Charles Beitz’ idea of human rights and the limits of law

ABSTRACT

In this contribution, I challenge Charles Beitz’ account of international human rights law within his practical account of human rights. Throughout his path-breaking book, Beitz insists that the predominant human rights practices are political rather than legal at the global level, which has important implications for the structure and content of his account. Yet, the criteria used to reach that conclusion concentrate on issues of effectiveness and compliance. I show that this lens leaves out important aspects of the current legal practice of human rights. More precisely, I argue that that practice’s overarching and distinctively legal function of human rights is to facilitate the consideration of supranational decisions and norms by domestic authorities, which requires significant procedural conditions established by states. I illustrate this function by looking at the ‘follow-up procedure’ that states have established (with the support of UN agencies) when a decision from UN treaty bodies is rendered against them. I also explain how this function is shaped by the broader relationship of the state with international law defined by the constitutional order. I finally draw some implications of my critique for the Beitzian model of human rights and its practice-centered methodology.

KEYWORDS:

• Human rights theory
• human rights practice
• Charles Beitz
• law
• UN treaty bodies

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to David Álvarez for inviting me to contribute to this special issue and to the participants in the special session on Charles Beitz’ monograph at the Braga Meetings in Ethics and Political Philosophy in June 2019. In particular, I wish to thank Charles Beitz and Jiewuh Song for very helpful remarks on the draft I presented there and an anonymous reviewer from the journal for very insightful comments on my manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No conflict of interest was reported by the author

Notes

1. Until today, six out of eight bodies have developed a formal follow-up procedure: Human Rights Committee (HRC); Committee on Elimination of the Racial Discrimination (CERD); Committee against Torture (CAT); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED); Committee on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

2. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 639. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/103 (last accessed 8 October 2019).

3. The 8 bodies are Human Rights Committee (HRC); Committee on Elimination of the Racial Discrimination (CERD); Committee against Torture (CAT); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); Committee on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); and Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

4. See in particular: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). National mechanisms for reporting and follow-up. A Practical Guide to Effective State Engagement with International Human Rights Mechanisms. New York and Geneva, 2016. HR/PUB/16/1. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_PUB_16_1_NMRF_PracticalGuide.pdf (last accessed 8 October 2019).

5. Sixth periodic reports of the Russian Federation, 20 December 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/6, p. 7.