Strategic races: understanding racial categories in Japanese-occupied Singapore

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Japanese policies toward different races (minzoku) in Singapore during the Second World War. These policies, which victimized the Chinese community and appeared to favor others such as the Malay and Indian communities, fostered inter-racial resentments that would persist long after the war. Drawing on internal occupation guidelines produced by the Japanese state and the accounts of the administrators who implemented them, this paper shows that the treatment of the Chinese community was in fact a direct result of the perceived significance of these groups to the success or failure of Japan’s wartime imperial project in Southeast Asia. Groups whose importance the Japanese initially dismissed, however, had greater freedom to chart their own destinies and demand Japan live up to its promise of an “Asia for Asians” as the war progressed.

KEYWORDS:

• Singapore
• Japanese empire
• overseas Chinese
• Etnic Governance
• Nationalism

Acknowledgments

This article is based on research conducted for my doctoral dissertation, which was supported by a Mellon Travelling Fellowship from Columbia University, a Fulbright Grant from the Institute of International Education, and a Junior Fellowship in Japan Studies from the Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Further research was supported by a Postdoctoral Fellowship from Yale-NUS College. I am grateful for the detailed comments of the anonymous reviewers who read my manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 92.

2. Before the Japanese invasion, British Malaya, a collection of colonies and protectorates, was administered by more than 1,600 British civil servants and support staff. See Malayan Establishment Staff List. The first Japanese plan for the occupation of the territory, produced by an ad hoc research group working for the Army General Staff, suggested that a military administration could govern this diverse territory and its more than five million inhabitants with 345 Japanese staffers based in Singapore and a handful of others based in the different Malay states. Sanbōhonbu Daiichibu Kenkyūhan, Eiryō Marai gunsei jisshi yōkōan, 1840–1842. Col. Watanabe Wataru (渡辺渡), one of Japan’s early administrators in Malaya, requested five hundred additional administrators, but he only received twenty-five and was encouraged to recruit an additional fifty on his own. Akashi, ‘Colonel Watanabe Wataru,’ 36. By the end of 1942, however, it became apparent to the Southern Expeditionary Army that they had grossly underestimated the manpower they would need to govern Southeast Asia, and by the end of that year they requested that more than 2,500 new administrators be sent to Malaya and Sumatra alone. Gunseisōkanbu, “Gunseisōkan shiji,” 305.

3. These particular quotations are taken from the agreement between the civilian government and the military that served as the foundation for occupation policy throughout Southeast Asia. Daihon’ei Seifu Renraku Kaigi, Nanpō senryōchi gyōsei jisshi yōryō, 333.

4. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 95.

5. For more information on the growth of these cities and their role in the colonial system in Southeast Asia, see Huff and Angeles, “Globalization, industrialization and urbanization in Pre-World War II Southeast Asia.”

6. See, for instance, Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power.

7. Manickam, “Bridging the race barrier,” 369–371.

8. Manickam, “Common ground,” 595.

9. For a detailed discussion of the complexities of these terms, how they have both shaped the construction of modern Japanese-ness, and how the association of ‘racial discrimination’ (jinshu sabetsu 人種差別) with jinshu instead of minzoku functions to obscure racism against Korean and Chinese residents in Japan today, see Kawai, “Deracialised race, obscured racism.”

10. For a detailed discussion of the importance of the concept of ‘civilizational development’ (mindo), and the perceived role of ‘spirit’ (seishin) in Japan’s developmental successes, as justifications for Japanese administrative policies in wartime Southeast Asia, see Nakano, Tōnan ajia senryō to Nihonjin, 99–101.

11. Gunseisōkanbu, “Gunseisōkan shiji,” 294.

12. For instance, see Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore; Cheah, Red Star over Malaya; Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya; Abu Talib, The Malay Muslims, Islam and the Rising Sun; Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars; Blackburn and Hack, War Memory and the Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore; and Rai, Indians in Singapore, 1819–1945.

13. These authors have all published extensively in Japanese, but some of their work has also been translated into English in Akashi and Yoshimura, eds., New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation.

14. This is particularly clear in the account of Col. Ishii Akiho, who was closely involved in the later stages of the planning process. Ishii, “Nanpō gunsei nikki,” 443–452.

15. To quote Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama Hajime during a liaison conference meeting on November 20, 1941, when the empire formally adopted the military’s plans for the occupation of Southeast Asia. Jyūichigatsu hatsuka, Daishichijyūkai renrakukaigi, 681–682.

16. Sanbōhonbu Daiichibu Kenkyūhan, Nanpō sakusen ni okeru senryōchi tōchi yōkōan, 1788–1789.

17. Akashi, “Japanese policy,” 61.

18. Daihon’ei Seifu Renraku Kaigi, Kakyō taisaku yōkō, 183.

19. Ibid.

20. Takase would also claim, in an interview with Japanese historian Akashi Yōji two decades after the war, that they had drafted the ‘Principles’ on December 28, 1941, in Taiping, Malaya, and that the liaison conference guidelines were based on their draft. Akashi, Nihon senryōka no Eiryō Maraya/Shingapōru, 41.

21. Dainijyūgogun Gunseibu, Kakyō kōsaku jisshi yōryō, 79–80.

22. Ibid., 81.

23. Ibid., 82. While Akashi Yōji seems to translate this phrase as ‘a basic driving force in Japan’s major policy,’ here I have attempted to capture the overwrought prose found in documents associated with Watanabe and Takase. Akashi, “Japanese policy,” 70.

24. Ibid., 71–73.

25. For an extremely in-depth description of the relationship between the SCCC and these other associations, see Leong, “Sources, Agencies, and Manifestations.”

26. Tan, “History of the formation of the Oversea Chinese Association,” 2.

27. Akashi, Nihon senryōka no Eiryō Maraya/Shingapōru, 45. For Ōtani’s place within the administration, see Hata, Nanpō gunsei no kikō/kanbu gunseikan ichiran, 59–60.

28. Shingapōru Shiseikai, Shōnan Tokubetsushi shi, 35.

29. Akashi, “Japanese policy,” 88–89.

30. Instances of the term domin (土民) can be found in many of the planning documents cited in this paper, including the Eiryō Marai gunsei jisshi yōkōan, the Nanpō sakusen ni tomonau senryōchi tōchi yōkō, the Nanpōgun gunsei shikō keikaku (an), and the Nanpō senryōchi gyōsei jisshi yōryō. Generally, it is used to refer to native military and security forces. References to dochakumin (土着民) can be found in the Eiryō Marai gunsei jisshi yōkōan, which specifically contrasts them with the overseas Chinese (kakyō 華僑). The term dokō (土侯) is used in the Eiryō Marai gunsei jisshi yōkōan and in many documents produced after the British surrender.

31. Nanpōgun Sōshireibu, Nanpōgun gunsei shikō keikaku (an), 77–79.

32. Dainijyūgogun Shireibu, “Dainijyūgogun gunsei jisshi yōkō,” 280.

33. Nanpōgun Sōshireibu, 59–60. Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, Nanpō sakusen ni tomonau senryōchi tōchi yōkō, 173.

34. Fujiwara was also tasked with liaising with anti-British elements among the overseas Chinese but had little success. After a confrontation with hardliners in the 25^th Army over the treatment of Chinese residents in Malaya during the first weeks of the invasion, Fujiwara “declared that his organization would henceforth assume no responsibility for Chinese affairs.” Akashi, “Japanese policy,” 62–63.

35. Fujiwara, F. Kikan, 41.

36. Cheah, Red Star over Malaya, 114.

37. Mustapha, Memoir Mustapha Hussain, 233–235. Ibrahim’s story was atypical. By the summer of 1942 the Japanese administration had disbanded the KMM and most of its members had left Shōnan to live quietly in rural Malaya. Cheah, Red Star over Malaya, 108–109.

38. For more on Ibrahim and radical Malay nationalism before, during, and after the war, see Aljunied, Radicals.

39. Cheah, Red Star over Malaya, 15.

40. Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia, 93.

41. Lebra, The Indian National Army and Japan, 81–99.

42. Nanpōgun Sōshireibu, 59–60; Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, 173; See also address by the “President of the Johor Religious Department,” translated and quoted in Abu Talib, The Malay Muslims, Islam and the Rising Sun, 218–219.

43. Aside from Ibrahim and KMM member Ishak Haji Muhammad (better known as Pak Sako), the council included Mohammed Gaus Mahyuddin as well as Malay leaders Daud Mohd. Shah, and Zainal Abidin Ahmad (Za’ba), Bugis leader Haji Amboo Sooloh, Arab leaders and associates Syed Ahmad Mohamad Alsagoff, Syed Hussein Ali Alsagoff, and Wanjor Abu Bakar, and South Asian Muslim leader Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaik Ismail, known popularly as Dr. S.I.M. Ibrahim. “Syonan Muslims Pledge Loyalty.”

44. These top-secret reports were issued to leading members of the Malayan Military Administration once a month, and summarised the various issues the administration faced in Singapore and Malaya. Kurasawa, Hiroku: Senji Geppō/Gunsei Geppō, Vol. 1, 18–19.

45. “Malays, Arabs Start Functions Today.”

46. “Deputy Mayor Praises Malai Footballers’ Prowess.”

47. “Malai Kosei Kyokai Formed in Syonan.” Mahjudin Gaus, M. Gausu kaisōroku, 89.

48. “Untitled,” June 21, 1942.

49. Shinozaki, Syonan – My Story, 63–64.

50. “Indian Independence and Local Muslims.”

51. “Untitled,” July 21, 1942.

52. S. Haque, “Hindu-Muslim Unity Goal of All True Indian Patriots.”

53. Judging from the tone of this piece it was probably written by Eurasian editor C.N. Leembruggen. “Indian Independence and Local Muslims.”’

54. “Way Paved for Muslims to Join the IIL.”

55. “Simple Yet Impressive Ceremony at Kokaido.”

56. “Muslims Joining Indian Independence League.”

57. Shinozaki recalls that Anwari was imprisoned, though he does not elaborate on what specifically led to this. Shinozaki, Syonan – My Story, 64. There seems to have been a short-lived North Indian Hindu Association formed in March 1942, but it is only mentioned once in the Syonan Times. “North Indian Hindus Pledge Co-Operation.” Rajesh Rai also points to evidence that the IIL was directly involved in shutting down “Muslim League branches” in Malaya, and that it viewed the Tamil Reform Association, which remained defunct throughout the occupation, with hostility. Rai, Indians in Singapore, 219.

58. Evidently a few Muslim participants in the rally had flown religious flags that several Hindu participants perceived as being “antagonistic to the interest of India as a whole.” “’No Independence Without Unity’: Mr. S.C. Goho.”

59. While this story has been told many times before, Rai, Indians in Singapore, offers a particularly helpful account for scholars interested in Bose’s time in Singapore.

60. Shamsul, “A History of an Identity, and Identity of a History,” 365.

61. Daihon’ei Seifu Renraku Kaigi, Jikyoku ni tomonau Yudayajin taisaku, 30–32.

62. Kurasawa, Vol. 4, 198–199.

63. Albert Lelah and his brother attempted to use this confusion to avoid detention by the police, identifying themselves as Iraqis to the Japanese authorities. Unfortunately, they were unaware that the Kingdom of Iraq had declared war on Japan during the Malayan Campaign, and were interned even earlier than the other men in the Jewish community. Lelah, Reel 5.

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Clay Eaton

Dr. Clay Eaton is a lecturer in the Department of Japanese Studies at the National University of Singapore. He was previously a postdoctoral fellow at Yale-NUS College. He is a historian of empire with a particular interest in the social and political effects of imperial policy. He received his doctorate from Columbia University and his dissertation, Governing Shōnan: The Japanese Administration of Wartime Singapore, analyzed the relationships between Japanese administrators and the various local figures they compelled to help them govern this occupied city.