Unexpected Persistence Amidst Enlargement Stasis: Usages of Europe in Turkey’s Nuclear Energy Debate

Abstract

Recent studies on European Union (EU) Enlargement have emphasised the importance of usages of ‘Europe’ by domestic actors as a necessary condition for the EU to have an impact on domestic politics. We study the usages of Europe in the critical case of Turkey’s nuclear energy policy. We analyse the narratives and actions of domestic actors in Turkey to identify if they use ‘Europe’ (the EU and the idea of Europe). We reach the counter-intuitive finding of usages by both state and non-state actors, which illustrates that usages of Europe can persist despite enlargement stasis in candidate states.

Keywords:

• Using Europe
• EU–Turkey relations
• Europeanisation
• nuclear energy
• narrative analysis

Notes

1. See for example Timofejevs Henriksson (2014); Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis (2016), Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015), Radaelli (2000), Jordan (2003), Börzel and Risse (2000), Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011), Aydin and Kirişçi (2013), Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber (2005) and Tocci (2005).

2. For exceptions, see Kaliber (2012), Duyulmuş (2011); Öner (2014); Günay and Renda (2014).

3. For example, on Turkey’s foreign policy, Kaliber (2012); Günay (2014); on Turkey’s public policies and polity, Güney and Tekin (2015); on Serbian policy towards Kosovo, Economides and Ker-Lindsey; on the multi-level governance of Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bache et al. (2011).

4. In the case of the Turkish Union of Chambers of Architects and Engineers (TMMOB), it is also an umbrella organisation for chambers of engineers and architects, so it also represents its member chambers.

5. The EU has targeted a 40 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions compared with 1990 levels by 2030: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/2030-energy-strategy

6. A procedure ensuring states take into account the environmental implications of their investment plans before finalising their decisions. Having the broadest environmental laws intertwined with other international and national environmental policies, the EU has a mix of mandatory and discretionary procedures to assess environmental impacts.

7. EU Directive (85/337/EEC) on the EIA was first introduced in 1985 and was amended in 1997. Following EU signature of the 1998 Aarhus Convention, it was amended again in 2003, and once more in 2009.

8. Considering the EIA’s narrow focus on investment decisions’ specific effects at the local level, in 2001 the EU came up with a broadened EIA to assess plans and programmes, the SEA (2001/42/EC), as a supplement to the Espoo Convention of 2013.

9. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice, or the Aarhus Convention, empowers the public to access information and participate effectively in decision-making on environmental issues (www.unece.org). Following its signing of the Aarhus Convention in 1998, the EU adapted the convention to the acquis. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, or the Espoo Convention, was adopted in 1991 and entered into force in 1997. At early stages of certain activities (e.g. nuclear power plant construction), the Espoo Convention obliges states to notify and consult each other to avert adverse environmental impact across borders (http://www.unece.org/env/eia/eia.html). The convention laid the foundation of the SEA.