The scissors and the magnifying glass: Internet governance in the transitional Tunisian context

Abstract

As the importance of online media content grows in Tunisia and as Internet infrastructure increasingly supplants or overlaps with traditional telecommunication systems, the issue of Internet governance has become a key component in understanding the media environment. This study investigates the structures undergirding the governance of the Internet within the context of political transition in Tunisia. These structures are identified as legal, institutional and architectural. The combined functions of these three structural levels (which are not necessarily coordinated) regulate the online landscape within the country including what users can see and do, how responsibilities and rights are distributed and how economic activities are coordinated.

Keywords:

• Tunisia
• internet
• censorship
• transition
• governance

Acknowledgements

Valuable guidance and comments for this paper were provided by Roxane Farmanfarmaian at Cambridge, Piers O'Hanlon at Oxford, and Vern Paxson at UC Berkeley. Any errors and omissions are solely attributable to the authors.

Funding

This research was funded by the University of Cambridge–al-Jazeera Centre for Studies Media Project. The authors would like to thank al-Jazeera Media Network for its generous support in making this research possible.

Notes

1. Instance National de Protection des Données à Charactère Personel (National Body for the Protection of Personal Data).

2. Interviewees:

Anonymous. 2014. “Engineer at Ooredoo.” By Author. Tunis, May 27.

Abdelaali, Nessima. 2014. “Secrétaire Générale, Instance Nationale de Protection des Données Personnelles.” By Author. Tunis, June 2.

Bejaoui, Wahid. 2014. “Chef de Département Radio, Orange.” By Author. Tunis, May 26.

Ben Hamida, Zaid. 2014. “Chef du Département Maintenance, Ooredoo.” By Author. Tunis, May 27.Ben Miled, Hela. 2014. “Membre Permanent – Magistrat, Instance Nationale de Protection des Données Personnelles.” By Author. Tunis, June 3.Ben Sassi, Souad. 2014. “Head of Department of International Cooperation and Communication, Centre National de l'Informatique, Ministère TIC.” By Author. Tunis, May 6.

Berrjab, Kaïs. 2014a. “Avocat.” By Author. Tunis, May 7.Brahem, Wajih. 2014. “Chef de Département Déploiement, Direction Réseaux et Services, Orange.” By Author. Tunis, May 26.

Chakchouk, Moez. 2014. “Directeur Général, Agence Tunisienne d'Internet.” By Author. Tunis, March 19–20.

Derbel, Mohamed. 2014. “Packet Core Manager, Ooredoo.” By Author. Tunis, May 14.

Ezzine, Naoufel. 2014. “Chef du Département Communication, Ooredoo.” By Author. Tunis, May 14.

Hamza, Marouen. 2014. “Direction Réglementation et Opérateurs, Orange.” By Author. Tunis, May 26.Jemai, Abderrazak. 2014. “Directeur Général, Centre National de l'Informatique, Ministère TIC.” By author. Tunis, May 6.

Louiz, Ghazi. 2014. “Directeur Exécutif Opérateurs et Projets, Ooredoo.” By Author. Tunis, May 23.

Maaouia-Mourali, Senda. 2014. “Chef du Départment Juridique, Orange.” By Author. Tunis, May 27.Rojbi, Tawfik. 2014. “Directeur Générale des Technologies et de la Communication, Ministère, TIC.” By Author. Tunis, May 6.

3. Instance Nationale des Télécommunications (INT) (2014). This number leaves out those individuals who get online through another person's device or who rely on publinets (Internet cafés).

4. Rijkers, Freund, and Nucifora (2014). It would be interesting to investigate whether this ownership transfer directly precipitated changes in decision-making and staffing in those firms. This would require further field work, perhaps looking at the background of top-level executives, which was not included within our study.

5. INT, Tableau de Bord de l'Internet.

6. Louiz. 2014. “Directeur Exécutif Opérateurs et Projets, Ooredoo.”

7. Ben Hamida. 2014. “Chef du Département Maintenance, Ooredoo.”

8. See: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/435052

9. See: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms675902%28v=vs.85%29.aspx

10. Ben Miled. 2014. “Membre Permanent – Magistrat, Instance Nationale de Protection des Données Personnelles.

11. Abdelaali. 2014. “Secrétaire Générale, Instance Nationale de Protection des Données Personnelles.”

12. Louiz. 2014. “Directeur Exécutif Opérateurs et Projets, Ooredoo.”

13. Maaouia-Mourali. 2014. “Chef du Départment Juridique, Orange.”

14. One complexity of the ATI is that it may be on the verge of being supplanted in favour of a new agency, the Agence Technique des Télécommunications (ATT). At the time of publication, the ATT, legally created in November 2013, was not yet operational (Ministère TIC 2013). Although there has been much discussion in the local media regarding what the exact role of this new agency will be, we have preferred to refrain from discussing the ATT in this paper in order to avoid undue speculation.

15. Chakchouk. 2014. “Directeur Général, Agence Tunisienne d'Internet.”

16. As a public relations scheme, the ATI gives access to a few devices in its basement, to ‘white hat' hackers. It is explained that as the ATI no longer retains an active license to this hardware, they cannot retrieve the data stored there, which are supposed to include lists of previously banned websites. According to Chakchouck, these servers contain no personal information (such as who was being spied upon), which he claims was erased in January 2011. However, it is not clear why the ATI would have erased all personal data – nor why they would not have retained an accessible list of blocked domains. Further research into this question would be of interest in order to reconstruct the interception practices of the old regime and the decisions made within the ATI during the transition post-2011.

17. http://www.ati.tn/TunIXP/tunixp2.html

18. Berrjab. 2014b. “Lawyer Specializing in Internet Law.”

19. Chakchouk. 2014. “Directeur Général, Agence Tunisienne d'Internet.”

20. Louiz. 2014. “Directeur Exécutif Opérateurs et Projets, Ooredoo.”

21. Anonymous. 2014. “Engineer at Ooredoo.”

22. Maaouia-Mourali. 2014. “Chef du Départment Juridique, Orange.”

23. Perhaps not too much should be imputed to political culture in this instance. ISPs operating in countries with a tradition of liberal democracy have been shown to cooperate with obscure state security services as well.