Decentralization in Italy and the Troubles of Federalization

Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, Italy has made significant steps towards federalism, decentralizing political, fiscal and administrative powers, also by means of a major constitutional reform. Yet, 20 years after the beginning of this process, the country is experiencing problems in finalizing these reforms towards a stable federal architecture. This article examines Italy as a case of failed federalization. Adopting a long-term focus inspired by the ‘gradual institutional change’ approach, we argue that federalization has been trapped between a rather anomalous (and pathological) alliance between a persistent centralism, which prevailed when Italy was born as a state in 1861, and an ever-present strong tradition of localism. This approach allows us to show the very incremental nature of institutional change and to map changes and continuities along the 150 years of the Italian state, identifying both political and cultural factors that help to explain this unfulfilled journey towards federalism.

Keywords:

• Italy
• federalization
• decentralization
• institutional change

Acknowledgements

A preliminary version of this article was presented at a Seminar in the Department of Political science of the University of Oslo, 4 September 2012. We wish to thank Øivind Bratberg for the invitation and all the participants for their comments. We are also grateful to Jörg Broschek as well as to the Journal's referees for their comments on previous drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

¹ We prefer the term ‘approach’ to ‘theory’. For some useful comments, see Van der Hejden (2011).

² The quintessential centralistic country is France where fully standardized administration and centre–periphery relations were built in the Napoleonic era, through the role of prefects.

³ In case of coming together federalism, formerly separate territorial units agree on setting up a new and upper inclusive level of government only if it preserves their autonomy and diversity (self-rule). In case of holding together (or devolutionary) federalism, peripheries mobilize in order to get self-rule and recognition of their diversity within a former unitary state transforming into a federal one. See Stepan (2001).

⁴ The main differences are the absence of both a territorial chamber (and more generally weak territorial representation of regions in central decision-making) and regional participation to constitutional amendment. Other institutional differences might refer to less exclusive law-making power and fiscal federalism.

⁵ This helps to explain also the failure of the federalist currents, mainly represented in the minority camp of the left, with important intellectuals such as Carlo Cattaneo, Giuseppe Montanelli, Giuseppe Ferrari (Sabetti, 2000).

⁶ Romanelli (1995: 140–143) talks about “bargained autonomy”. Piattoni and Brunazzo (2010: 333–34) talk about “bargained pluralism”. An enduring element which took root in the first quarter of the twentieth century as a consequence of these relations was the increasing ‘meridionalization’ of public administration, as recruitment shifted towards the southern regions and became a key means of social mediation (and patronage) in those areas where public sector became the major employer (Melis, 1996).

⁷ Indicators on both administrative and fiscal decentralization are consistent with this trend. Although the latter followed a double pattern, with public expenses increasingly decentralized and almost doubled from 17.9% (1866) to 34.0% (1913) as sub-state shares, and fiscal revenues, kept constant around 25%, the former saw local expenditures becoming higher than in France or Germany (Marchese and Piazza, 2011) and local public employment in 1881 reaching 36%.

⁸ The use of proportional representation and very consensual rules of procedure, the upper and lower chambers (the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies) placed on an equal footing in a form of balanced bicameralism that remains unique among advanced industrial democracies, and parliamentary structures, built on a broader logic of ‘institutional polycentrism’, created important countervailing positions of power and influence (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007).

⁹ This refers to both state-wide parties and NSWP: the tiny and short-lived Action Party and the Italian Republican Party (PRI), and the South Tirol People's Party (SVP), the Union Valdôtaine, the Partito sardo d'azione and the short-lived Movimento indipendentista siciliano.

¹⁰ This was part of the agreement reached by the DC and the PCI in the very peculiar season of the so-called ‘historical compromise’ (governments of National Solidarity, 1976–79), when a single-party DC cabinet was supported in parliament by PCI abstentions.

¹¹ Secession has not been consistently pursued by LN except for a short period in 1996–97. The abandonment of such a policy was conditional for the party return into the centre-right coalition as of 1999.