Rethinking small arms control in Africa: it is time to set an armed violence reduction agenda

Dr Robert Muggah is Research Director of the Small Arms Survey at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He is also a Principal of The SecDev Group in Ottawa, Canada.

Abstract

Policy-makers and practitioners concerned with small arms control have traditionally focused narrowly on ‘supply-side’ forms of regulation and containment. Concerned that excessive arms availability might destabilise fragile and post-war countries, they typically advance a host of activities such as weapons embargoes, export and import controls, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and weapons collection schemes. These initiatives often achieve fewer dividends than expected. This article argues for a broader conceptualisation of ‘availability’ that accounts for both supply and demand dimensions. Availability would thus extend from arms production and diverse forms of weapons circulation to the manifold factors shaping acquisition and the multiple ways arms are used and misused. A broad spectrum treatment directly acknowledges the many faces of armed violence and allows for more sophisticated diagnosis, treatment and cure. This article considers how a host of ‘second generation’ armed violence prevention and reduction activities might enhance efforts to promote security in the aftermath of Africa's wars.

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my thanks to Robert Picciotto, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to recognise the fact-checking support provided by Bilyana Tsvetkova.

Notes

Dr Robert Muggah is Research Director of the Small Arms Survey at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He is also a Principal of The SecDev Group in Ottawa, Canada.

 1. See, for example, the UN Programme of Action on Combating the Illicit Trade and Trafficking of Small Arms In All Its Aspects (2001). Available at: www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/2001_un_conf.htm [Accessed January 2010]; the Arms Trade Treaty, available at: www.armstradetreaty.com [Accessed January 2010]; and OECD, Guidance on Evaluating; Principles for Good International Engagement; Security System Reform ; Preventing Conflict ; and Guidelines on Helping.

 2. African Development Bank, African Development Report; WHO, WHO Report on Violence in Africa.

 3. According to Meijer and Verwimp, ‘recent quantitative research using a large-scale database of victims of genocide in Kibuye province shows that more young male adults with non-farm occupations were killed with firearms than any other group […] This data also reveals that firearms, often in combination with grenades, were more frequently used in certain locations and events than in others; in particular, they were used in large-scale massacres in which many Tutsi were killed simultaneously in the same location, such as the Gatwaro football stadium in the city of Kibuye, where thousands of people were killed’. Use and Perception of Weapons, 9.

 4. According to Harbom and Wallensteen, there were 32 armed conflicts in 23 locations in 2006. This is far fewer than the peak of 52 in 1991 and 1992. ‘Armed Conflict’, 623.

 5. A recent ‘demand-side’ approach to addressing arms availability is the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. Launched in 2006 and now signed by more than 100 states, the Geneva Declaration represents an innovative effort to address both the supply and demand dimension of small arms through a concerted focus on armed violence prevention and reduction. See, for example, www.genevadeclaration.org [Accessed January 2010] and the Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence.

 6. Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction; Muggah, ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’; Muggah, ‘Emerging from the Shadow of War’.

 7. Muggah, ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’.

 8. See, for example, the International DDR Standards (UNWG 2006) which define ‘effective’ DDR as an activity contributing to stabilisation, promoting a ‘return’ of combatants to civilian life and reducing the availability of arms. See also Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

 9. Small Arms Survey 2006.

10. Small Arms Survey 2009.

11. The most common type of weapons in Africa are not military-style rifles, but (civilian) automatic rifles, sporting handguns and homemade firearms. There is no reliable total or accounting mechanism of the total number of civilian held arms. Of the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, comprehensive data is only available for Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. See, for example, Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003 .

12. Small Arms Survey 2008; Small Arms Survey 2006; Small Arms Survey 2005.

13. Bevan, Conventional Ammunition in Surplus.

14. See, for example, reports of the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA)—particularly Human Security Baseline Assessment, ‘Responses to pastoral wars’; and Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2006 .

15. See, for example, Human Security Report (2005) and Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008).

16. Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003 , 80–86.

17. Brauer and Muggah, ‘Completing the Circle’.

18. Brauer and Muggah, ‘Completing the Circle’

19. On the Great Lakes see, Nichols and Muggah, Quoi de neuf sur le front congolais, 46; on West Africa see Berman and Florquin, Armed and Aimless.

20. See, for example, Small Arms Survey 2006; Small Arms Survey 2005; and Small Arms Survey 2003 for a review of trade and trafficking of arms and the intersection of the black, grey and legal trade.

21. See, for example, SIPRI, ‘Air Transport’, on air transport agents and illicit transfers of small arms in Africa.

22. Killicoat developed a simultaneous equations demand and supply model of the small arms market and sought to identify the key determinants of assault rifle (AK-47) prices. He found that variables that proxy the effectiveheight of trade barriers for trade both within and between countries are consistently significant in weapon price determination. He also observed that neighbours' average military expenditure is a robust predictor of low weapon prices. ‘What Price the Kalashnikov’, 257–258.

23. Muggah, ‘The Ecology of Arms Flows’.

24. WHO, WHO Report on Violence in Africa.

25. See Small Arms Survey 2006.

26. See Human Security Baseline Assessment, ‘Responses to Pastoral Wars’ for a review of pastoral violence in the Horn of Africa.

27. Kirsten, Guns and Roses, 5.

28. Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction; Colletta and Muggah, ‘Context Matters’.

29. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Duffield, Global Governance.

30. Harom and Wallensteen 2007.

31. Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction examines the issue of ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’ in detail. Drawing on extensive baseline and survey-based data, the volume explores the extent to which multiple DDR operations contribute to demonstrable reductions in real and perceived victimisation and social, political and economic reintegration in the long term.

32. Weinstein and Humphreys, ‘Assessing Progress’; Blattman and Anan, ‘Reintegration of Child and Youth Combatants’; Pugel, ‘DDR in Liberia’; Muggah and Bennett, ‘Comparing Soldiers and Forced Migrants’.

33. Colletta and Muggah, ‘Context Matters’.

34. See Muggah and Krause (2007) for a review of the evolution of UN Security Council resolutions in the context of a single country, Haiti, from 1990 to 2006.

35. See, for example, Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction; Muggah, ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’.

36. Small Arms Survey 2007; Small Arms Survey 2006.

37. Nichols and Muggah, Quoi de neuf sur le front congolais; Muggah, ‘Anatomy of Disarmament’.

38. OECD, Armed Violence Reduction Guidance.

39. See, for example, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence for an accounting of direct and indirect conflict deaths.

40. See Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence.

41. See, for example, Human Security Report (2005).

42. To put them into perspective, of the estimated 3.9 million deaths in DRC reported by the IRC between 1998 and 2004, approximately 10 per cent were from violence.

43. OECD, Guidance on Evaluating.

44. Muggah, ‘Emerging from the Shadow of War’.

45. For example Oxfam-GB estimated costs of some US$ 300 billion (1990–2005) which amounted to 15 per cent of continental GDP. See Oxfam-GB, Africa's Missing Billions, 3.

46. See Stewart and Fitzgerald, War and Underdevelopment.

47. See Picciotto, ‘Conflict Prevention’.

48. See Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap.

49. See Cincotta, ECSP Report 10.

50. See Jutersonke et al., ‘Guns and the City’.

51. See Picciotto, ‘Conflict Prevention’.

52. See, for example, OECD, Guidance on Evaluating and the review of efforts to monitor and evaluate of conflict prevention and peace-building activities.

53. Small Arms Survey 2009; Small Arms Survey 2007; The Small Arms Survey 2005 document the escalation of firearm-related homicides in so-called ‘post-conflict’ contexts. In Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Colombia and Haiti rates of homicide in ostensibly ‘peaceful’ contexts exceed conflict deaths reported during periods of intense warfare.

54. The OECD recently published a paper on armed violence reduction in order to enhance donor capacities to diagnose and respond to various forms of violence, including crime and victimisation. The OECD also established a working group to examine entry points and map out intervention strategies to prevent and reduce armed violence. See OECD, Armed Violence Reduction Guidance.

55. Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2007 . Violent crime—including homicide, attempted homicide, assault, harassment and sexual violence—accounts for approximately 15 per cent of all reported crime.

56. Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence; AVPI, Armed Violence and Conflict Assessments; Moser and Mcllwaine, Violence in a Post-Conflict Context.

57. Rodgers and Muggah, ‘Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups’; Jutersonke et al., ‘Guns and the City’; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence; AVPI, Armed Violence and Conflict Assessments; Moser and Mcllwaine, Violence in a Post-Conflict Context.

58. See IADB, ‘How is Violence Measured’.

59. Actions encouraging social investment in youth to reduce criminal delinquency or interventions to reduce victimisation have a return of more than US$ 7 on every US$ 1 spent. See UNDP and WHO, Armed Violence Prevention Programme; IADB, ‘How is Violence Measured’.

60. Whether in contexts of war or crime, youthful males are most likely to perpetrate and be victimised by armed violence. Across time and space, young males are most ‘at risk’ of being involved in a fatal or non-fatal incident of intentional violence. See Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence; WHO, WHO Report on Violence in Africa.

61. Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2007 .

62. Colletta and Muggah, ‘Context Matters’.

63. By 2015, the UN estimates that there will be more than 2015 cities with populations exceeding one million. A growing number of these rise above 20 million—including vast slums with a global population expected to reach more than 1.4 billion by 2020. See Jutersonke et al., ‘Guns and the City’.

64. See Muggah, States of Fragility.

65. See, for example, Anderson, Do No Harm; OECD, Guidelines on Helping and Armed Violence Reduction Guidance.

66. See, for example, UN, ‘Promoting Development’ and the Geneva Declaration as well as OECD, Principles for Good International Engagement for a review of the specific impacts of armed violence on MDG priorities.

67. OECD, Armed Violence Reduction Guidance; OECD, Guidance on Evaluating; Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2007 .

68. In November 2007 more than 20 African countries signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development—with clear commitments to achieving measurable reductions in armed violence by 2015.

69. The World Bank and IADB, for example, are supporting experimental efforts to prevent and reduce criminal violence in a host of countries. Likewise, the WHO has heavily invested in violence and injury prevention and is supporting the collection of ‘best practices’ and ‘quick wins’.

70. OECD, Armed Violence Reduction Guidance.

71. More recently the UN has sought to develop its approach to DDR and arms reduction through the design of ‘integrated missions’. While experiencing growing pains in countries such as Haiti and Sudan, integrated missions combining UNDP and UNDPKO are expected to enhance coherence and co-ordination in relation to DDR, address civilian possession and reduce transaction costs and collective action dilemmas between agencies. A set of ‘integrated’ DDR guidelines (IDDRS) were recently produced to guide the process. See Muggah, ‘Emerging from the Shadow of War’.

72. Colletta and Muggah, ‘Context Matters’.

73. Colletta and Muggah, ‘Context Matters’

74. Small Arms Survey 2009; Ghoborah et al., ‘Civil Wars Kill’.

75. A significant factor influencing the onset of conflict is the unsustainable growth of military establishments, as the Small Arms Survey 2003 makes clear.

76. These kinds of processes are a form of ‘governmentality’—a process involving the extension of subtle forms of state control through the rational practices and actions of citizens.

77. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Keen, Economic Functions of Violence; Kaldor, New and Old Wars.