The West and Russia in the Mediterranean: Towards a Renewed Rivalry?

Abstract

While Russia during the Yeltsin period was largely relegated to a spectator role in the Mediterranean, under Vladimir Putin it has emerged as an increasingly significant player in the region. In particular in the energy and military sectors, Russia has shown a renewed interest in the Mediterranean and also stepped up its efforts to establish closer relationships with the countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea. This in turn has been of considerable concern to Western, and in particular European, countries, which at least to some extent have seen Russia's growing activism in the Mediterranean as a challenge to their interests. As a result, there now appears to be a renewed rivalry between Western countries and Russia in the region – rivalry predominantly over oil and gas supplies, as well as military cooperation, in particular arms sales, with the countries south of the Mediterranean. This renewed, but transformed, geopolitical contest between East and West seems to have been, at least to some extent, an empowering development for the countries along the southern rim of the Mediterranean, enhancing their leverage both vis-à-vis Western countries and Russia.

Notes

¹ Apart from Russia, China is also an increasingly significant player in the Mediterranean in a number of sectors. The focus of this article, however, is on the rivalry between Western countries and Russia and in the region.

² Some analysts have, however, argued that energy policy might be less-well integrated into Russian foreign policy than is commonly assumed. See, e.g., Levgold, 2008.

³ Russia's dismay at European countries’ diversification efforts in the gas sector were recently highlighted by the deputy chairman of Gazprom, Alexander Medvedev, at a conference on EU-Russian energy relations in Berlin. Medvedev called upon EU leaders to abandon their search for alternative providers, as these were essentially driven by political and not economic motives, and meant that Russia was not being treated as an ‘equal partner’ by the EU (RBK-Ukraina, 20 May 2009). According to Russia's current foreign policy concept, one of Russia's foreign policy goals its to strengthen relations with energy-rich countries such as Algeria or Libya, which are considered as ‘leading regional states’. See Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008.

⁴ This is not to suggest that this is the only reason for Russia's efforts to collaborate with Algeria in this area. According to Katz (2007) another important motive seems to have been to gain access to Sonatrach's expertise in the field of LNG.

⁵ The latter interpretation has been provided by some Russian experts. See Kommersant, 31 December 2007.

⁶ Algeria's refusal thus far to take part in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, which stands in contrast to all other southern Mediterranean countries except Libya, also testifies to Algeria's growing assertiveness vis-à-vis the EU. Also this policy has arguably also been a consequence of what Hakim Darbouche calls the ‘Russian syndrome’ (Darbouche, 2008).

⁷ Figures calculated on the basis of European Commission, 2009: 31.

⁸ Up until 2005, it was the fourth largest importer, behind Russia, Norway and Saudi Arabia.

⁹ Figures calculated on the basis of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer Database. The SIPRI Arms Transfer Database is available online at: http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

¹⁰ Figures calculated on the basis of SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.

¹¹ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.

¹² SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

¹³ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

¹⁴ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

¹⁵ Federal Register, vol. 72, no. 25 (Feb. 2007), Rules and Regulations, p. 5614.

¹⁶ SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.

¹⁷ Between 1991 and 1999, Russia sold Syria weapons worth around US$80 million, whereas during the 1980s, Soviet arms to Syria averaged about US$1.5 billion per year (figures calculated on the basis of SIPRI Arms Transfer Database).

¹⁸ This information is contained in the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.

¹⁹ SIPRI Arms Transfer database.

²⁰ For an overview, see Calleya, 2000.

²¹ In the terminology of Castells, one could argue that they control the ‘switches’ of flows, which according to him are the true seats of power (Castells, 1996: 471).

²² For a perspective on ‘postmodern geopolitics’ along these lines, see, e.g., Ó Tuathail (1998).