Conceptualizing and Theorizing Constitutional Change in Federal Systems: Insights from Historical Institutionalism

Abstract

The connection between past and present politics manifests itself most obviously in the constitution. Diverging trajectories of constitutional evolution usually depart from a ‘constitutional moment’ and, therefore, are causally tied to formative events that take place early in a historical sequence. And yet, while the historical nature of the constitution is often acknowledged, studies rigorously applying a historical-institutionalist framework to the study of constitutional change in federal systems have been few and far between. This article probes the value of historical institutionalism for investigating and explaining both the origins and patterns of constitutional change in federal systems. It taps into three strands within the historical-institutionalist literature and asks what each can contribute to the analysis of constitutional change in federal systems.

Keywords:

• Constitutional change
• historical institutionalism
• critical junctures
• path dependence
• incremental change
• political development

Notes

So far, the APD literature has gone largely unnoticed outside the USA. For an overview of how APD relates to the broader universe of historical institutionalism, see Katznelson (2009), Orren and Skowronek (2004), Sanders (2006) and Thelen (1999; 2000).

The distinction between inter- and intra-organ controls was introduced by Karl Loewenstein (1957). The basic idea, however, can be traced back to Montesquieu who has distinguished between the “separation des pouvoirs” and the “distribution des pouvoirs” (see also Lange, 1980; Schultze, 1990). In a rather descriptive way, Canadian political scientists first introduced this distinction into the field of comparative federalism using the terms intrastate and interstate federalism (see also Wallner, 2008; Broschek, 2009).