Fiscal federalism and the politics of immigration: Centralized and decentralized immigration policies in Canada and the United States

Abstract

Why would immigration policy be centralized or decentralized in a federal system? What incentives do political actors at the central and sub-central levels of government possess vis-à-vis immigration policy? Taking account of the growing need to make sense of the unique features of immigration policy in a federal system (e.g. the mobility of labor, regional and national identities), and the unique challenges to federalism posed by immigration (e.g. public policy co-ordination, social cohesiveness), this paper advances a general theory of immigration politics in federations. It then illustrates this theory through discussion of two empirical cases: Canada and the United States.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Erik Wibbels, Johanne Poirier, Nathalie Jouant, Nadine Fabbi and Phil Shekleton for helpful comments and research support. Prior versions of this paper were presented at conferences organized by COMFED, the Université Libre de Bruxelles and the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States. The authors would like to thank those organizations, as well as the Canadian Studies Center at the University of Washington, for providing a stimulating research forum.

Notes

1. A free-flowing labor market can be considered a public good, because its “consumption” is non-excludable and non-rival.

2. While most EU member states no longer have mutual border controls for short-term travel, they still maintain their own, individual immigration controls for longer-term entrants. The EU has made small steps towards a common immigration policy in recent years, but such a policy is still far from being centralized (see Givens and Luedtke 2004).

3. For instance, while the European Union has moved towards a common border guard in recent years, most aspects of border policing are still left up to national governments.

4. Though it should be noted that Quebec selects numbers of specific immigrants based on a national, overall numerical target set by the federal government (which we would argue is more of a control issue, of course).

5. For a discussion, see Neuman 1993.

6. In 2000, Senator Dianne Feinstein of CA co-sponsored legislation to increase the number of H1B visas available to skilled workers in order to meet industry needs. For information see: http://feinstein.senate.gov/releases00/competitiveness_act.html (accessed February 2, 2005).

7. Though the other provinces have obtained far less leeway than Quebec in selecting economic immigrants, under the aforementioned Provincial Nominee program.

8. For more discussion of the Australian case, including the relative weight of market-preserving and nation-preserving imperatives on policy outputs, see Baringhorst 2004.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Graeme Boushey

Graeme Boushey is a PhD candidate in political science and a graduate fellow with the Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the University of Washington. His research focuses on policy diffusion in federations, with a particular focus on state policy innovation and adoption in the United States.

Adam Luedtke

Adam Luedtke is an assistant professor in political science at the University of Utah. His research focuses on immigration policy in the developed world, with a particular focus on immigration policy at the supranational level in the European Union.