The Role of Party and Coalition Politics in Federal Reform

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the role of the German political parties as actors of federal change. Parties perceive federal processes through their own organizational lenses, giving priority to electoral logics, programmatic ideas or territorial interests. Each of the three reform steps in the German case was shaped by a specific blend of the three logics. Looking at the sequences of reform, the analysis shows that parties have remained central for organizing federal processes but have become less capable of arriving at cohesive and unified party positions. There have been struggles over which of the strategies was to prevail both within individual parties and across the party divide. The territorial power balances within parties, the timing of the reform, that is, the constellation of political majorities at federal and regional levels in the moment of reform, and the policy issues in question are important framing conditions for the choice of particular party strategies.

KEYWORDS:

• Political parties
• German federalism
• territorial reform
• political change
• party organizations

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In multi-level contexts, electoral logics may differ between the state-wide and sub-state levels of party competition causing frictions between different territorial layers of the party organization. Thus, we need to analyse the internal power balances of multi-level parties to understand better their strategic electoral choices (see Hepburn and Detterbeck, 2013).

2. For analytical tools in quantitative research that may help distinguishing between the different logics of partisan action in federal processes, see Bräuninger et al. (2010). In qualitative research, case studies and interviews with politicians and civil servants are most frequently used to learn about actorś perception of their interests and priorities (see Turner and Rowe, 2013).

3. Electoral systems at state-wide and sub-state levels and the electoral cycles resulting from the timing of elections at different levels constitute another institutional layer for party agency. As with territorial arrangements, the crucial question is whether there is a high or a low degree of interconnectedness between territorial levels. Differences in electoral formulas and consecutive elections at various levels, distributed over time, can add to the distinctiveness of state-wide and sub-state party systems, whereas simultaneous elections fought under similar rules may produce more symmetrical results (Deschouwer, 2006). In any case, the various structures of the electoral process provide distinct framework conditions for the choice of partisan strategies.

4. The most visible single element of territorial heterogeneity in German party competition is the success of the PDS / Left Party, which is a major party in the East but has remained a rather small force in western Germany. But there are other factors as well: the relative weakness of the FDP and the Greens in the East, the temporary inroads of the populist right made into some Land parliaments, the growing instability of voting behaviour resulting from a general decline of partisan alignments, and, related to this, an increased tendency of switching party preferences between elections at different territorial levels (Sturm, 1999; Hough and Koß, 2009).

5. Changes to the German constitution, the Basic Law, require two-third majorities in both houses, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.

6. The decision of the Land governments to leave the federal convention without result was influenced by rulings of the federal constitutional court in 2014 on education policy (junior professorships, student tuition fees) which strengthened the position of the sub-state level. In curtailing federal legislation in areas of concurrent matters, the court decision revitalized Land responsibilities without federal constitutional reform (see Benz, 2008: 186–188; Scharpf, 2009: 93–96).

7. It may be true, however, that for the CDU prime ministers the failure of the federal convention in 2004 had the attractive side-effect of defeating ambitions of the SPD policy experts on education to secure more federal influence on schools and universities. So, there has been a party conflict at play here in a policy field which is traditionally quite prone to ideological disputes in Germany (see Wolf, 2006).

8. Mecklenburg-West Pomerania based its no-vote on the argument that the federal reform would bring negative effects for the small and economically disadvantaged Länder while also making the federal level less capable of reducing regional inequalities. The grand coalition of Schleswig-Holstein abstained in the final Bundesrat vote. They had made clear that they were particularly sceptical about the competitive dynamics arising from the new Land competence of regulating the careers, payments and provisions of state civil servants (Laufer and Münch, 2010: 112).

9. See Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 December 2015, ‘Ministerpräsidenten schließen Finanzpakt’ (1).