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Abstract
It is believed to be common knowledge that history (in the sense of things done, in the sense of a collective singular) is suspended, that history is doomed to remain motionless. What is more, we all – or at least many of us – tend to believe that this precisely is how it should be: history, if such thing exists at all, has to stand still. It is against this backdrop that I wish to point out that there is a cultural phenomenon we should not leave unnoticed, namely, that a new quasi-substantive philosophy of history – operating with the notions of commemoration, trauma, and the sublime – sets history into motion again. It sets history into motion by reclaiming the monstrosities of the world, that is, by compensating for the rather one-sided attention paid to language in the last decades; and it sets history into motion despite the respect it seriously pays to the primary suspension of history.
Notes
1. See, for instance, Nancy (Citation1991a, Citation1991b, Citation2000). For an interpretation of Nancy as a philosopher ‘of the future,’ see Hutchens (Citation2005).
2. Indeed, the case is so regarding even historical approaches that were born out of a dissatisfaction with the neglect of the individual level, such as microhistory. See Magnússon and Szijártó (Citation2013).
3. The speculative/critical and the substantive/analytical distinctions were introduced by William Walsh and Arthur Danto, respectively. See Walsh (Citation1960, 9–28) and Danto (Citation1985, 1–16).
4. Cf. Danto (Citation1995).
5. There is nothing in the notions of presence and historical experience themselves which would inevitably lead to the direction I discuss in this essay. The road leading to the suspension of the suspension of history entails a stress on the ontological dimensions one attributes to the notions of presence and historical experience. However, by stressing the aesthetic dimensions of these notions, another road can be taken; a road that leads to the renewal of the philosophy of historiography, or, in a broader sense, considering non-academic forms as well, to the renewal of the philosophy of historical representation. While in this essay I do not wish to take any of these roads and only intend to register a remarkable phenomenon, the latter would be the road I have already taken (see Simon Citation2013). Finally, one last remark: taking any of these roads does not entail the complete rejection of theoretical insights associated with the lingustic turn; what they entail is rather a challenge only to the absolutism of language.
6. Certain aspects and elements of the theory that unfolds in this article can also be tracked in Runia's other essays. Apart from his already mentioned texts, see Runia (Citation2010a, Citation2010b).
7. In my brief and sketchy treatment of the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment and German Idealism, I am indebted to the interpretations of Miklós (Citation2011).
8. There are two things I would like to mention in relation to this assertion. The first is that Keith Jenkins, while reading and commenting upon an earlier version of this essay – for which I am very grateful – remarked that while I answer the ‘Why are we doing this?’ question, despite claiming so I do not really answer the related ‘Why now?’ question. I have to concede that he may be right: I do not explicitly discuss the issue. Nevertheless, I think that I give at least an implied answer, however vague it might be. It goes like this: if history is set into motion again as a compensation for the limitless playfulness of language and for the one-sided attention paid to it, then such compensation can take place only after experiencing a heyday of that exclusive attention paid to language. In other words, my implied and vague answer to the ‘Why now?’ question is that because this is the time that we have just experienced that exclusivity of attention, and because it is in doing so that we have become aware of its narrow confines. The second thing I would like to mention in relation to the assertion in the main text is that such compensation does not overrule or supersede whatever it compensates for. Consequently, no Derrida, Foucault, or any other intellectual hero of the last decades is to blame for anything for which the secondary suspension compensates, since this compensation does not challenge practically any system of ideas. What it might challenge is only the totality and universality claims of such systems of ideas.
9. In fact, Runia (Citation2007, 319) also does not hesitate to claim explicitly that ‘history really is before us’ (emphasis in the original).
10. Cf. Rüsen (Citation2004), LaCapra (Citation2007), and Roth (Citation2012).
11. In addition to the previous note, see Rüsen (Citation2003) and LaCapra (Citation2009).
12. Ankersmit makes use of the notion of sublime following Kant and Burke (but not Schiller) and disregarding contemporary interpretations of it. For a discussion of the sublime regarding historical writing which engages with its contemporary interpretations, see Kellner (Citation2009).
13. In reading my submission both referees of the journal – whose suggestions I am thankful – pointed out that my supposedly neutral attitude toward the phenomenon I describe might not be possible or even desirable. As for the question whether it would be possible, I wholeheartedly agree with the referees that it is not. Nevertheless, I still did not wish to take sides in the question in the sense that I do not wish to position myself neither in the camp of those who are enthusiastic about such a quasi-substantive philosophy nor in the camp of those who think that history does (and/or must) stand still. Everyone is free to read a position into my essay, and it is also not out of the question that subconsciously I have already taken sides. However, at the moment, and at least consciously, I just cannot decide whether the suspension of the suspension of history is desirable or not, and until I cannot do so, I do not wish to disclose anything, simply because I do not have anything to disclose of which I am aware. The best I can do is to say that my attitude toward the prospect of setting history into motion is just as ambiguous as Nancy's, in the same way as Referee 1 explained in their report: just like Nancy, we can be anxious about both the movement and the non-movement of history. The only thing that seems to be clear (to answer a question of Referee 1) is that the way in which Ankersmit and Runia set history into motion is, in my reading, definitely non-progressive, which might diminish the anxiety concerning the prospect of the movement of history.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon is a doctoral research associate at the Bielfeld Graduate School in History and Sociology. Reflections on the historical-theoretical ‘developments’ of the last decades are the prerequisite of his project of building a characteristically aesthetic theory of history revolving around a peculiar notion of historical experience. An outline of this project can be read in the Journal of the Philosophy of History (2013).