Compromise, pluralism, and deliberation

Abstract

The pluralism that marks modern, pluralist liberal democracies makes compromise an attractive goal of democratic decision-making. Compromise differs from consensus in that it is viewed as sub-optimal by all parties relative to the disagreement at hand, but preferable to the absence of agreement, as long as that which is agreed to does not require by any party the sacrifice of a fundamental value. Voting does not vitiate the need for compromise in democracies, given that all practicable electoral systems are only imperfect ways of translating political preferences into democratic representation. What’s more, deliberation aimed at consensus is inappropriate, and potentially counter-productive, in the context of pluralist liberal democracies. Deliberation aimed at compromise, rather than consensus, should therefore be promoted and practiced in pluralist liberal democracies. It requires deliberative procedures distinct from those that characterize deliberation aimed at consensus, in that it requires of parties to a disagreement that they be transparent about their comprehensive conceptions of the good, in order to be able to measure the mutual concession that parties make to one another in deliberation.

Keywords:

• Compromise
• deliberation
• pluralism
• democracy

Notes

1. That this is starting to change is clear from a recent profusion of books on the topic. See for example, Margalit (2009), Wendt (2016), Ebeling (2016) and Rouméas (2016).

2. For a bracing dissenting note, see Brennan (2016).

3. This is clearly not to say that Waldron abstracts from institutional considerations in the rest of his work. Indeed, his recent Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions (Waldron, 2016) is a plea for a more institutionally grounded political theory.

4. For an attempt at formulating a voting system that accords equal representation to all voters, see Dummett (1997).

5. Much more needs to be said about the institutional settings that are most appropriate for democratic deliberation. In another paper, I have argued that political parties should be seen as important sites of deliberation aimed at compromise in a liberal democracy. See Weinstock (2015). See also Wolkenstein (2016).

6. Two anonymous referees of this article have pointed out that the list of options upon which my argument is premised leaves out a fourth option that has been prominent in the recent literature in democratic theory, that of ‘agonistic’ democracy. This conception finds value in the conflictual nature of democratic institutions and interactions, and finds fault with conceptions that read this dimension of democratic life out of the theoretical picture. In a nutshell, my view is that agonistic theory is not a theory of democratic decision-making, but rather a theory of democratic procedures. For an important statement of the agonistic position, see Mouffe (2013).

7. For a spirited defense of modus vivendi in contexts of pluralism, see McCabe (2010). The ‘realist’ justification of modus vivendi is provided by a number of authors, including Rossi (2010).

8. There are obvious policy convergences between the view defended by Okin (1999) and Miller (2016).

9. The idea of ‘incompletely theorized agreements’ was developed by Sunstein (1995).

10. On the importance of trust in pluralist liberal democracies, see Weinstock (1999).

11. This notion is central to Élise Rouméas (2016) account.

12. There is thus an ideal-theoretical dimension to the view of deliberation and compromise being defended here. Despite its being grounded in citizens’ actual beliefs and values, it is therefore not compatible with the so-called ‘realist’ program in contemporary political philosophy. On this point see Rossi (2013).

13. I am thinking here in particular of the work of, among others, John Parkinson and of Robert Goodin. See Parkinson (2006, 2012) and Goodin (2008).