Michael Oakeshott and Hayden White on the practical and the historical past

Abstract

Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between the practical and the historical past has been the focus of much discussion in contemporary theory of history. This is primarily due to Hayden White’s appeal to Oakeshott’s distinction in several recent works. However, the philosophical underpinnings of Oakeshott’s distinction are seldom discussed. This essay provides a philosophical elaboration and critique of both Oakeshott’s distinction and White’s use of it. Oakeshott’s distinction is expounded as an integral part of his idealist philosophy. My contention is that in order to properly understand the distinction, we must first understand Oakeshott’s theories about different modes of understanding to which different kinds of past belong. Besides comparing White and Oakeshott, this essay will also develop a critique of the distinction between history and practice. The main claim of the essay is that there are important internal connections between history and practice that Oakeshott’s distinction neglects. In conclusion, I argue that the ethical and existential dimension of history can only be appreciated by dissolving Oakeshott’s absolute distinction between the practical and the historical past.

Keywords:

• Michael Oakeshott
• Hayden White
• practical past
• history
• historical understanding
• constructionism

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Kalle Pihlainen and the anonymous readers of this journal for valuable comments and critique.

Notes

1. In this essay, I will use ‘history’ and ‘practice’ primarily to denote different modes of understanding. ‘The historical past’ and ‘the practical past’ will be used to denote the different pasts that these modes of understanding create.

2. Oakeshott used the concept of ‘modes’ frequently in his early work, while ‘universe of discourse’ is primarily to be found in his later texts. See Oakeshott (1933, passim, 1983, 28, 48, 52, 57).

3. This would be a controversial claim about Oakeshott. Scholars on British idealism often emphasize that Oakeshott rejected positivism in history (Boucher 1984; Smith 1996; O’Sullivan 2003). This is not to be confused with the fact that Oakeshott’s understanding of natural science was indeed influenced by positivism (Podoksik 2004).

4. I cannot here go into the question of whether Oakeshott’s interpretation of Heidegger is viable.

5. A similar critique, directed at Oakeshott only, has been given by Rex Martin. However, Martin focuses more on the fact that historians must construct accounts which are intelligible to their audience (2005, 144–146).

6. This does not, of course, mean that we are entirely dependent on the agent’s self-understanding. We can legitimately ascribe intentions to people without their own consent. No matter what any particular member of the Nazi party was claiming, their acts themselves manifest the intentions of an organized plan for the destruction of entire populations.

7. As Pihlainen frames White’s general stance in this matter, ‘White is […] clear about the kinds of practical goals he sets for a politics of historical interpretation: enlightened historical representation aims at questioning oppressive power structures, ideologies and philosophies, and at emancipation and general well-being’ (2013, 522). The general idea here is that history needs to be reformed, not that it is impossible for history to become ‘ethically responsible’. In the latter case, enlightenment wouldn’t even be a meaningful goal.