Alliances of convenience: assessing the dynamics of the Malian insurgency

Abstract

This article analyses the precarious alliances concluded between insurgent groups in the context of the conflict in Northern Mali that began in 2012. Building on the literature on civil wars and social movements, it develops a mechanism-based approach that intends to shed light on the processes of alliance formation and disintegration that are taking place at the meso- and micro-levels of analysis. It shows that the solidity and durability of alliances in a civil war context strongly depend on the interplay of three intra-organizational and inter-organizational mechanisms (brokerage, competition and shifting alliance), which contribute to the shaping of complex local power games. While ideological compatibility facilitates alignment and organizational collaboration, alliances are first and foremost cemented or fissured through the changing short- and mid-term personal interests of a variety of actors, who try to adapt to a volatile context.

Notes

1. As most of these groups have French names, we retain the French acronym when it is used even in the English-speaking literature, but employ the English acronym when such an acronym exists (for instance AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).

2. Rebel groups are predominantly composed of Arabs and Tuareg. There are also some Fulani, Songhai, Peul members of these groups, although they are often in a minority position.

3. On the notion of personal authority, see Schlichte, 2009: 249.

4. Discussions started in 2012 in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso).

5. Several contradictory hypotheses exist to explain the creation of the MUJWA (The Moor Next Door, 2012).

6. The amenokal is the spiritual and moral chief of this noble Tuareg tribe, which counts among the most influential among Tuareg communities.

7. The HCA was originally an organization created by Mohamed Ag Intalla, Alghabass Ag Intalla’s brother, and supported by their father (Carayol, 2013).