Opposition inclusion and exclusion in the Arab world: Evidence from a new dataset

Figures & data

Table 1. Coding scheme of the Arab opposition power relations dataset.

Scale	Category	Description
1	Repressed	Ideological group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted repression by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power.
2	Informal toleration (powerless)	The ideological group holds no political power (or does not influence decision-making) at the national level of executive power – although without being explicitly discriminated against.
3	Formal recognition (powerless)	The ideological group holds no political power (or does not influence decision-making) at the national level of executive power but they are recognized as a legal political player in the form of a political party.
4	Junior partner	The ideological group participates as a junior partner in government.
5	Senior partner	The ideological group participates as a senior partner in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement.
6	Dominant	The ideological group holds dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of ‘token’ members of other groups who however do not have a real influence on decision making.
7	Monopoly	The ideological group holds monopoly over power in the executive to the exclusion of members of all other groups.

Source: Author.

Note: The coding scheme of the Arab opposition power relations dataset is a revised version of the Ethnic Power Relations dataset coding (Vogt et al., 2015). The original EPR coding uses ‘discriminated’ instead of ‘repression’. Discriminated is more appropriate for examining ethnic groups but repression is clearer since it indicates the direct exclusion including via the use of force, which is not that obvious with ‘discrimination’.

Table 2. Opposition power relations in 13 Arab countries.

	Liberal secularists	Exclusionary secularists	Participatory Islamists	Conditional Islamists		Total
Repressed	52 (33.3%)	8 (5.1%)	45 (28.8%)	19 (12.1%)		124 (19.8%)
Informal toleration (powerless)	20 (12.8%)	36 (23.1%)	28 (17.9%)	75 (48%)		159 (25.4%)
Formal recognition (powerless)	58 (37.1%)	104 (66.6%)	64 (41%)	46 (29.4%)		272 (43.5%)
Junior partner	12 (7.7%)	0	7 (4.4%)	12 (7.6%)		31 (4.9%)
Senior partner	13 (8.3%)	8 (5.1%)	11 (7%)	0		32 (5.1%)
Dominant	1 (0.6%)	0	1 (0.6%)	4 (2.5%)		6 (0.9%)
Monopoly	0	0	0	0		0

Source: Author.

Note: The raw numbers refer to group-country-year observations for each group over a twelve-year period.

Table 3. Change in opposition power relations per country and per group post-2011.

Change in power relations per country post-2011	Change in power relations per group post-2011
Change: Egypt (8) Libya (4) Morocco (1) Saudi Arabia (1) Tunisia (8) UAE (4) Yemen (7) No change: Algeria Bahrain Jordan Kuwait Qatar Syria	Liberal secularists: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen (9) Exclusionary secularists: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen (6) Participatory Islamists: Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen (12) Conditional Islamists: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen (6)
N = 7 countries with change N = 6 countries with no change	N = 33 changes in power relations for four ideological groups

Source: Author.

Note: In some countries, there was more than one instance of change in power relations for some groups in the same country during the twelve-year period under study.

Vogt, M., Bormann, N.-C., Rüegger, S., Cederman, L.-E., Hunziker, P., & Girardin, L. (2015). Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: The ethnic power relations data set family. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(7), 1327–1342. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715591215

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