Political opportunities, not migration flows: why the EU cooperates more broadly on migration with some neighbouring states

Figures & data

Table 1. Conditions and theoretical expectations.

Condition	Theoretical expectations
Migration Flow	If (a) a large number of asylum seekers come from a third country or (b) a third country can be regarded as a transit country to the EU, EU migration cooperation is expected to be broader.
Administrative Effectiveness	If the administration is capable in a third country, the EU is able to cooperate broadly with that country in the area of migration.
Existing Relations	The scope of cooperation is broad if the existing relations between the EU and a third country are close (or if a country is an accession candidate).
Democracy	If a third country is a democracy, the EU is expected to broadly cooperate on migration.
Economic Dependence	The EU’s scope of migration cooperation is broader, if a third country is economically dependent on the EU.

Table 2. Overview of operationalisation, data and calibration of the conditions^a.

Condition	Operationalisation/Data	Calibration
Migration Flow	Country of Origin, % of asylum seekers Transit Country, % of transit migrants per route (Frontex + Eurostat data)	Full membership (1–0.75): 4%, Crossover Point: 1%, Full non-membership (0.25–0): 0.37% Full membership (1–0.75): 5%, Crossover Point: 1%, Full non-membership (0.25–0): 0.00001% (combined with LogicalOR)
Administrative Effectiveness	World Bank Governance Indicator, Government Effectiveness, 0–100	Full membership (1–0.75): 75, Crossover Point: 50, Full non-membership (0.25–0): 25
Existing Relations	Indirect calibration: status as accession country, potential accession country, ECFR Scorecard, ENP Action Plan or not	Accession Candidate: 1.0 Potential Accession Candidate: 0.9 ECFR Scores: – 1.75 is 0.75 – 2.25 is 0.45 (Crossover Point) – 3 is 0.2 No ENP Action Plan: 0.0
Democracy	Freedom House Index, aggregate score, 0–100	Full membership (1–0.75): 73 Crossover Point: 50 Full non-membership (0.25–0): 28
Economic Dependence	Import, Export, FDI, ODA (share of total; EU DG Trade, OECD data)	Full membership (1–0.75): 66% Crossover: 35% Full non-membership (0.25–0): 15% (combined with LogicalOR)
Outcome: Cooperation Extensity	See Table 5 (online material) for a full overview	Indirectly calibrated in 0.2 steps (or 0.1 for strong bilateral relationships under EU auspices) for all the instruments

^a For an elaboration of operationalisation and calibration, refer to the online supplement material.

Table 3. Truth Table without Logical Remainders.

Migration Flow	Admin-istrative Effective- ness	Existing Relations	Demo-cracy	Economic Depen- Dence	Num. of cases	Outcome SCOPE	Cons- istency
1	1	1	1	1	5	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	3	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.9624
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.8601
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.838
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.8128
0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0.7543
0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.6321
1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.6175

All other combinations are logical remainders (full table in supplement material).

Table 4. Intermediate solution for presence of the outcome^a.

Solution Terms:	Existing Relations	Democracy AND Economic Dependence
Consistency	0.97	0.98
PRI	0.96	0.97
Raw Coverage	0.79	0.53
Unique Coverage	0.29	0.03
Cases	Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Kosovo, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine	Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Tunisia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Moldova, Turkey, Kosovo, Ukraine
Solution Coverage	0.82
Solution Consistency	0.96
PRI	0.94

^a I explain in the supplement material that there is model ambiguity and that I decided to analyse the results presented here for the intermediate solution.

Figure 1. XY-plot for scope and existing relations. Note: ‘SCOPE’ is the abbreviation for the outcome ‘Migration Cooperation Extensity’.

Figure 2. XY-plot for scope and democracy AND economic dependence. Note: ‘SCOPE’ is the abbreviation for the outcome ‘Migration Cooperation Extensity’.