Scratching the Democratic Façade: Framing Strategies of the 20 February Movement

Abstract

This article tentatively assesses the role of the 20 February Movement in current Moroccan politics. Drawing on social movement theory, the analysis focuses on the ways in which the movement has attempted to challenge the legitimacy of the system in place. The article first provides a thorough description of the movement's characteristics. Subsequently, the frame analysis in the main part studies how the movement has sought to deconstruct the self-portrayal of the incumbent regime. It argues that the relevance of the challenge mounted by the 20 February Movement derives from its transgressions of red lines formerly delimiting political discourses in the kingdom.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Koenraad Bogart for his fruitful comments and constructive feedback on an earlier version of this article. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We are indebted to Nikolai Alber for his scrupulous editorial work as well as to Sophie Perl for her great proof-reading. Furthermore, we would like to thank everybody supporting the research conducted in Morocco; without their overwhelming help and our many stimulating conversations, this article simply would not have been possible. The research in Morocco was conducted in conjunction with the research project, ‘Challenges for Local Governance Institutions? Decentralisation in Morocco and Jordan’ at the SFB 700 ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood’, which is funded by the German Research Foundation.

Notes

¹ See http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature = player_embedded&v = b-sZmVioIOo (accessed 30 November 2012); and video documentation by the oppositional online journal Demainonline: http://www.demainonline.com/2012/05/29/slogans-anti-monarchistes-lors-de-la-manifestation-de-lusfp-a-casablanca/ (accessed 15 July 2012).

² In an obvious effort to regain control over political discourses after the first large-scale protests, King Mohamed VI in a public speech on 9 March 2011 announced that a referendum on constitutional reforms was to be held on 1 July 2011. According to the official counting, the changes were approved by 98 per cent of the voters. In the ensuing early parliamentary elections of 25 November 2011 the Justice and Development Party (PJD) won a plurality of the vote (the official turnout being 45 per cent), yet not the absolute majority in the new parliament comprised of 18 parties. However, in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution the PJD's leader, Abdelillah Benkirane, became prime minister. As the PJD had since its foundation in 1998 been the largest opposition party, the formation of a (coalition) government by a moderate Islamist party was seen by some observers as a marked change in Moroccan politics.

³ Some of the arguments in this article have been previously sketched in a German working paper (Hoffmann, 2011).

⁴ This is not to deny that social movements in western polities are also influenced by the behaviour of state authorities. As one scholar put it, ‘When confronted with protest behavior, government authorities have been shown consistently to apply some form of state repression – the magnitude of the application varying in accordance with the political-economic context involved’ (Davenport, 2005: xi).

⁵ The categories are derived from Johnston (2002: 73).

⁶ There have also been many protests in rural areas and urban slums (bidonvilles), which were staged autonomously or were not affiliated with the 20 February Movement. Yet the movement has repeatedly declared its solidarity with these struggles.

⁷ On movement of Unemployed Graduates in Morocco see Emperador Badimon (2011).

⁸ Desrues elaborates on this observation and argues for the existence of a new sociological generation with different forms of cultural expression, political activism and conceptions of religion. According to Desrues, this new generation is characterized by an enhanced degree of individualization, the question of inherited hierarchies, socio-economic frustration and the ability to harness new resources for mobilization, such as new information and communication technologies and a new historical configuration: the Arab Spring (Desrues, 2012).

⁹ If we were to investigate how the movement's activities had been reported by the Moroccan media, this would have significant methodological implications, because such analyses usually focus on how the media frame the movements. However, our analysis is built on the texts and symbols produced by the movement itself.

¹⁰ Being part of the international movement (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Citizens' Action), Attac Morocco has attracted people critical of the effects of neoliberal globalization, and has organized larger campaigns against the augmentation of prices and privatization of public services.

¹¹ Authors' interview with members of the Justice and Development Party, Midelt, 13 June 2011 and Rabat, 9 July 2011.

¹² See http://www.aljamaa.net/fr/document/4134.shtml (accessed 28 July 2012).

¹³ Literally, makhzen means magazine or depository. Today it usually refers to the Moroccan way of domination, wherein the dominator comprises the royal palace and powerful men close to it.

¹⁴ Authors' interview with a member of the Casablanca 20 February Movement, Rabat, 11 September 2011.

¹⁵ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/maroc-apres-le-suicide-de-amina-un-sit-in-con (accessed 15 July 2012).

¹⁶ Authors' interview with AMDH, Rabat, 8 September 2011.

¹⁷ See https://www.mamfakinch.com/feb20-casa-repression-sit-in-dimanche-matin (accessed 15 July 2012) [translation from original].

¹⁸ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/guantemara-liveblog-marche-vers-le-centre-sec (accessed 15 July 2012).

¹⁹ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/mamfakinch-calls-for-the-end-of-the-media-bla (accessed 15 July 2012).

²⁰ See https://www.mamfakinch.com/deces-de-kamal-omari-militant-du-20-fevrier-safi-suite-a-la-repression-de-dimanche/ (accessed 15 July 2012) and http://www.amdh.org.ma/fr/communiques/martyrs-20-fevrier (accessed 15 July 2012).

²¹ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/nous-sommes-le-lundi-23-mai-2011-et-jai-la-gu (accessed 15 July 2012).

²² See http://24.mamfakinch.com/les-methodes-policieres-marocaines-en-deux-ac (accessed 15 July 2012).

²³ See http://www.invest.gov.ma/?Id = 1&lang = en (accessed 15 July 2012).

²⁴ In 2010, Omnium Nord Africain (ONA) merged with Société Nationale d'Investissement (SNI), but remains a symbol of the royal implication in economies.

²⁵ Observed for example at a demonstration on 24 April 2011, Rabat. See http://www.larbi.org/post/2011/04/Live-Suivez-les-manifestations-du-24-avril-au-Maroc (accessed 15 July 2012).

²⁶ For a more detailed analysis of El Himma's role in Moroccan politics, see Dalmasso (2012).

²⁷ Apart from Mohamed Mounir Majidi, other representatives frequently denounced by protesters are Fouad Ali El Himma and the Fassi Fihri family.

²⁸ Leaflet issued by Co-ordination 20 February Movement Rabat, 13 August 2011.

²⁹ This phrase is the title of a book written by two French journalists, Catherine Graciet and Eric Laurent, and published in March 2012. Of course, this very critical publication has encouraged activists of the 20 February Movement to issue their more direct critique of the king. See https://www.mamfakinch.com/au-maroc-une-corruption-tres-royale/ (accessed 20 July 2012).

³⁰ Authors' interview with a member of the Casablanca 20 February Movement, Rabat, 11 September 2011.

³¹ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/feb20-khitab-rappel-de-la-liste-des-revendica (accessed 20 July 2012).

³² See http://www.larbi.org/post/2011/07/Les-slogans-20f%C3%A9vrier (accessed 28 July 2012).

³³ Being viewed as credible and legitimate representatives of the interests of broader segments of the Moroccan population has constituted one of the major challenges for the core activists, most of whom are middle-class intellectuals. The 20 February Movement has faced allegations of being an elitist group. For this reason, the movement is eager to link its protests with other – and at times even violent – struggles in rural or impoverished areas (Authors' interviews).

³⁴ For the Arabic version, see https://www.facebook.com/groups/MLEDM/doc/182441525128321/ (accessed 20 July 2012).

³⁵ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/feb20-khitab-rappel-de-la-liste-des-revendica (accessed 20 July 2012).

³⁶ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/communique-mamfakinchmamsawtinch-appel-aux-mi (accessed 20 July 2012) [translation from original].

³⁷ See http://24.mamfakinch.com/liveblog-referendum-constitutionnel-au-maroc-7770 (accessed 20 July 2012).

³⁸ Authors' interview with a member of 20 February Movement, Khenifra, 4 September 2011.

³⁹ Existed between September 1921 – May 1926, when the Riffians revolted and declared independence from the Spanish colony as well as from the Moroccan sultan.

⁴⁰ Authors' interviews with members of the 20 February Movement, Rabat, 17 August and 13 September 2011; Kouribga, 3 September 2011; Khenifra, 4 September 2011; Midelt, 18 November 2011.

⁴¹ Authors' interviews with members of the 20 February Movement, Rabat, 11 and 13 September 2011.

⁴² See http://www.bladi.net/moncef-belkhayat-polisario.html (accessed 30 March 2011).

⁴³ In order not to overstate the role of Kifaya, one has to note that its constituency was mainly composed of members of the urban middle class with little appeal to broader segments of society. Mobilization for the 2011 revolution in Egypt was achieved by at least two further movement currents, i.e. the ‘April 6 Youth Movement’ and the ‘We are all Khalid Said’ campaign. Finally, the Egyptian labour movement came to play a decisive role in the ousting of President Mubarak by staging mass strikes (Zemni et al., 2012).