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Articles

Cambodia's Unofficial Regime of Extraction: Illicit Logging in the Shadow of Transnational Governance and Investment

Pages 200-228 | Published online: 19 May 2015
 

ABSTRACT: 

Cambodia has recently demonstrated one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world. While scholars have long explored the drivers of tropical forest loss, the case of Cambodia offers particular insights into the role of the state where transnational governance and regional integration are increasingly the norm. Given the significant role logging rents play in Cambodia's post-conflict state formation, this article explores the contemporary regime and its ongoing codependent relationship with forested land. Insights are distilled from comparative analysis of illicit logging in two ethnographic case studies. Both involve foreign investments by state-owned companies – a Chinese-backed hydropower dam and Vietnamese-owned rubber concessions – and both are nestled in prominent conservation landscapes that are managed with international donor support. Together, the cases reveal how Cambodia's current timber extraction regime works through the use and abuse of legal mechanisms associated with forest conservation and foreign investment projects, and the mobilization of elite alliances that log both for private gain and in service of the ruling party's interests. By implication, the government's remarkable facilitation of transnational projects for conservation and development must be reappraised and ultimately seen as constitutive of a predatory and extractive regime that continues to rely heavily upon illicit logging revenues.

Acknowledgments

The material presented in this article has been gathered and developed steadily since 2011. I thank many colleagues and friends who have contributed insights, support, and critical feedback along the way. At the ANU, they particularly include Sango Mahanty, Keith Barney, and Jacqui Baker. Many of those who assisted me in Cambodia cannot be named, but I would like to acknowledge the help of Thap Savy, Alex Gonzalez-Davidson, David Boyle, Megan MacInnes, Marcus Hardtke, Jeremy Ironside, and Mathieu Pellerin, among many dear and brave others. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the funders or any other people or organizations who have provided assistance. Finally, I thank those who reviewed this paper and contributed greatly to its improvement, including Andrew Cock, Robin Biddulph, John Marston, and four anonymous peer reviewers.

Funding

Funding for this research has in part come from the Australian Research Council Discovery grant [DP120100270], The Political Ecology of Forest Carbon: Mainland Southeast Asia's New Commodity Frontier? No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Sarah Milne has been working on forest conservation issues in Cambodia since 2002, as a practitioner and a scholar. Her 2009 doctoral dissertation examined the political ecology of transnational biodiversity conservation in the Cardamom Mountains, southwest Cambodia. She has recently completed an edited volume on related material entitled Conservation and Development in Cambodia: Exploring Frontiers of Change in Nature, State and Society, published in 2015 by Routledge.

Notes on contributor

Sarah Milne has been working on forest conservation issues in Cambodia since 2002, as a practitioner and a scholar. Her 2009 doctoral dissertation examined the political ecology of transnational biodiversity conservation in the Cardamom Mountains, southwest Cambodia. She has recently completed an edited volume on related material entitled Conservation and Development in Cambodia: Exploring Frontiers of Change in Nature, State and Society, published in 2015 by Routledge.

Notes

1Adapted from Sonando's poem at http://sbk105.sakfm.com/pages/I_A_Khmer_in_Eng.htm (accessed 15 June 2013).

2See 2001 Land Law, Art. 16, and Sub-Decree no.146 on Economic Land Concessions 2005, Article 4. Downloadable from Open Development Cambodia's Law Compendium: see http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/laws_and_regulations/environment-land-and-nrm-laws/?post_type=law (accessed 3 February 2015).

3Blomberg and Ana Citation2014; Boyle and May Citation2012.

4FAO Citation2010; Global Witness Citation2013; RGC Citation2010a.

5Hansen et al. Citation2013.

6ADHOC Citation2013.

7Of course these conservation areas are not empty, and their designation as state land remains contested.

8The GMS is an ADB initiative that has facilitated intra-regional cooperation and investment, see Tan Citation2014.

9Le Billon Citation2002; Un and So Citation2011; Cock Citation2010; Springer Citation2013.

10Collier Citation2007; Ascher Citation1999; Snyder Citation2006.

11Vandergeest and Peluso Citation1995; Bryant Citation1997; Peluso and Watts Citation2001.

12Le Billon Citation2000 and Citation2002.

13Blaikie and Brookfield Citation1987.

14Mitchell Citation1991; Levi Citation2002; Vu Citation2010.

16Sharma and Gupta Citation2006; Sikor and Lund Citation2009.

17Migdal Citation2001.

18Slater Citation2010.

19Le Billon Citation2000; Peluso and Watts Citation2001.

20Levi Citation1988; Moore Citation2004.

21Moore Citation2004; Larsson Citation2013.

22Smart Citation1999; Levi Citation1988.

23Heyman and Smart Citation1999; Anders and Nuijten Citation2007; Aspinall and van Klinken Citation2011.

24Gellert Citation2010.

25Ibid., 32.

26Ibid., 33.

27Erdmann and Engel Citation2007; Bratton and van de Walle Citation1997.

28Heder Citation2007; Un and So Citation2011.

29Sidel Citation1989; Reno Citation1999.

30Reno Citation1999.

31Le Billon and Springer Citation2007; Le Billon Citation2000.

32Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015.

33Subedi Citation2012; Global Witness Citation2013; Neef, Touch and Chiengthong Citation2013.

34Neef, Touch and Chiengthong Citation2013; Brinkley Citation2011.

35Un and So Citation2011.

36Following the Corruption Perceptions Index, see article Khoun Citation2013.

37Larsson Citation2013.

38Gottesman Citation2003.

39Pak Citation2011; Cock Citation2010; Roberts Citation2002; Heder Citation2005; Un and So Citation2011.

40St John Citation1995.

41Ibid.; Gottesman Citation2003.

42Hughes Citation2006; Öjendal and Sedara Citation2006; Pak Citation2011.

43Gottesman Citation2003; Cock Citation2010. Note that Cock uses “ruling class” to refer to those holding government positions.

44Cock Citation2010; Roberts Citation2002.

45Roberts Citation2002.

46Ibid.; Cock Citation2010; Hughes Citation2003.

47Roberts Citation2002, 525.

48Hughes Citation2003; Gottesman 2004.

49Cock Citation2010, 243. See Heder Citation2007 on the performance of the formal state.

50Craig and Pak Citation2011; Un and So Citation2011; Hughes Citation2003.

51Un and So Citation2011, 294.

52All dollar figures hereafter are US dollars.

53Verver and Dahles Citation2014.

54Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015; Craig and Pak Citation2011.

55Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015.

56Craig and Pak Citation2011; Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015.

57Gellert Citation2010; Ascher Citation1998. Asher notes that off-budget spending falls outside of the central budget and is often funded by donations or “informal taxes” on natural resource exploitation.

58Hughes Citation2003; So Citation2010; Blunt and Turner Citation2005.

59Cock Citation2010; Milne Citation2013.

60Hughes Citation2003; Heder Citation2007.

61Sullivan Citation2011.

62Global Witness Citation2013.

63Le Billon Citation2002.

64Le Billon and Springer Citation2007.

65Ibid.

66Sidel Citation1989.

67Global Witness Citation2002.

68Neak Citation2007; Le Billon Citation2002.

69Cock Citation2010; Paley Citation2015; Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015. The expression “taxing the law” refers to the use of legal authority to extract bribes; it comes from Ret'd Col. David Mead (personal communication 2001).

70Cock Citation2010; Paley Citation2015.

71Roberts Citation2002; Vickery Citation1984. Both authors note how state employment became a guarantor of reliable remuneration in this way.

72ICEM Citation2003.

73Springer Citation2013; see also Land Law and Forestry Law, downloadable from Open Development Cambodia's Law Compendium: see http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/laws_and_regulations/environment-land-and-nrm-laws/?post_type=law (accessed 3 February 2015).

75Statistics on land area are listed in the Trading Economics database, 2015. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/cambodia/land-area-sq-km-wb-data.html (accessed 13 December 2014).

76Revkin Citation2002.

77Baird Citation2009.

78Vandergeest and Peluso Citation1995.

79Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015; Singh Citation2014.

80Blundo Citation2007.

81Describing how project staff and villagers were ostracized, disciplined, and threatened by those involved in the logging is beyond the scope of this article. This was a daily concern. Responsible for the intimidation were government officials, armed forces, police, powerful businessmen, and employees working for the logging and company operations. The means they used included gossip, death threats, phone calls, and advice about “safety” and “danger.”

82These include the Stung Tatay dam, the upper and lower Roussey Chrum dams, and the Stung Areng dam. All are within or very close to the Central Cardamoms Protected Forest.

83Middleton Citation2008.

85Interview with a high-level official, Phnom Penh, 2013.

86Another Yunnan SOE, closely but ambiguously connected to CYC, has the contract to build transmission lines in Pursat Province, linking the Atay Dam to the national grid. See, for example: Xinhua News Agency Citation2007.

87Middleton Citation2008. The fact that the company is from Yunnan is notable because this province is part of the GMS. Investment relationships that underpin dam contracts often emerge from GMS events like workshops and trade fairs.

88See “Dam Finished End 2013.” Blog. Constructing Cambodia: Following Cambodia's infrastructure development, 12 January. http://constructingcambodia.wordpress.com/category/construction-complete/stung-atay-hydropower-dam/ (accessed March 2014).

89Middleton Citation2008.

90In 2013, Try Pheap rose to prominence across Cambodia for his logging exploits. He is now a household name. This was not the case in 2009 when his operations began in O'Som.

91Two species of rosewood grow in Cambodia: Thailand rosewood (D. cochinchinensis) and Burmese rosewood (D. bariensis). Both are strictly protected under the Cambodian Forestry Law.

92Boyle and May 2011.

93EIA Citation2012; Singh Citation2014; To, Mahanty, and Dressler Citation2014.

95See EIA Citation2012 on furniture prices and interviews with key informants on local rosewood prices in 2011.

96Taing Citation2011. Five years on, now that Try Pheap has secured a domestic timber transportation license, larger trucks are used to transport the rosewood.

97This sum derives from two independent sources: (1) a leaked NGO report that calculated the amount of rosewood removed from the O'Som area based upon vegetation mapping and estimates of the density of rosewood for each forest type; and (2) data from informants on the number and size of trucks passing the O'Som checkpoints every day during the period of logging.

98From two interviews: with a consultant who visited the area in late 2013, and a doctoral student conducting research there in early 2014.

99Interview with a high-level government official, Phnom Penh, September 2013.

100Taing Citation2011.

101CHRTF Citation2013, 18.

102Interview with a high-level government official, Phnom Penh, September 2013.

103In covering these expenses (around $300/month/ranger) the NGO's intention was to remove incentives and justifications for ranger corruption. But the “financing fix” was not sufficient to produce non-corrupt rangers: a problem that the NGO denied steadfastly when it was accused of “turning a blind eye” to corruption within its project. The NGO involved is Conservation International; see Boyle and May Citation2012.

104Two of the senior rangers received new cars, while the more junior officers received new motorbikes.

105Interview with an NGO informant, Phnom Penh, 2012.

106Although both companies are linked to Hun Sen's family, I was told that “like the mafia” internal conflicts within this familial network were not uncommon. Interview with a local activist, Phnom Penh, 2013.

107This is common knowledge among Forestry Administration officials; they discuss the subject openly. The former Central Cardamoms Protected Forest director is now Try Pheap's “right hand,” officials declare.

108This is common knowledge among NGO staff working in the area.

109NGO informants in Phnom Penh (2012) and Mondulkiri (2013). The provision of tanks to the government was said to be what secured the tycoon's monopoly rights over timber in Ratanakiri, granted in late 2013.

110CHRTF Citation2013, 12.

111Ibid.

112Craig and Pak Citation2011; Milne, Pak, and Sullivan Citation2015.

113See CHRTF Citation2013; Global Witness Citation2009; Pheap and Woods Citation2013.

114Peter and Pheap Citation2013.

115These rights were apparently acquired at a fee of $3.4 million, paid to the Forestry Administration, although the 5000 cubic meters of timber would be worth over $25 million. See Pheap and Woods Citation2013.

116Exports to China are via boat. When Timber Green was operating in the Cardamom Mountains, boats left from Sre Ambul port, Koh Kong Province. According to an informant in 2014, Try Pheap now exports rosewood to China from Cambodia's main port in Sihanoukville. This is because rosewood sale prices are at least ten times higher in China than in Vietnam, so it is more profitable for Try Pheap to export directly to China.

117Pheap and Woods Citation2013.

118Peter and Pheap Citation2013.

119Pheap and Woods Citation2013.

120For example, see the maps of ELCs and mining concessions generated by ADHOC (2012).

121See 2001 Land Law Article 16; and Sub-Decree No.146 on Economic Land Concessions 2005, Article 4. See Open Development Cambodia: http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/laws_and_regulations/environment-land-and-nrm-laws/?post_type=law (accessed 3 February 2015).

122Vrieze and Naren Citation2012. See also Open Development Cambodia's briefing on ELCs: http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefing/economic-land-concessions-elcs/ (accessed March 2014).

123Interview with an NGO informant in Phnom Penh, February 2014.

124On the company's website (http://www.vnrubbergroup.com/en/about.php/) VRG is described as “a multi-ownership Group, in which dominant capital ownership belongs to the State.” VRG has admitted ownership of Binh Phuc 1, but denies association with the other concessions, in spite of evidence that suggests otherwise. See, for example, Global Witness Citation2013.

125See Boyle and May Citation2013. An NGO worker in the area informed me that Binh Phuc itself was a furniture company. The website for Tien Dat Furniture Company (http://www.tiendatquinhon.com.vn/index.asp?language=EN) shows that it had a $40 million turnover in 2012–2013 and that it has Forest Stewardship Council certification.

126Global Witness Citation2013.

127Unofficial translation of So Chor Nor 693, Council of Ministers, 2 July 2012.

128Unofficial translation of So Chor Nor 693, Council of Ministers, 2 July 2012. The letter also calls for the full cancelation of five other concessions in Koh Kong and Kompong Thom that had not yet signed contracts with the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, because they also overlaid natural forests.

129Interview with a Khmer official in Mondulkiri, later confirmed by two NGO sources in Phnom Penh, November 2012.

130Interviews with local villagers and NGO workers in Mondulkiri in January 2013 and July 2014.

131Reports from villagers near to the concessions, Mondulkiri and Kratie provinces, January 2013.

132The boundary runs through the middle of Srei Chuuk commune and Sre Andoal village. Local residents said the provincial boundary had been disputed for years, with no local demarcation. The disputes, they told me, related to resource struggles and company claims being exerted through the provinces.

133Two reliable sources in 2013 calculated timber removal rates from the three concessions of twenty trucks per day. Truck size was calculated conservatively from photographs. The value of $1000 per cubic meters is conservative, given that luxury species in the area were worth about $2000 per cubic meters in mid-2014 and $1700 per cubic meters in 2013 (see WCS Citation2013).

134Calculated based on conservative estimates of the density of valuable hardwood species (1100 kilograms per cubic meter); forest gate timber prices of $1000 per cubic meter; tree biomass/hectares in Mondulkiri's dense evergreen forest (see WCS Citation2013); and a proportion of one third of the tree biomass being marketable. (Note: this proportion is at the lower end of conversion timber recovery rates, which typically fall within the range of 30 to 70 percent, according to Phuc To. Personal communication.). The resultant figure of $100,000 per hectare for conversion timber in Cambodia was verified by NGO informants in Phnom Penh in 2014.

135Assuming, conservatively, that 5000 hectares of evergreen forest is cleared for each concession.

136Pye and May Citation2014.

137Global Witness (Citation2007) likened the regime and its interrelationship with logging syndicates to a “family tree.”

138Erdmann and Engel Citation2007, 14.

139Anders and Nuijten Citation2007.

140Tan Citation2014.

141Ong Citation2000; Bayart Citation2009, cited in Tan Citation2014. The term “foreignization of rule” was suggested by an anonymous reviewer of this article, whom I thank.

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