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Abstract
This paper explores the most salient features of the reshaping of the state–territory–nation triangle in Serbia over the last 20 years, through the lenses of citizenship regime. It looks at the ways in which the dominant political narrative in Serbia has imagined political community and accordingly managed its members. During the period of violent Yugoslav break-up and Milošević's rule, the Serbian citizenship regime was surprisingly ‘civic’, while post-2000 liberalisation has introduced ethnic elements which are likely to be further strengthened. This apparent contradiction can be explained by the specific goals of Serbian political elites to maintain control over population and territory in changing political circumstances. I will argue that the legacy of different attempts at defining the relation between the Serbian state and the Serb people, coupled with the wider context of Yugoslav conflicts and post-conflict developments in the region, led to an unconsolidated citizenship regime in Serbia with varying and contested conceptions about how to achieve congruence of state, territory and nation.
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Acknowledgements
The financial support of the European Research Council (CITSEE, ERC 230239) in the preparation of this special issue is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes
1. For an overview of critiques directed at the concept of citizenship as universal political category, see Nash (Citation2000, pp.156–216).
2. Well-known theoretical models of ‘group-differentiated citizenship’ (Marion Young Citation1989), ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor Citation1994) and ‘multicultural citizenship’ (Kymlicka Citation1995) all call for re-conceptualisation of the classical model of national citizenship so that it could account for different identities. However, many have criticised these approaches for their effects on ethnification of politics and for what is perceived as devaluation of universal humanism (see Barry Citation2001, Cowan et al. Citation2001).
3. Despite the growing body of work pointing at either ‘devaluation of citizenship’ or different forms of transnational citizenship where the role of the states is becoming increasingly diminished (Spiro Citation2008, Soysal Citation1994, etc.), we cannot disregard the fact that citizenship status remains primarily regulated within the state framework.
4. On the interaction between regime elites and the masses in these events, see Vladisavljević (Citation2008).
5. Many of the growing grievances found their expression in the notorious Memorandum, the draft document of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts that was leaked to the press in 1986. Although it became common in the scholarly analysis of Serbian nationalism to portray the Memorandum as a document envisioning Greater Serbia's plans and providing ‘ammunition for Milošević's nationalist campaign’ (Lampe Citation1996, p. 6), much of these representations exaggerate the content of the text itself (but probably not the context of its production and consequent instrumentalisation). See more in Dragović-Soso (Citation2008, pp. 18–20).
6. The 1974 SFRY Constitution almost gave sovereignty to Yugoslav republics with similar competences, even to the Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The functioning of the confederal political system on the basis of ‘one republic one vote’ created a basis for the narratives of neglected Serb interests, given the fact that the Serbs constituted the largest ethnic group in the SFRY (some 36% of the total population), but more than a third of them (in 1981, 3 million of the over 8.1 million in total) resided outside the Socialist Republic of Serbia.
7. Commenting on newly installed constitutional arrangements that favoured dominant ethnic groups, often by denaturalising large numbers of residents (belonging to minor ethnic groups), while at the same time adopting large numbers of non-residents (of ‘appropriate’ ethnic origin), Hayden has nicely noted: ‘A better example of the power of the imagined community to destroy actually existing communities would be hard to find’ (1992, p. 666).
8. ‘The Republic of Serbia is a democratic state of all citizens living within it, founded upon the freedoms and rights of man and citizen, the rule of law, and social justice’ (art.1).
9. One way to understand the linkage between the centralisation of power and avoidance of open nationalistic rhetoric is to look at it through the prism of Gagnon's deconstruction of the idea that the wars in Yugoslavia were ethnic wars. He saw in Milošević's rule a continuation of practices previously used by the conservative elite in the SFRY: whenever threatened with new political forces with potential to take over its own privileges, the elite would de-legitimise them on the accounts of being nationalistic and secessionist (Gagnon Citation1995, pp. 130–166). Thus nationalism and secession were conveniently used as a pretext for greater centralisation and preservation of power, and in Milošević's Serbia even for military engagement. Higher ideological ends, seemingly above and beyond nationalistic aims would justify the concentration of all power. In the rhetoric of Serbian leadership and state-controlled media nationalism became the feature of others/enemies (‘separatist’ Slovenians, ‘irredentist’ Albanians, ‘fascist’ Croats or ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims) and openly endorsing its ‘qualities’ on the domestic terrain, in circumstances created by Milošević's way of ruling, would have had de-legitimising effects.
10. They could register as citizens, but they were required to make an application at the Federal Ministry of the Interior for ‘entry’ into the register of citizens provided they had lost another citizenship (art. 47). The application had to be made within one year of the date when the law came into force. However, they had difficulties in obtaining permanent residence (required for the entry into citizenship) in accordance with the laws at that time (Rava Citation2010, p. 9).
11. Some data indicate that only around a third of applications for citizenship status was accepted (Rava Citation2010, p. 9).
12. For more on refugee political preferences in Serbia, see Grujić (Citation2006).
13. On reasons and interpretations for evoking nineteenth century Serbia's state symbols, see Malešević (Citation2008).
14. Again, in art.1: ‘Serbia is a state of Serb people and all citizens living in Serbia’, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 98/2006.
15. It is mentioned three times in the Preamble: as having ‘substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia’ and: ‘from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations’.
16. Easy access to citizenship is also offered to emigrants from the territory of Serbia and their descendents (art. 18) and to all former citizens of Serbia who lost their citizenship, mainly due to former intolerance of dual citizenship (art. 34). And, finally, a foreigner (and his or her wife or husband) could be granted citizenship, without meeting any conditions, if considered to be in the interest of the state (art. 19).
17. It remains indicative that the President of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, was admitted to the citizenship of Serbia in 2007.
18. The status process negotiations began in October 2005. Since no compromise was reached after two years of negotiations, Martti Ahtisaari, in the role of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the future status of Kosovo presented in March 2007 the Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, the so-called Ahtisaari Plan, to the Security Council. Due to Russia's objections the negotiations continued but without any result.