The EU's First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity

Abstract

This paper uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyse the EU's first policy reassessment in light of the Arab uprisings. COM(2011)200 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) claims to outline a new framework for EU Democracy Assistance (DA) based on a new conception of democracy, and a new position for democracy in the EU's external relations. The paper analyses PfDSP and one of its key antecedents, COM(2001)252, to assess this claim, focusing on the way two pillars of the debate on democracy – civil–political and socio-economic rights – are defined and how they are organized into a narrative about democracy and its promotion. This analysis suggests that the conceptual structure – and therefore policy implications – of PfDSP maintain unaltered the substantive vision of a liberal model for both development and democratization in the region. This continuity sets the EU up to repeat earlier mistakes, which resulted before 2011 in the poor reputation of the EU on democracy promotion among pro-democracy opposition groups – many of which were central to the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Patricia Bauer, Giuditta Caliendo, Annette Jünemann, Claudio Radaelli, Peter Seeberg, Ingeborg Tömmel, Ruth Wodak, the editors and to three anonymous reviewers for comments on elements of earlier versions of this article.

Notes

¹ European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 final; 8 March 2011.

² This phrase is most commonly used to designate the wave of anti-authoritarian protests which began in Tunisia in December 2010. Although frequently used, it is analytically questionable (see ElMahdi 2011). This article uses ‘Arab Uprisings’ instead, to comprise the failed, successful and ongoing revolt processes.

³ There are partial exceptions such as Pace (2006, 2007, 2011), Schmidt (2000, 2001, 2002) and Schmidt and Radaelli (2004). However, none of these analyses provide a close reading of texts showing the operation of linguistic constructs.

⁴ For an introduction to the methods of CDA and a review of the methodological debate, see Wodak and Chilton (2005); van Dijk (1993), and the contributions by Meyer, Wodak and Fairclough in Wodak and Meyer (2001).

⁵ Various labels which have been commonly deployed to describe the protests which began in Tunisia in December 2011, quickly followed by Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and other Arab states, including ‘Arab Spring’, ‘Arab awakening’ and ‘Arab uprisings’. Of these, this article adopts ‘Arab uprisings’ in recognition of their ongoing/incomplete nature, and in the attempt to avoid Orientalist connotations of ‘Spring’ and ‘Awakenings’ (for a discussion of these, see El-Mahdi, 2011).

⁶ Confidential interviews with EEAS officials, March 2010 and April 2011, and with former DG RelEx official March 2012; personal communication with former DevCo official, March 2012. There are several dimensions to the EEAS’ complexity, including the still ongoing necessary transition period to a more homogenous esprit de corps within a new institution, or, from an epistemic standpoint, the fact that several officials involved in designing Neighbourhood policy previously worked in DG Enlargement (as readily evidenced by the ENP's ‘acquis-centric’ logic).

⁷ The disarray EEAS still seems to find itself in after the merger of DG External Relations and parts of the Council structure which gave life to it – e.g. the lack of proper lines of responsibility or dialogue between formerly distinct groups of staff – has not helped address the lack of coherence in PfDSP.

⁸ For a general review of the commitment to democracy promotion in EU documentation focusing on the Lisbon Treaty, see Cardwell (2011).

⁹ Other relevant documents display similar properties, including Commission and Council strategy papers and evaluation reports COM(2003)104, COM(2004)373, COM(2006)726 or COM(2009)188/3, and Action Plans and Progress Reports for specific countries (available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm).

¹⁰ It also mentions, presumably as a suggested modus operandi, that the Commission ‘has its own instrument in the ‘social incentive clause’ in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which provides for additional preferences to be extended to countries honouring certain International Labour Organization (ILO) standards‘ (COM(2001)252: 8).

¹¹ It is important to note also that COM(2001)252 differentiates between CS and ‘social partners’, appearing to explicitly exclude trade unions from being classified as CSOs: ‘Other key players are the social partners (business, trade unions) and civil society organisations‘ (COM(2001)252: 8).

¹² It is worth noting that PfDSP is presented as ‘a qualitative step forward‘ in Euro-Mediterranean relations and in transition towards democracy. However, this change ‘can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms‘ (COM(2011)200 final: p. 1), i.e. this ‘qualitative step’ is in reality viewed as an acceleration of existing processes, as a quantitative change. An examination of PfDSP's other claims to innovation – primarily its focus on ‘deep democracy’ and its ‘more for more’ mechanism – reinforces this impression.

¹³ One element of apparent departure is the relative weight of elections in PfDSP: although ‘A commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections should be the entry qualification for the Partnership‘ (p. 5) this is the only mention of elections apart from in the summary of support offered to Tunisia. Having said this, electoral support is mentioned in the opening paragraph of Section 3 ‘Democracy and Institution-Building’.

¹⁴ Legislation on unionization and on advocacy NGOs in Egypt, for example, is so restrictive that several labour-focused groups have established themselves formally as legal firms (e.g. the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre and the Centre for Trade Union Workers’ Services).

¹⁵ For an early analysis, see Teti and Gervasio (2011).

¹⁶ For a review of the impact of EU trade policies on partner states’ social policies, see Kerremans and Orbie (2009).

¹⁷ It should also be noted that ‘social partners‘ and ‘trade unions‘ are never mentioned in the EU annual reviews of aid and external relations spending – which includes development instruments, as well as ENPI and EIDHR – nor are they ever mentioned in connection with democracy or human rights. Annual Reports are available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/index_en.htm (accessed 28 February 2012).

¹⁸ E.g. N. Pratt, Human Rights NGOs and the ‘Foreign Funding Debate’ in Egypt, mimeo.

¹⁹ On conditionality, see for example Pace et al. (2009); Schimmelfennig and Scholz (2008); Youngs (2009); Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). For a review of the ‘normative power’ debate, see Pace (2009).

²⁰ This confirms claims based on non-CDA analyses made, for example, in Pace (2011).