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Abstract
When national governments support homogenising religious programs within plural populations, scholars are called to pay close attention to the subsequent interactions between state power and religious projects/actors. This article responds to this need by providing a sub-national perspective on Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI), a national body seen by some as a state-supported homogenising project. Based on fieldwork in the Indonesian cities of Tasikmalaya and Malang, the article describes the ideological diversity that exists between the central MUI and its regional branches. In the regions, the MUI is supported financially by regional governments, and in this way, its branches are shaped by local political conditions rather than by allegiance to ideological programs promoted from the centre. The authors observe the openness of the Tasikmalaya MUI to a wide range of Islamic movements, and contrast this with the ideological homogeneity of Malang's MUI, where the regional government is intent on restricting Islamic programs that threaten religious and social diversity. The contrasting religio-political positionings of the regional MUI signal the ideological heterogeneity to be found within the Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council and shed light on the importance of sub-national factors in shaping Indonesia's institutional responses to religious diversity.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the many academics, Islamic leaders and MUI officials in West and East Java, too many to name individually, who graciously assisted us in our research. The authors also extend their gratitude to Professor Merle Ricklefs and Dr Melissa Crouch, who were kind enough to give comments on an earlier version of the paper. The authors remain responsible for all deficiencies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
[1] The municipal/regency level consists of governments with jurisdiction over the administrative entities known as kota (city) and kabupaten (regency).
[2] Sukarno's Pancasila model was inclusive because it performed a number of equalisations between, for example, ethnicities and monotheistic religions. Yet, some groups were marginalised by the doctrine, notably followers of indigenous belief systems. A useful overview can be found in Kipp and Rodgers (Citation1987).
[3] A representative picture of Islamic diversity in the two regions is conveyed in Hefner (Citation1987) and Ricklefs (Citation2012) for East Java, and Mutaqin (Citation2014) and Newland (Citation2000) for West Java.
[4] The fatwa may be read in Chapter I of Sekretariat MUI (Citation2011).
[5] We consulted two sets of largely similar MUI fatwa-making regulations: ‘Guidance for Identification of Deviant Currents’ dated 6 November 6 2007 published in Sekretariat MUI (Citation2008); and ‘Guidance and Procedure for Making Fatwa’ dated 16 December 2003 published in Sekretariat MUI (Citation2011).
[6] A further example of clashes between regional and Central MUI fatwa is described in Bowen's (Citation2003, 231–33) discussion of a 1990 Acehnese MUI fatwa on women's attire.
[7] 1 USD = 13,160.16 IDR (as at 18 March 2015). Our research has convinced us that the funds provided for the Tasikmalaya municipal MUI over recent years have been higher than the corresponding funds made available in Malang. Our convictions about the accuracy of the figures quoted here, however, are qualified. We could obtain no documentary accounts of the payments, but received these figures in conversations with people well-placed to provide the information. Because the figures are basically recollections produced ‘on the spot’, their accuracy is questionable. Furthermore, comparisons of raw figures for annual allocations have limited value because governmental assistance to the regional MUI takes many forms, and includes assistance such as the provision of office space and cars.
[8] Nahdlatul Ulama (The Rising of the Scholars) is a national organisation formed as a response to Islamic reformism in 1926. Its leaders are based in Indonesia's Islamic schools (pesantren). The organisation advocates for the aspirations and religious styles of Indonesia's massive traditionalist Islamic community.
[9] At the time of writing, the membership of Tasikmalaya's current municipal MUI executive reflects West Java's fragmented Islamic public sphere, including figures from NU, Muhammadiyah, The Islamic Association (Persis), The Onset of Illumination (Mathla’ul Anwar), The Association for the Islamic Community (PUI), Association for Islamic Education (Perti), The Congregation of Good Relations (Al-Jam‘iat Al-Wasliyah) and the Islamic Association (Sarikat Islam).
[10] This East-Java based movement is described in Zamhari (Citation2010).
[11] A recent example has been the public attacks on the infrastructure of the Idrisiyyah sufi order by mobs accusing the sufi order of propagating ‘deviant’ teachings (Kompas, 27 April 2013). The group has suffered a campaign of intimidation by activists of the Islamic Defenders’ Front. Some of these activists are active within the MUI.
[12] The figure of 100 million rupiah (10,000 USD) was mentioned to us. The funds for the socialisation of the law trickled down to MUI actors at lower levels.
[13] Some MUI personnel disagreed with the exclusion of groups other than NU and Muhammadiyah. Others supported it, expressing dislike for groups they labelled as ‘hard’ (keras).
[14] Muslim and Christian leaders in Malang have on occasion collaborated to contain disputes about insults to religion (Crouch Citation2014, 154–56).
[15] A recent, typical example indicates the kind of situations to which we are referring here. On 25 March 2012, the Party of Liberation (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) planned to hold a preaching event at a village in Ajung, Jember in protest against the changes to government policy on fuel subsidy. Thousands of ‘helpers’ (banser) from the Ansor Youth Movement assembled at a nearby pesantren, compelling local police to prevent the preaching event from proceeding (Jawa Pos, March 27, 2012). Nathan Franklin (Citation2009) was an observer to a similar case of impending violence between polarised religious groups in East Java.
[16] This does not mean that the MUI-municipality relationship is always harmonious. Under the previous mayorship of Peni Suparto, the MUI opposed a controversial mall development supported by the municipal government. That tension prevented the mayor from attending many religious events.
[17] Regency MUI are generally more interventionist in the public sphere than municipal ones. Existing research indicates that governments of municipalities (kota), and the MUI which depend on them, work harder to prevent overt religious conflict than their neighbouring residential (kabupaten) governments. Governments of municipalities such as Malang and Bandung need to preserve economic status quos in which diverse social and religious segments make meaningful contributions (see Millie and Safei Citation2010).