Intergovernmental councils in Spain: Challenges and opportunities in a changing political context

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the most important characteristics and of the Spanish Intergovernmental Councils (IGCs) and theorizes about the effect of the increasing fragmentation of the party system on the nature and dynamics of multilateral bargaining in IGCs. The essential argument is that party system fragmentation may have an impact on IGCs through its effect on the formation of minority and coalition governments. These types of governments may put an end to the two-bloc confrontation, bring to the system higher levels of party congruence between levels of government and lower the costs of compromise, three factors that may help to grease the bargaining process and, in turn, enhance the achievement of intergovernmental cooperation agreements. The positive effect will be conditional on several factors, namely the ideological coherence of inter-party alliances, the predominant type of government in the system (coalition or single-party minority) and the duration of governments.

KEYWORDS:

• Intergovernmental councils
• intergovernmental relations
• Spain
• state of autonomies

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Riker suggested that the constitutional structure of a federation is determined by the degree of centralization of the party system, understood as the balance between federal and state interests.

2. When devolution started, four regions – Catalonia, the Basque Country, Andalusia and Galicia – accessed autonomy with higher levels of self-rule (fast-track process), whereas the rest followed the slow-path and were granted more limited authority.

3. Cooperation agreements between regions require the approval of the higher house (Senate).

4. With the exception of the CPFF (Fiscal and Financing Policy Council), which technically is not a Sectorial Conference, where decisions are subject to vote. The central government’s vote counts for 50%, so it becomes virtually impossible for the ACs, whatever the combination of parties, to promote and prevent decisions against central government interests.

5. See also Mueller (2013) and Mueller and Mazzoleni (2016).

6. Such as the Sectorial Conferences on Agriculture and Rural development, the Sectoral Conference on Fishing or the Consultative Councils on Fishing and Agriculture European issues (González Gómez, 2006: 112).

7. Another example of the executive-type cooperation is the creation of the Presidents’ Conference (Conferencia de Presidentes) was created in 2004 and brings together regional premiers and the prime minister. It has been convened intermittently (last time in January 2017).

8. Most of the new regional Statutes of Autonomy approved between 2006 and 2007 have regulated bilateral cooperation more extensively. The Statues in Catalonia, Andalusia, Aragon, Castile Leon and Extremadura have created new and permanent Bilateral Commissions on Cooperation as permanent bodies. In addition, in Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Andalusia, Aragon and Extremadura the new Statutes have created specific Bilateral Commissions on fiscal and economic issues.

9. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to know how the effective number of parties is calculated.