The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?

Abstract

The paradox of federalism is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates ethnic divisions. A federal arrangement that formally recognizes ethno-linguistic diversity to help manage divisions can also pave the way for eventual disintegration. In this introductory piece, the editors of this Special Issue highlight a number of common reference points for the study of the secession-inducing and secession-preventing features of federalism: First, the political will of the secessionists and their capacity to mobilize to this end; secondly, the characteristics of federal institutional/constitutional design; and, thirdly, economic and sociological uncodified factors that have a bearing upon these questions.

Keywords:

• Federalism
• autonomy
• secessionism
• nationalism
• accommodation
• ethnic divisions

Acknowledgement

The editors would like to thank Charlie Jeffery, Wilfried Swenden, the anonymous referees and all the contributors to the issue.