Adverse effects of repressive policies: safety and security issues in Iranian football

ABSTRACT

Iran’s football has been plagued by substantial safety and security problems. This paper argues that these problems represent to some extent the adverse effects of the repressive policies the government has adopted towards football. First, football matches have become focal points for social and political protests. Second, attempts to control football by limiting its commercialization have facilitated underinvestment in stadium safety. Third, the repressive policing of football crowds is likely to escalate football related riots. We provide support for these ideas on the base of a qualitative case study. Iranian football will need some fundamental reforms to escape the vicious circle of repression and conflict escalation.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. e.g., Wong and Chadwick, “Risk and (In)Security”; Ludvigsen and Millward, “A Security Theater”.

2. CNN, “Fans killed as Stadium collapses”; IRNA, “غربتیک استادیوم، ۲۰ سال پس از یکشنبه سیاه”.

3. ISNA, “کشته و ۲ نقص عضو!/تلفات سنگین فوتبال ایران در ۱۸ سال”; ISNA, “…''آزادی’ در مرگ’. The reason for the security forces’ decision to close the exit doors of the stadium was that a helicopter landed in front of one of the ramps of Azadi Stadium. Therefore, there was no emergency exit.

4. Varzesh 3, “گریه برای چشمی که دیگر فوتبال نمی‌بیند”.

5. Khabar Online, “ مصدوم طی بازی پرسپولیس-کاشیما”.

6. Khabar Online, “حمله وحشیانه به یک کودک پس از شکست سپاهان مقابل پرسپولیس”; SNN, “نابینا شدن یک

کودک و مجروح شدن ۱۵۰ هوادار بعد از بازی سپاهان و پرسپولیس”.

7. ISNA, “عماد ۸ ساله ‘که گیت‌های آزادی’ جانش را گرفت”; Khabar Online, “مرگ دلخراش پسربچه هشت ساله در استادیوم آزادی”. Stadium officials use electrical wires to secure the scaffolding.

8. Tasnim News Agency, “برگزاری سومین جلسه معاونان فرهنگی باشگاه‌های لیگ برتری در سازمان لیگ”.

9. Varzesh 3, “فوری؛ تمام مسابقات فوتبال بدون تماشاگر شد!”.

10. Merton, “Unanticipated Consequences”.

11. See Jervis, “Complexity”; Portes, “The Hidden Abode”.

12. Merton, “Unanticipated Consequences”, p. 901–2.

13. Baert, “Unintended Consequences”; De Zwart, “Unintended”.

14. Baert, “Unintended Consequences”.

15. Jervis, “Complexity”.

16. Baert, “Unintended Consequences”.

17. Mica, “The Unintended Consequences”.

18. De Zwart, “Unintended”.

19. Merton, “Unanticipated Consequences”, p. 897.

20. Dousti et al., “Sport Policy”.

21. Chehabi, “A Political History”, “The Politics of Football”.

22. Atghia et al., “Prerequisites”; Bromberger, “Football”; Dousti et al., “Sport Policy”; Alidoust Ghahfarrokhi, Analysis’.

23. Carter and Carter, “Focal Moments”.

24. Granovetter, “Threshold Models”; Lohmann, “Dynamics”.

25. Schelling, Strategy, p. 57.

26. Young, “Economics”.

27. Eydipour et al., “Challenges”.

28. Chehabi, “A Political History”, “The Politics of Football”.

29. Alidoust Ghahfarrokhi, “Analysis”.

30. Chehabi, “The Politics of Football”.; Dousti et al., “Sport Policy”.

31. Ghobadi Yeganeh et al., “Identifying”; Fişne et al., “Foreign Ownership”.

32. Deldar et al., “Investigate”; Alidoust Ghahfarrokhi, “Analysis”; Atghia et al., “Prerequisites”.

33. Rezaei, “Designing”.

34. Khajeheian and Sedighi, “Competition”.

35. e.g., Johnes, “Heads”.

36. Della Porta and Fillieule, “Policing”.

37. Ludvigsen, “Examining”.

38. Reicher et al., “Knowledge-based”.

39. Stott et al., “Value”, p. 198.

40. Stott et al., “‘Keeping the Peace’”.

41. Hoggett and West, “Police”.

42. Reicher et al., “Knowledge-based”.

43. Hoggett and Stott, “Crowd Psychology”, “Role”.

44. Parsa, “Authoritarian”.

45. Della Porta and Fillieule, “Policing”.

46. Beach and Pedersen, “Process-tracing methods”, p. 2.

47. Beach and Pedersen, “Process-tracing methods”, pp. 120–140.

48. Sparkes and Smith, Qualitative Research, pp. 88–89.

49. Friberg and Öhlen, “Searching”.

50. Miles et al., Qualitative Data Analysis, pp. 71–86.

51. Abdolmohammadi and Cama, Contemporary, p. 4.

52. e.g., Cordesman, Crisis, p. 14; Azadi, Governance, p. 1.

53. For an overview: Roudi et al., Iran’s Population.

54. In general: Goldstone, “Population”.

55. Cordesman, Crisis, p. 15.

56. Parsa, “Authoritarian”.

57. Deldar et al., “Investigate”.

58. Faraji et al., “Critical Factors”.

59. Young Journalists Club, “AFC”.

60. The phrase “expedient and friendly decisions” is commonly used in Iran to indicate that an official acts not according to the law but on his own discretion.

61. National football matches are held in accordance with the instructions of FIFA, AFC and the Sports Security Council of the Ministry of Interior. The National Sports Security Council, which is the highest body for ensuring the safety and security of sports, is under the direct supervision of the Minister of Interior and its head, the General Directorate of Law Enforcement and Public Order Development.

62. The Province Football Security Council is one of the other institutions organizing football matches, especially the Pro League matches. The members of the Provincial Security Council for holding league matches include the Head of the Province Sports and Youth Department, the City Governor, the Province Governor, the Security Force, the Special Unit, the Representative or Vice President of the League Organization, the head of the Emergency and Fire Stations, and the Representative of the Country’s Radio and Television.

63. Tasnim News Agency, “برگزاری سومین جلسه معاونان فرهنگی باشگاه‌های لیگ برتری در سازمان لیگ”.