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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Al Mele, Derk Pereboom, Eleonore Stump, and David Widerker for excellent comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I owe a special debt of gratitude to John Martin Fischer for his thorough comments and generous support.
Notes
1. I first introduced the challenge for Fischer and Ravizza's view that I will focus upon in this paper in an earlier publication (see McKenna Citation2000). In it I did not develop the point, nor did I offer the solution to it that I offer here.
2. As Fischer and Ravizza observe (Citation1998, 67–68), merely increasing the number of sufficient reasons in a larger class of possible worlds will not help. Suppose that the Edwina would not helped Edward only if he was wearing a Yankee's hat, or had just previously been singing a Beatle's song, or instead, smelled like garlic at the time. This 'pattern' of reasons would be just as perverse as would be the thought that the only reason to help toeless Edward is that he is wearing a Yankee's ball cap.
3. Fischer himself recognized these problems in Fischer Citation(1994), in which he presents weak reasons-responsiveness as a ‘first approximation’ to a fully adequate account of the sort of reasons-responsiveness involved in moral responsibility (1994, 168, especially footnote 8, the text of which appears on page 243). A critical discussion is presented in Peter Van Inwagen (1997); for Fischer's reply, see Fischer Citation(1998).
4. Fischer and Ravizza advise an idealized, sane and reasonable third-party interviewer as a modest test to ensure that the pattern is not bizarre but meets objective criterion. This will show that the agent is ‘in tune’ with reality (1998, 71–73).
5. Al Mele Citation(2000) criticizes Fischer and Ravizza on similar grounds. For Fischer's reply see Fischer Citation(2000).
6. In personal correspondence Fischer has acknowledged this point.
7. As Al Mele has pointed out in conversation, specifying how much weaker the reactivity component must be in relation to the reactivity component is a tall order. Since Fischer and Ravizza mean to give an account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for guidance control, this has to be hammered out. One suggestion for Fischer and Ravizza would be to make the reactivity component strong enough to defeat the sorts of charges brought to light here. However strong that has to be, it can still be weaker than the receptivity component is.
8. Ishtiyaque Haji (Citation1998, 81–83) develops a thoughtful account of reasons-responsiveness similar in many respects to Fischer and Ravizza's. There, Haji suggests that in assessing the same reason, one could alter background belief contexts. This is very similar to the point I am making here.
9. I am thankful to Ish Haji for drawing my attention to this last point.
10. This point is one Derk Pereboom and I considered over the course of several conversations. I am in his debt for helping me to formulate it.
11. This point is one Al Mele and I considered over the course of several conversations. I am in his debt for helping me to formulate it.
12. In a work in progress, ‘Expressive theories of responsibility and an agent meaning theory,’ I have sketched an account for the proper sorts of standards for sameness of mechanism. I attempt to do this in terms of the sort of interpretive scheme morally competent agents might apply to understanding how their actions and others' can be understood as exemplifying moral quality of will.
13. My formulation of this point is inspired by a recent conversation with Nomy Arpaly.