione Valdotaine (UV) in the majority French-speaking region of Val D'Aosta, which have dominated their respective provincial/regional governments since the 1960s. Partito Sardo d'Azione is also a historic regionalist party located in Sardinia, which continues to compete in regional elections. Although Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Sicily and the province of Trentino do not contain strong regionalist parties, they nevertheless contain distinct ex-DC parties that have emerged in these regions.
The exception to this rule is the Tuscan electoral system since 2005, which allocates the ‘majoritarian bonus’ to party lists in the provincial constituencies that form part of the winning coalition.
The instability and unpopularity of the centre-left governing coalition led by Romano Prodi (2006–08) obliged the new Democratic Party leader, Walter Veltroni, to field a very different pre-electoral coalition for the 2008 national election. This excluded many peripheral governing parties (Socialists, Greens, PDCI), and all ambivalent coalitional parties (PRC, Udeur). In response Silvio Berlusconi (now leader of the People of Liberty) fielded a pre-electoral coalition that excluded UDC and Udeur (Wilson, Citation2009). Whether this election constitutes a turning point in coalitional relations will depend on the relative electoral success of these new formations. It is also uncertain how these national developments will affect regional governing coalitions, which are now broader than at national level.
Except for the single seat Udeur obtained in Marche during the 2005 elections.
Blackmail potential is calculated on the basis of actual votes cast, although it must be recognized that the strategic choices of voters can be affected by the type of pre-electoral coalition presented.
This outcome had occurred to LN after the 1995 regional elections. Despite a strong performance in these elections, LN remained in opposition at all regional levels because the CRC in Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont was guaranteed a comfortable governing majority in the regional council.
La Repubblica 20 November 2004, Florence Edition.
Component parties 2000 = DS + PPI + Dem + RI + SDI; 2005 = DS + DL + SDI.
La Repubblica, 18 February 2000, Milan Edition.
La Repubblica, 7 January 1999, Naples Edition. The direct election of regional presidents since 2000 has made such actions impossible, because removal of the regional president would lead directly to new elections (Fabbrini and Brunazzo, Citation2003).