Club members in German professional football and their attitude towards the ‘50+1 Rule’ – A stakeholder-oriented analysis

ABSTRACT

While several clubs in England have established possibilities for co-determination by supporters as part of the supporters’ trust movement, in Germany a repeal of the so-called ‘50 + 1 Rule’ is being discussed. The German ‘50 + 1 Rule’ was created to exclude controlling investors’ influence on clubs, therefore ensuring that non-profit clubs and their members have the decision making power over the management of their professional football team. Due to the ‘50 + 1 Rule’ affecting sociological themes like participation of club members, oligarchization and commercialization, we examined the interests of club members with regards to the rule. Club members were asked about their arguments for retention, as well as their arguments for repeal and their preference regarding the future of the ‘50 + 1 Rule’. The empirical results showed an endorsement of the rule, with advocacy largely explained in the context of participation, the exclusion of multi-club ownership, and the avoidance of increasing commercialization.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Merkel, ‘Football Fans and Clubs in Germany’; Totten, ‘Sport Activism and Political Praxis’; and Rohde and Breuer, ‘The Market for Football Club Investors’.

2. DFB, Ausgliederung von Kapitalgesellschaften aus Fußballvereinen, 1; § 16c No. 3 of the statute of the German Football Association, § 8 No. 3 of the statute of the German League Association; see also Brown and Walsh, ‘Football Supporters´ Relations’, 96; and Franck, ‘Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member´s Association Governance Structures’, 121.

3. For example Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’; Kollmann, Aufnahme von Investoren bei Bundesligavereinen, 8; Ouart, ‘Handlungsbedarf auch nach dem DFB-Beschluss’, 55; and Lopatta et al., ‘Reformvorschlag’.

4. Freeman, A Stakeholder Approach.

5. Lammert, ‘Einbeziehung der Interessengruppen’.

6. Kromrey, Empirische Sozialforschung, 353.

7. Lammert, ‘Der Fall Hoffenheim’; Lammert, ‘Der Fall RB Leipzig’; and Bauers et al., ‘Umgehungen der 50 + 1-Regel’.

8. Hovemann and Wieschemann, ‘Regulierung von Investitionen’; Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’; Lopatta et al., ‘Reformvorschlag’, and Lammert et al. (2018) ‘Evaluation von Lösungsvorschlägen’.

9. Kollmann, Aufnahme von Investoren bei Bundesligavereinen, 8; Ouart, ‘Handlungsbedarf auch nach dem DFB-Beschluss’, 55; and Punte, Kapitalgesellschaft als Rechtsform professioneller Fußballklubs, 257.

10. Bauers et al., ‘Interessen von Fußballklubs’; Pilz, Einstellungen der Faninitiativen und Interessengemeinschaften der organisierten Fußballfans. Club and fan surveys, which exclusively deal with the retention, modification, or repeal of the ‘50 + 1 Rule’, were described by: Pfeiffer and Hovemann (2007), Bälle, Tore und Finanzen, 16; Kollmann et al., Ergebnisse einer Onlineumfrage, 5; and FC PlayFair, Situationsanalyse Profifußball 2017, 50.

11. FC PlayFair, Situationsanalyse Profifußball 2017, 32 and 43.

12. Freeman, A Stakeholder Approach; Senaux, ‘A Stakeholder Approach to Football Club Governance’; and García and Welford, ‘Supporters and Football Governance’.

13. García, ‘UEFA and the European Union’; and Schubert, ‘Potential Agency Problems in European Club Football?’

14. Hovemann and Wieschemann, ‘Regulierung von Investitionen’; Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’; and Thieme and Lammert, ‘Sicherung von Wettbewerbsintegrität’.

15. Williamson, Markets and hierarchies; Horch, ‘Vereinigungsversagen’; Franck, ‘Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member´s Association Governance Structures’; and Dilger, ‘Im Verein ist es am schönsten’.

16. Roose and Schäfer, ‘Fans und Partizipation’.

17. Ibid., 320.

18. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.

19. Alchian and Demsetz, ‘The Property Rights Paradigm’; Franck, Die ökonomischen Institutionen der Teamsportindustrie; Franck, ‘Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member´s Association Governance Structures’; and Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’.

20. Heinemann and Horch, ‘Soziologie der Sportorganisation’; Horch, ‘On the Socio-Economics of Voluntary Organisations’; Walsh and Giulianotti, ‘Ethics, Money and Sport’, 15; and see also Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens.

21. Franck, Die ökonomischen Institutionen der Teamsportindustrie; Franck, ‘Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member´s Association Governance Structures’; and Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’.

22. Müller et al., ‘The Financial Fair Play Regulations of UEFA’; Schubert and Könecke, ‘“Classical” Doping, Financial Doping and Beyond’; and Iorwerth et al., ‘Financial Doping in the English Premier League’.

23. Schellhaaß and Enderle, Wirtschaftliche Organisation von Sportligen, 30; and Müller, ‘Wettbewerbsintegrität als Oberziel des Lizenzierungsverfahrens’, 21.

24. Ziebs, ‘Ist sportlicher Erfolg käuflich?’; and Frick, ‘Die Voraussetzungen sportlichen und wirtschaftlichen Erfolges’.

25. Frick et al., ‘Kooperationserfordernisse und Wettbewerbsintensität’; Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’; Hovemann and Wieschemann, ‘Regulierung von Investitionen’; and Thieme and Lammert, ‘Sicherung von Wettbewerbsintegrität’.

26. Weiler, Mehrfachbeteiligungen an Sportkapitalgesellschaften; Weiler, ‘Multi-Club Ownership-Regelungen’; Dietl and Franck, ‘Governance Failure and Financial Crisis’, 668; and Hovemann et al., ‘Defizite der aktuellen UEFA-Regulation’.

27. Weiler, Mehrfachbeteiligungen an Sportkapitalgesellschaften, 28 and 253.

28. Heinemann, ‘Sport und Wirtschaft’, 236; Roy, Die Zuschauernachfrage im professionellen Teamsport, 58; and Weiler, Mehrfachbeteiligungen an Sportkapitalgesellschaften, 252.

29. See note 7 above.

30. Heermann, ‘Zulässigkeit der 50 + 1-Regelung’.

31. See note 21 above.

32. Franck, Die ökonomischen Institutionen der Teamsportindustrie.

33. Walsh and Giulianotti, ‘Ethics, Money and Sport’.

34. Heinemann, ‘Sport und Wirtschaft’; Walsh and Giulianotti, ‘Ethics, Money and Sport’; and Giulianotti, ‘Sport Spectators and the Social Consequences of Commodification’.

35. Pilz, Einstellungen der Faninitiativen und Interessengemeinschaften der organisierten Fußballfans.

36. Walsh and Giulianotti, ‘Ethics, Money and Sport’, 15.

37. Bryman, Social Research Methods, 90; and Creswell, Research Design, 25.

38. Thank you for the support from Rot-Weiß Essen e.V. It made it possible for 186 fans to answer the questions on the pre-test.

39. Kromrey, Empirische Sozialforschung, 362.

40. Bauers et al., ‘Interessen von Fußballklubs’.

41. ‘Umfrage zur 50 + 1-Regel’. Kicker Sportmagazin, 4 September 2017.

42. Schnell et al., Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung, 350 and 368.

43. Ibid., 375.

44. 92% of club members and 91% of non-club members said that they were aware of the 50 + 1 Rule before the survey. 97% of the club members and 95% of the non-club members can (according to the introductory explanations) comprehend the rule well or very well.

45. Morgan et al., ‘Problems in the Analysis of Survey Data, and a Proposal’; and Sonquist et al. ‘The Detection of Interaction Effects’.

46. Kass, ‘An exploratory Technique for Investigating Large Quantities of Categorical Data’.

47. Ritschard, ‘CHAID and Earlier Supervised Tree Methods’.

48. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Roose and Schäfer, ‘Fans und Partizipation’; and Kiernan, ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’.

49. Pawlowski, Mitgliederbefragung, 16; and FC PlayFair, Situationsanalyse Profifußball 2017, 51.

50. See note 20 above.

51. There was a possibility to choose different arguments, but not when ‘there is no argument’ or ‘no answer’ was chosen. ‘No answer’ was a possible option which ensured that fans did not feel forced to choose an answer in case they were uncertain. Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 93.

52. Hovemann and Wieschemann, ‘Regulierung von Investitionen’; Lammert et al., ‘Vermeidung eines beherrschenden Einflusses’; and Thieme and Lammert, ‘Sicherung von Wettbewerbsintegrität’.

53. Dietl and Franck, ‘Governance Failure and Financial Crisis’, 668; and Hovemann et al., ‘Defizite der aktuellen UEFA-Regulation’.

54. Thieme and Lammert, ‘Sicherung von Wettbewerbsintegrität’; and Pawlowski and Budzinski, ‘The (Monetary) Value of Competitive Balance’.

55. See note 21 above.

56. Franck, ‘‘Zombierennen’ und ‘Patenonkel’’; Budzinksi and Müller, ‘Finanzregulierung und internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit’; Szymanski, ‘The Financial Crisis and English Football’, 39; Wilson et al., ‘The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Club Performance’, 33; and Rohde and Breuer, ‘The Market for Football Club Investors’, 286.

57. Weiler, Mehrfachbeteiligungen an Sportkapitalgesellschaften, 253.

58. Müller, ‘Wettbewerbsintegrität als Oberziel des Lizenzierungsverfahrens’, 21.

59. See note 7 above.

60. Heermann, ‘Zulässigkeit der 50 + 1-Regelung’; and Wallrodt, ‘Dietmar Hopp, der erste König der Bundesliga’. Die Welt, 11 February 2015.

61. Walsh and Giulianotti, ‘Ethics, Money and Sport’.

62. See note 35 above.

63. Ibid.

64. Freeman, A Stakeholder Approach; and Lammert, ‘Einbeziehung der Interessengruppen’.

65. Merkel, ‘Football Fans and Clubs in Germany’; and Totten, ‘Sport Activism and Political Praxis’.

66. See note 27 above.

67. See note 26 above.

68. See note 34 above.

69. See note 35 above.

70. See note 56 above.

71. DFL, ‘Grundsatzdebatte unter Beibehaltung der 50 + 1-Regel.’

72. See note 13 above.

73. See note 40 above.