From Ethics to Aesthetics: A Reconsideration of Buddhist Monastic Rules in the Light of Michel Foucault's Work on Ethics

Abstract

This article considers the recent debate over the nature of Buddhist ethics largely conducted by scholars who have argued in different ways that Buddhist ethics may be assimilated to or may correspond with different forms of western ethical theory.

I argue that the interpretation of Buddhist texts, and in particular the Vinaya, in light of western ethical theory creates misunderstanding. I argue that in each case of a supposed ethical dilemma, Buddhist ethics should be seen as empirical, since the ultimate point of reference for the choices involved in a proposed action lies in the purity and wholesomeness of each individual action.

My approach follows Foucault's argument for scepticism with regard to the notions of a universal nature or of a universal rationality. I argue that it is not instructive to read Buddhist texts against generalized standards. Rather, it is more productive to regard ethics as creating a space for the ethical, not in a normative sense but one arising from personal practice as related to individual circumstances.

At the same time, this article outlines the role of beauty and its role in ethical formation. I suggest that one interpretation of Theravada Buddhism has regarded beauty as a form of sensuous pleasure, which is seen as a danger for someone on the spiritual path. However, an alternative reading of such texts is more sympathetic to the educative role of beauty.

Notes

^1. I recognize this is a problematic term as recently scholars have shown this term is a later invention. It may be more instructive to study lineages rather than schools (Skilling 2009). For a good over view of the problems of term ‘Theravada’, see Crosby 2013, 2–5.

^2. There are several interconnected issues concerning an academic portrayal of Buddhism. Firstly, is it possible to locate any particular form as representative of Buddhism? Secondly, the problem of finding ‘Buddhism’ depends on how one deals with the different levels of syncretism that have made their way into Buddhist culture. These issues make it difficult to extract one strand of Buddhist thought as representative, as there is no monolithic or independent form of practice or philosophy that constitutes Buddhism (Laumakis 2008, 62–65; Heirman and Bumbacher 2007, 1–5). I do not assume that each representation of Buddhism is unique or self-contained, as each form does have some connections with other forms or schools. As the Buddha said, ‘as the ocean has one taste, the taste of salt, even so monks, does this dharma and the discipline have one taste, the taste of freedom’ (Book of Discipline 5. 335). In this article, I assume for heuristic purposes that there is a generic form of Buddhism (see a similar assumption in Faure 1998).

^3. The term ‘aesthetics’ refers to a sub discipline of philosophy concerned with nature and the expression of beauty in the fine arts. While many words denote such features of the world as colours, texture and so on, the word aesthetics is not of this type, as it a concept that makes sense of the world and by expressing ideas that are not necessarily inherent in the world (Koren 2010, 8). Koren has identified several current definitions of the term, pertaining to appearance, style, taste, philosophy of art, exegesis and beauty (as regards ‘beauty’ see infra). The word ‘aesthetics’ comes from the Greek word aesthesis, which, etymologically, pertains to perceptual or sensory knowledge (Koren 2010, 15). For the history of the word ‘aesthetics’ see Lamarque 2014. The first use of the term ‘aesthetics’ in its modern sense is attributed to Baumgarten 2007. In the lexicon of the eighteenth century, the term came to designate a kind of object or a kind of value judgment.

Ancient and medieval India possessed a variety of very subtle terms dealing with aesthetics. For instance, the word kalyani may mean ‘fortunate’ or ‘blessed’ while the word sundara means ‘beautiful’ (Nair 2005). The term rasa is sometimes translated as ‘beauty’ but may also mean ‘taste’ or ‘flavour’. The issue of a link between the notion of rasa and saṃvega (discussed later) is not explored here due to reasons of space (see Dehejia 1996, 54–56).

^4. The word subha has been defined in the P.E.D. to mean shining, bright, beautiful, auspicious, lucky or pleasant. The meaning of the term is best understood by its opposite, asubha, meaning horrid, disgusting, repulsive or impure (see Sangharakshita 1967, 84).

^5. I recognize that beauty is a relative concept and that it varies from person to person. A particular individual may appreciate or find something inspiring and of importance to their self-formation, while another may see the object or situation differently.

^6. Here I am referring to the natural physical world, as often described in Pāli texts. The Pāli equivalents which come closest to ‘nature’ are loka and yathabhuta. The former is usually translated as ‘world’ while the latter means ‘things as they really are’ (see De Silva 2005). For an expanded definition of loka, see Marasinghe sv loka BEP; Nyanaponika 1972, 90. Later I will discuss the terms sattvaloka and bhājanaloka.

^7. Some scholars have pointed out that important aesthetic qualities may be found within visual objects having devotional or liturgical significance (see Morgan 2005, 2009).

^8. While some western thinkers see beauty as a reflection of the divine (Martin 1990), attitudes to beauty vary in the Buddhist world. Unfortunately space does not allow me to develop ideas of beauty reflected in Buddhist texts from other traditions. (See also Japanese aesthetics and their particular approach to beauty: Marra 2002; Lafleur 1983). Odin (2001) explains how, through meditation, one realizes that every phenomenon of nature is a spontaneous manifestation of Buddha's nature. Tendai Buddhism therefore ‘affirms beauty in nature and recognizes it as art to be a valid path to enlightenment’ (Odin 2001, 61; see also Stone 1999; Keene 1971). For Kukai, whatever was beautiful reflected the nature of the Buddha, as nature, art and religion are one (De Barry 1958, 138).

^9. I use the term ‘intrinsic value’ to denote valuing something for its own sake rather than instrumentally (see discussion in Colette 2010, 30–33). Gnanarama (1998, 111) uses the term ‘intrinsic quality’, a term which he does not define. I take him to mean, in the context of his discussion, a temporal and visual quality which has a certain reality, albeit an impermanent one. However, I argue that nature is portrayed in early Buddhist texts as having neither an instrumental nor moral quality.

^10. Beauty is characterized by the idea of an object of longing. Following Sartwell (2006), I am not interested in defining beauty but use the idea as a basis for trying to find something common to particular kinds of experiences in relation to particular objects (nature, human forms). ‘Longing itself is enduring, which is also to say an unsated, state of desire. So in the broad sense the experience of beauty is erotic and always wants’ (Sartwell 2006, 3–4). Nehamas (2007, 77), too, writes of ‘beauty as the emblem of what we lack, the mark of an art that speaks to our desire. Beautiful things don’t stand aloof, but direct our attention to our desire'.

^11. According to Buddhist thought, the world is in a constant state of change (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā) (see Aṅ;guttara Nikāya, IV, 100). The world is defined as that which disintegrates, as there are no stable things (Saṃ;yutta Nikāya, IV, 52). Some texts seem to have no other rationale than to express supreme joy at beauty, while some are more ambivalent about it.

^12. See the term āyatana, which has been translated as ‘sense base’ (Bodhi 2000) in the Saṃyutta Nikāya in the Salāyatanavagga (see part IV, ‘The Book of Six Sense Base’). In Buddhism there are six internal sense bases or organs or gates, which are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind (see āyatana s.v p.597 EOB).

^13. EOB s.v. ‘beauty’ p. 597. See Visuddhimagga xix, section 29.

^14. See later discussion of the connotations of the term aesthetics.

^15. See references top Powers 2009a, 2009b.

^16. Some philosophers on beauty (such as those in the Kantian tradition) identify beauty with disinterested pleasure (Kant 1790, 45). On the other hand, some philosophers have argued that beauty is useful, see e.g., Berkeley 1732, 174. Sartwell writes that although beauty is connected to pleasure it is not an immediate sense experience, as ‘it requires intellection and practical activity: one has to know the use of a thing and to assess its suitedness to that use’, see beauty sv SEP.

^17. Some European thinkers have advanced the idea in various forms of a ‘natural theology’, that God exists through the order and beauty of nature: see Manning 2014, Brown 1989. The argument that beauty presupposes the existence of a realm of immaterial ideas or proves the existence of God has been connected to Plato and his idea of universals, and ideas from Richard Swinburne who argued that God made a beautiful world for instrumental purposes.

^18. I acknowledge the richness of Buddhist similes and metaphors as regards nature. Here I refer to images such as the lotus flower, the Bodhi tree and fruits in general. However, as several commentators have noted, as regards the images of fruit and trees, such literary devices are ambiguous as they are deployed in an unsystematic manner. See Stewart 1962, 524–571; Sahni 2008, 59–62.

^19. See references to reception and performance theory (see late discussion). As regards the study of emotion and the cultivation of moral emotions, see my discussion above as regards the work of Berkwitz (see late discussion). See also Hallisey and Hansen 1996.

^20. Here I draw on the idea of saṃvega (see late discussion) as well as on ideas of reception and performance theory (see late discussion).

^21. I recognize the danger of implying that there is one Foucault, as his work went through various stages and developments.

^22. For the standard Theravada works on the verification of the different forms of knowledge, see Jayatilleke 1963; Kalupahana 1975; Hoffman 2002. For the development of later forms of epistemology, see Dunne 2003, and his references. I later refer to issues of interpretation and hermeneutics.

^23.Aṅ;guttara Nikāya 4. 384, trans. Bodhi and Nyanaponika 2000.

^24. This approach has less emphasis on ‘an author and the text’ and more emphasis on the study of the reader's reception of a text and their personal deployment of that text (Holub 1984, xii). I acknowledge the similarity of approach to reception and performance theory. As regards the former, see Holub 1984; Iser 1978; Jauss 1982. As regards the latter, see Austin 1976.

^25. See volumes 2 and 3 of the History of Sexuality, namely, the Use of Pleasure (Foucault 1985) and the Care of the Self (Foucault 1986), as well as his lectures published in English (Foucault 2004).

^26. In the South Asian context, see Hallisey 1996, 1997, 2010; Ali 1998, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011; Ali and Pandian 2010; Berkwitz 2004. Some scholars have also utilised the work of Hadot, a contemporary of Foucault (see Kapstein 2001; Zhang 2005).

^27. Foucault indicated that there were different modes of working on one's self, or ways to study the unfolding of the self. He divided these processes into four subsidiary questions or areas, all of them forms of self-formation. The first concerns ontology, which is about what we seek to govern in ourselves and others. The second mode of self-formation is the mode of subjection. In the third form of self-formation we might examine deontology and the way an individual establishes a relationship to the rules which he/she is supposed to practise. The fourth concerns the telos of the ethical subject. This might consist of an understanding of an aim or goal (Foucault 1985, 27).

^28. The so-called brahma-vihāra are mentioned in several places in the Nikāyas and also in the Visuddhimagga. Buddhaghosa says they are called brahma-vihāra because these abidings indicate the right attitude towards human beings (Visuddhimagga 313) (see Mills 2004, 35). On the cultivation of the six perfections, see Wright 2009, and for a description of the elimination or reduction of negative emotions in Tibetan Buddhism, see McRae 2012. For a discussion of a text that discusses the cultivation of virtues and the six perfections, and the importance of cultivating proper habits over time, see Śāntideva'sBodhicaryāvatāra and Clayton 2006.

^29. Readers may well ask whether Foucault could be described as an epistemologist. The answer depends on how we define the umbrella term ‘epistemology’. Foucault's radical approach to epistemology is usually seen as outside the traditional form of epistemology (Alcoff 1996, 115–117). However, I agree with Alcoff (1993, 111; 1998) when he argues that Foucault's work is epistemological, as that work indicates a strategy whereby we can detect whether knowledge, has been institutionalized in disciplinary discourse. I would add that I regard his work as epistemological because he is concerned with discursive ideas and how they constitute the subject, and the conditions under which they are assembled to form a view of the self. For an account of the presentation of the Vinaya as a text, see Voyce 2012.

^30. Hermeneutics is the study of the interpretative practices concerning the understanding of texts, as well as questions concerning the nature of those texts and the principles to be used for interpreting them (see ‘hermeneutics’ sv SEP). For this approach, in the Buddhist context, see Lopez 1988. The extent to which such contemporary philosophical concerns regarding hermeneutical approaches are compatible with Buddhist assumptions has been challenged by Maraldo 1986.

^31. A full discussion of later forms of Buddhist epistemology and their criteria of knowledge is beyond this work, as different traditions give differing emphases to the role of perception, knowledge, textual analysis and personal experience. Some schools of Buddhism regard the received textual tradition as an epistemological category equal to perception and inference. A Theravada commentary called the Nettipakaraṇa says in Pāli pamāṇa (Sanskrit pramāṇa) na hi pāḷito aññaṃ pamāṇataraṃ atthi (Nettipakaraṇa, 1902, 11). Ñaṇ;amoli translates this as: ‘for there is no other criterion beyond a text.’ Later Buddhist philosophers did develop an epistemological framework, as evidenced by a later philosophical framework seen in the teachings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This has been recognized—for instance by Edelglass and Garfield (2009, 4) in their comment that ‘Buddhist philosophical concerns became principally metaphysical, epistemological ethical and hermeneutical’.

^32. Foucault argued against a system of universal rationality because he associated this approach with the values of the Enlightenment doctrine of Humanism. He argued that Humanism provides a vision wherein men and women are expected to conform. Such an approach offers a universal criterion of moral judgment. He argued, however, that Humanism has such a diverse history that it fails to provide a universal or coherent doctrine. Foucault wrote that the ‘central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has been, still is and always will, I hope, remain the question: what is this reason we use’. He goes on to argue that other forms of rationality such as Darwinism and Nazism have their own kind of rationality. This, he said, was ‘of course, an irrationality, but an irrationality that was at the same time, after all, a certain form of rationality’ (see Foucault 1984, 249; Bernauer and Mahon 1994, 141).

^33. Gethin 1998, 170; Harvey 2000, 199; Visuddhimagga 5–57; Nyanatiloka 1975; entry ‘sīla’; Tiwary 1987, 6).

^34.Visuddhimagga 11.

^35.Dīgha Nikāya 1. 79 trans. Rhys Davids 1910.

^36. In a later footnote I define deontology in relation to consequentialism.

^37.Deontology is a normative theory which specifies that moral choices are morally required or forbidden. In other words, deontology holds that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action is right or wrong according to a set of rules, rather than according to the consequences of the action. Consequentialists hold that choices, acts or intentions are to be morally assessed solely by the states of affairs they bring about. Aretaic ethics, sometimes called virtue ethics, emphasizes character over actions or consequences.

^38. Charles Goodman (2009, citing Wood 1999, 97–104) has recently shown that Kant's famous categorical imperative does not offer a reliable test for discerning what is right and wrong. Goodman (2009, 197–214) contends that Kant's second formulation, known as the ‘formula of humanity’, is also flawed.

^39. The full development of this argument is beyond the scope of this work, but is to some extent intimated by the following discussion of Collins. The full argument develops from several intimations of Foucault on the difference between ars erotica and scientia sexualis (Foucault 1978, 57–58) and the idea that ars erotica or the ‘truth of sex’ comes from pleasure itself within a particular esoteric structure. While some scholars like Ali have developed the link between kāma and aesthetic pleasure, this argument has not been fully developed as regards Buddhism.

^40.Majjhima Nikāya 3.125.

^41.The Laws of Manu verses 2.180, 3.125

^42. Vinaya Piṭaka 4.229, Book of Discipline 3.188.

^43. Readers will recall how Seyyasaka became handsome and well after his acts of masturbation. Sudinna, on the other hand, after an act of sexual intercourse, became miserable. If sexual activity is inimical to the religious life, how are we to reconcile its different physical and psychological outcomes? One way to view these is to suppose that, in the interests of a uniform approach to sexual activity and the apparent social norms against masturbation, the Buddha gave a ruling on masturbation consistent with his ban on sexual intercourse. This explanation does not explain the difference physical outcome.

^44. Here the reference is to the well-known mahāpadesa in Aṅguttara Nikāya 2.167; Dīgha Nikāya 2.123. I also note the difference between statements which had provisional meaning (neyārtha) and those with definitive meaning (nītārtha). The approach of locating the intention (abhiprāya) and skillful means (upāya) was seen as the key to interpretation. For a debate over these terms, see Broido 1985 and Seyfort Ruegg 1985; Lamotte 1988; Harrison 2003; Cabezón 1994; Davidson 1990.

^45. Buddha says ‘one who sees dependent origination, sees dhamma; one who sees dhamma sees dependent origination’. In this context, the idea of the dhamma as the teachings and as minutest phenomena fits perfectly. Majjhima Nikāya 1.190–1; see Jungnok 2012, 91.

^46.Aṅguttara Nikāya 9, 67, 68; 10, 13; Dīgha Nikāya 33; Nyananatiloka (1972, 171). See ‘fetters’ s.v EOB. While the Buddha criticized rituals; he advocated that it was not the ritual itself which may be inappropriate, but the accompanying state of mind. See Gombrich 1971; Terwiel 2001; Blackburn 1999; Ryūtaro 1991.

^47. See Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, trans. Luk (1972, 30–32).

^48. For an elaboration on this idea see Voyce 2010.

^49. See the story of an anonymous Vajjian monk who complains to the Buddha about having to recite more than 150 rules each fortnight. ‘Lord’, he says, ‘I cannot stand the training’. The Buddha excused him from compliance with these rules, as the monk lived a life of morality. We are told he eventually reaches the same stage as other monks who diligently followed the Vinaya. The implication is that these rules were not appropriate for this monk and special allowances should be made. See Aṅguttara Nikāya 1.230.

^50. See recent work by Finnegan 2009; Schopen 2003; Voyce 2010.

^51. For an account in the tradition of Chinese Buddhism of how rules can be stretched, see Hierman 2008.

^52. Rule 15–25, Pāṭimokkha (ed.) William Pruitt and Kenneth Norman.

^53. Rule 32–55, Pāṭimokkha (ed.) William Pruitt and Kenneth Norman.

^54. Buddhist texts praise the beauty in nature, and its songs and even extoll the beauty of attractive monasteries. As regards the positive appraisal of nature, see Dhammapada 1987, 52–54, 382; Majjhima Nikāya 1954-59, 1, 169–70; Sutta Nipāta 1881, see Therāgathā 1966, 527–529, 1062–1071; Jatāka 61–62. The songs of Milarepa also show a great love for nature and indicate the effect they had on Milarepa's life (see The Hundred Thousand Songs of Milarepa [1999]; De Silva 2005). Recently the subject of Buddhism and the environment has become popular (see several studies that discuss the role of nature, such as Colette 2010; Holder 2007; Contemporary Buddhism volume 8:2 ‘Buddhism and the Environment’; Sahni 2008; De Silva 1998). As regards the beauty of songs, see Dīgha Nikāya 1910, 2, 265; Udāna 2000, 51, Aṅguttara Nikāya 2000, 1, 24. As regards the attractiveness of well-kept monasteries, see Vinaya Piṭaka 1.287, 2, 150, 152,175.

^55.Majjhima Nikāya Bhikkhu Ñaṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodi 1995, 32. 9 at pp. 309–310.

^56.Majjhima Nikāya Bhikkhu Ñaṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodi 1995, 5.29 on p.112.

^57. These comments are based on the Śikṣāsamuccaya, a text attributed to Śāntideva, a monk believed to have lived between the seventh and eighth centuries.

^58. By early Buddhism, for the purposes of the article, I mean Buddhism up to the end of the first millennium of the Common Era.

^59. See Dhammapada Aṭṭthakathā 1906–1914, I, 96–105; III, 104; IV 168, Udāna Aṭṭthakathā 1885,168; EOB s.v Beauty; Wilson and her study Charming Cadavers. Wilson shows how appealing female bodies become objects of contemplation through death and disfigurement, and in such an extreme way that they actually resemble death: see Wilson 1996.

^60. See the discussion of the nuns' verses in the Theragāthā by Lang 1986, 73–76. See also Sponberg 1992.

^61. Bendall 1970, Śikshāsamuccaya, 318.5–319.2, quoted in Mrozik 2007, 90.

^62. Bendall 1970, Śikshāsamuccaya, 319.3–4, quoted in Mrozik 2007, 90.

^63. For a description of the effect of saṃvega see Coomaraswamy 1943.

^64. Buddhist texts recommend the quality of equanimity or uppekkhā, which can be seen as evenness of mind or ‘detached observation’ (see Odin 2001, 20). In the Aṅguttara Nikāya 111.288, the Buddha assents to the suggestion that he is ‘a-rasa-rūpa’, or one who lacks taste, implying that he is one who has transcended one who savours the five sense objects.

^65.Majjhima Nikāya 1995, 2.121–2.

^66. Book of Discipline 1.34.

^67. Buddhist texts advise that before doing anything through thought, word or deed, one should scrutinize carefully (paccavekkhitvā paccavekkhitvā kattabbaṃ) whether such action stands to the detriment of oneself (attavyābādhāya) or to the detriment of others (paravyābādhāya) Majjhima Nikāya 1995, 1, 414. Various texts, such as the teachings indicated in the Satipaṭ;ṭhāna Sutta, centre on the methodical cultivation of mental faculties. The key to the practice is to combine energy, mindfulness and clear comprehension in attending to the phenomena of mind and body, summed up in the ‘four arousing’s of mindfulness': body, feelings, consciousness, and mental objects. See the Sutipatthana Sutta, trans. Soma Thera.

^68. See Dhammapada 188 forward.

^69. The Buddha said monks ‘I do not perceive any principle of conduct that causes the arising of sensual pleasure if not arisen, if arisen, that leads to the increase and expansion of sensual pleasure as the sign of the beautiful’ (subha nimitta): Aṅguttara Nikāya 2000, 1.2. See discussion of subha nimitta by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Saṃyutta Nikāya 2000, vol. 2, 1899–1900, 1568.

^70. However, the Buddha does indicate that one who has obtained true realization (yathābhūtañāṇa) experiences spiritual beauty. This form of beauty finds expression in the Thera and Therī-gāthā and in utterances of joy (udāna) attributed to the Buddha.

^71. Dhammapada 1987, 262–263.

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Malcolm Voyce

Malcolm Voyce is an Associate Professor of Law at Macquarie University, Sydney. I acknowledge the help of the Law School at the School of Oriental African Studies, London University who provided assistance in my sabbatical semester in 2014. I also acknowledge the kindness of Suzanne and Edward Armour during this period. Address: Macquarie University, Law School, North Ryde, 2013, Sydney, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]