Abstract
This essay explores the impact of Europe’s colonial past on the nature of the European Union’s engagement with Turkey as a candidate country, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It begins by arguing the European Union’s role as a normative power replicates a colonial trope of external engagement that assumes the world beyond the metropole is violent, barbaric and uncivil. Yet this perception is also self-referential whereby the “badness” of the colonized is meant to underline the metropole’s moral and material superiority. A similar assumption about the world that exceeds its territorial limits informs the “logic” of the European Union’s accession process as candidate countries like Turkey are expected to pursue and eventually embody European (“good”) values. In this regard, responding to Erdoğan’s severe crackdown on political dissent and civil liberties following a failed coup attempt in 2016, the European Union’s censorious rhetoric towards his “bad” conduct is expected and warranted. Yet, drawing on public statements made by the European Union justifying the eventual suspension of negotiations and accession talks with Turkey, this essay argues Erdoğan, as a “bad” leader, also helps furbish the European Union’s self-perception as a moral and ethical entity. That is to say, the “bad” Turkish leader serves as a contrasting background against which the European Union is able to present itself as a force for good.
Notes
1 Video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKN67ImpO4k.
2 It would be strenuous to claim here that the EU considers the uncivility of Erdoğan to be synonymous with the uncivility of Turkey as a whole. Nonetheless, Erdoğan’s (bad) politics has consequences for Turkey’s bid for EU membership.
3 I use quotation marks for “bad” and “good” to indicate subjective categorizations. This is not to say there is nothing bad about Erdoğan’s politics or anything good about the EU’s normative principles. The quotation marks are meant to underline that such categorizations can also a serve a political end.
4 However, the EU promotes its “good” values among its southern and eastern neighbours under the auspices of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
5 This does not mean that cultural concerns can be disentangled from economic concerns.
6 Following the 2018 general elections when Erdoğan pivoted Turkey to a presidential system and, as the President of Turkey, he assumed both executive as well as ceremonial duties.
7 As discussed later in this essay, this censorious rhetoric is particularly alarming considering that the EU–Turkey migration deal was signed a few months prior in March 2016. At the time, the deal was portrayed as form of collective action signifying further deepening of relations between Turkey and the EU (European Council Citation2016).
8 For a video of Verhofstadt’s speech delivered on 22 November 2016, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfTBSWv9Wf8.
9 A video of the speech delivered on 15 November 2017 is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zH8i5vD6nPU&t=38s.