Abstract
This essay is concerned with the moral oxygen for Islamist-inspired terrorism in Western countries, i.e. those supplying, often without knowing, the tacit support for both violence and the legitimacy of direct action in support of shared goals. The kinds of intervention needed to tackle terror plots directly will be distinctive and differ from those needed to address the problem of those who ‘look the other way’. But the effects of one kind of policy will often be felt, in some degree, by all Muslims. Some of the most sophisticated approaches to counter-terrorism are supposed to act with the precision of a slingshot, singling out the various targets in an accurate and predictable fashion. However, there has, in practice, been something of a boomerang effect, whereby counter-terrorism measures have spawned unintended side-effects which have swung back to damage the reputation of government and the security and intelligence communities. This article discusses these tensions and suggests new and innovative ways to maximise slingshot impacts while minimising, if not avoiding altogether, the public detriment created by boomerang effects.
Notes
1. This term was first used by the author in 2003 in a strand of policy work on extremism and radicalisation (The Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, Strategic Audit, 2003). The summary public report can be found on the PMSU website alongside summaries of the 2005 audit exercise and related assessment papers: www.strategy.gov.uk.
2. For example, the conceptual idea (and actual term) was extensively incorporated into a pair of unpublished reports by Oxford Analytica in 2004 and 2005 dealing with ‘The likely evolution of radical Islam in Western Europe’. This material has been more generally used in the published output of the National Intelligence Council, May 2005.
3. For a more extensive discussion of these themes, see the author's book, Pariah Politics (Citation2008).
4. See also Joppke's contribution to this volume.