Confronting Peaceful Co-existence: Psychological Warfare and the Role of Interdoc, 1963–72

Abstract

Interest in Cold War psychological warfare and propaganda operations by both East and West, and the institutions that have pursued them, has increased among diplomatic historians over the last decade.1 As an addition to the burgeoning literature on the ideological dimension of the conflict, this article examines the foundation and purpose of the International Information and Documentation Center or ‘Interdoc’. Founded in 1963 in The Hague, Interdoc was meant to develop a psychological response to the Soviet strategy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Its arrival was the result of discussions between French, German, and Dutch intelligence services, along with individuals from industry and academia, that had taken place over the previous six years. Interdoc's central focus was to increase the level of understanding of communist doctrine and practice by stimulating and making available well-researched information on the policies and realities of the Soviet bloc. By the end of the 1960s Interdoc had expanded into a centre of increasing activity for research, training, conference, and publication programmes. However, at the point when plans were being made to extend its operations by making contacts with the Eastern bloc, Chancellor Brandt's pursuit of Ostpolitik caused a catastrophic withdrawal of German financial support.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the following, without whom this research would not have been possible: Christiaan and Marona van den Heuvel, Robbert Jan Hageman at the Nationaal Archief, and Paul Koedijk.

Notes

 [1] See Osgood, Total Cold War; Defty, Britain, America, and Anti-Communist Propaganda; Lucas, Freedom's War.

 [2] On the significance of this development see Lucas, “Mobilizing Culture.”

 [3] On the Soviet position in 1945–46 see Nadzhafov, “The Beginning of the Cold War between East and West”; On the methods used see Clews, Communist Propaganda Techniques.

 [4] “The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare,” 4 May 1948, Policy Planning Staff [George Kennan], FRUS , 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 668–72. Political warfare was a term originated by the British during World War II. A useful definition: ‘A form of conflict between states in which each protagonist seeks to impose its will on its opponent by methods other than the use of armed force. For practical purposes, the principal weapon of political warfare may be described as the combined operation of diplomacy and propaganda’. “The Strategy of Political Warfare,” n.d., quoted in W.E.D., “Changing Concepts”, in Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, 16.

 [5] NSC 4, 4A, and 10/2, FRUS, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 640–42, 649–51, 713–15.

 [6] See Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom; Mickelson, America's Other Voice.

 [7] See Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy; Stonor Saunders, Who Paid The Piper?

 [8] See Aldrich, “Putting Culture in the Cold War”; Wilford, The CIA, The British Left, and the Cold War, 262–96.

 [9] The sequence of Western-orientated fronts went as follows: August 1948 World Assembly of Youth (to oppose World Federation of Democratic Youth); December 1949 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (to oppose World Federation of Trade Unions); June 1950 CCF; November 1951 International Federation of Deportees and Resistance Internees (to oppose Federation Internationale des Resistants); January 1952 Coordinating Secretariat of the International Student Council (to oppose the International Union of Students); May 1952 International Federation of Journalists (to oppose the International Union of Journalists); July 1952 International Commission of Jurists; August 1952 World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (to oppose communist dominance of World Federation of Teachers Unions). “Non-Communist International Organisations,” 20 July 1959, WP(59)1, AC/52 Committee for Information and Cultural Cooperation, NATO archive, Brussels.

[10] On Paix et Liberté see Regnier, “La Propagande Anticommuniste de Paix et Liberté”; Delmas and Kessler (eds), Renseignement et Propagande pendant la Guerre Froide; Ludwig, “Le Comité Européen et International Paix et Liberté.”

[11] Osgood, “Total Cold War,” 24.

[12] Kirkpatrick (ed.), Year of Crisis, 7. This book was prepared with material from USIA's Office of Research and Information.

[13] Taubman, Khrushchev, 354.

[14] Khrushchev, “Peaceful Coexistence,” 126–8.

[15] “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 9 January 1958, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958 , 2–17; Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 149–83; Osgood, “Total Cold War.”

[16] Koedijk, “Van ‘Vrede en Vrijheid’ tot ‘Volk en Verdediging’.” Koedijk's ground-breaking chapter gives an excellent introduction to the background and formation of Interdoc, and it has been the inspiration for this research.

[17] Tasks for the Free World Today , 93; Einthoven, Tegen De Stroom In, 232–3; Crozier, Free Agent, pp.30–33. Crozier reports that Bonnemaison's colloques began in 1955, but material in van den Heuvel's archive points to 1957.

[18] “Interdoc,” 20 May 1963, File: Prospectus Interdoc, archive of C.C. van den Heuvel, Nationaal Archief, The Hague (hereafter ‘CC’).

[19] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Mogelijkheden van Psychologische Verdediging tegen Sovjet-beinvloeding”, April 1959, as quoted in Koedijk, “Van ‘Vrede en Vrijheid’ tot ‘Volk en Verdediging’,” 71.

[20] Bonnemaison to Einthoven, 2 December 1959, File: Italy Map 7, 1960–1961, CC.

[21] C.C. van den Heuvel, “De psychologische oorlogvoering in verband met de BVD-taak,” and “Het gebruik van de inlichtingen van een veiligheidsdienst ten behoeve van de psychologische oorlogvoering tegen het communisme,” n.d. [1958–59], File: SOEV Map 2, CC.

[22] C.C. van den Heuvel et al., “Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Influence,” April 1959, author's copy.

[23] Memo, n.d. [February 1962], concerning a meeting of “a number of distinguished industrialists” with Prince Bernhard at Palace Soestdijk, 10 February 1962. File: Map 55 Prince Bernhard 1962–86. The companies that were most enthusiastic about SOEV's proposal were Shell, Unilever, and the Netherlands Railways. SOEV also developed a close working relationship with the internal information service of the Dutch Air Force.

[24] See “Stichting bestudeert de koude oorlog,” Trouw, 3 February 1962, 9.

[25] C.C. van den Heuvel, “De psychologische oorlogvoering in verband met de BVD-taak,” File: SOEV Map 2, CC.

[26] In 1965 the two merged to form the Oost–West Instituut (OWI), thereby joining the training and advisory functions of SOEV with the scholarly-intellectual output of the journal. The OWI lasted until 1978, when its tasks were taken over by another van den Heuvel vehicle, the Centrum voor Europese Veiligheid en Samenwerking. The Oost–West journal, however, was renamed Civis Mundi in 1971 and remains in print under the control of its original editor, professor S.W. Couwenberg.

[27] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Enkele nadere gegevens m.b.t. de mogelijkheid van een instituut in Nederland ter bestrijding van de psychologische verdediging tegen Sowjet beinvloeding,” 15 March 1960, CC (no file number).

[28] Van den Heuvel to James L. Monroe, 21 July 1961, File: SOEV Map 1, Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, 1958–64, CC.

[29] For a detailed analysis of the NATO psychological warfare discussions and the link with Interdoc's formation, see Scott-Smith, “Not a NATO Responsibility?”

[30] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Hoofdlijnen van een Internationaal Instituut ter Bestrijding van de Psychologische Oorlogvoering van het Communisme,” 16 November 1959, CC; C.C. van den Heuvel, “Psychologische Oorlogvoering,” 22–3.

[31] “…dat er verkeerde elementen binnen zouden dringen.” “Reis Amsterdam-Munchen-Zurich-Bern-Geneve-Amsterdam, 22–26 januari,” L. Einthoven, n.d. [1962], File: Reisverslagen Zwitserland, CC.

[32] It is not clear who replaced Bonnemaison within the SDECE, but Brian Crozier has confirmed that Bonnemaison's SDECE rival Jean Violet ‘more or less took over the colloques’. Brian Crozier, interview, London, 4 November 2004.

[33] “Interdoc,” January 1963, File: Interdoc UK Algemeen Map 1 (1962, 1963), 1964–65, CC.

[34] In 1966 the Verein was renamed the Deutsche Arbeitsgruppe für West–Ost Beziehungen.

[35] See Gehlen, The Service, 258.

[36] File: Interdoc Statutes, CC. Hornix was a sociology lecturer who taught at the Dutch Air Force Staff School and had been investigating psychological warfare issues since the early 1950s. Rijks, the SOEV treasurer, was a high functionary of Shell. Both Kernig and Lades were attached to the Verein. Kernig was a researcher with Herder publishing company, and Lades was a history professor at the University of Erlangen.

[37] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Enkele gegevens over de psychologische verdediging in de VS en Engeland,” March 1960, CC (no file number).

[38] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Hoofdlijnen van een Internationaal Instituut,” 12 October 1959, CC (no file number).

[39] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Psychologische Oorlogvoering,” 24. In the Netherlands itself this task was fulfilled by first SOEV, then the Oost–West Instituut, in an overlapping arrangement with Interdoc.

[40] The colloque held in Mont St. Michel in 1962, organized by Bonnemaison, was devoted to an in-depth theoretical and practical study of cadre formation. File: Kadertraining Italië, 1962–64, CC.

[41] File: Interdoc Statutes, CC.

[42] “Notes on Terminology,” Tasks for the Free World Today, 9.

[43] Wilford, The CIA, The British Left, and the Cold War, 161.

[44] Gert van Maanen, interview, 1 November 2006. Van Maanen was international secretary and then president of the Dutch Student Council during 1962–64 and had close contact with van den Heuvel in that period.

[45] On the early festivals and the West's response see Kotek, “Youth Organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War.”

[46] “World Youth Festivals,” International Youth Service, Norway, n.d. [1962], CIA-RDP79-01194A000200030001-1, CREST (CIA Records Search Tool), National Archives, College Park, Washington DC.

[47] Drs. J.M.M. Hornix and C.C. van den Heuvel, “Een Karakteristiek van de Waarden van het Westen, alsmede enkele Gedachten over de Mogelijkheden van Bevordering van een Blijvende Invloed van deze Waarden,” September 1959, CC (no file number).

[48] Hans Beuker, interview, Houten, 3 September 2003; C.C. van den Heuvel, “VIIIth World Youth Festival, Helsinki, 29 July to 6th August 1962”, n.d., author's copy.

[49] As well as being the subject of a report in the New York Herald Tribune (4–5 August 1962), Beuker was also captured on film making his speech by a CBS TV crew. The footage was broadcast by CBS in the series ‘20th Century’ on 3 February 1963.

[50] The international contact group that van den Heuvel coordinated for Helsinki, named first the ‘Strasbourg’ and later the ‘Luxembourg group’ (the name change had presumably to do with the end of French participation), remained prepared for similar actions in the future. An IUS meeting in Florence in 1963 was the next target. Once again a small group, this time led by van den Heuvel's deputy (and former BVD colleague) Herman Mennes, prepared and presented another anti-Soviet imperialism speech which they were able to print on the university press and distribute themselves. Yet it turned out that this was the high point for such activities. Plans for similar counter-actions at major youth festivals in Algiers in 1965 and Accra in 1966 were shelved due to the cancellation of these events following political turmoil (the Ghana conference was cancelled due to the fall of Nkrumah). Following Helsinki the Soviet-controlled international youth movement was also more cautious, waiting six years before holding another festival on a smaller scale in 1968 in Sofia. While Interdoc observers were sent to Sofia, no Helsinki-style counter-action was planned, it being also a more dangerous location than Helsinki. By that stage the importance of the youth festival movement had faded. For the 1973 festival in East Berlin van den Heuvel did no more than send his son as observer, who returned to write his MA thesis on the WFDY and IUS at the Free University in Amsterdam. Pieter Koerts, interview, Amsterdam, 2 June 2004; Alexander Heldring, interview, The Hague, 30 June 2004; File: Interdoc UK Algemeen Map 1 (1962, 1963) 1964–65; File: Interdoc UK Map 4 1966; van den Heuvel, “Nederland en het 11de Wereldjeugdfestival.”

[51] “Gesprek in Ostkolleg met Bahro en Nitsche op 16 januari 1963”, File: Ost-Kolleg 1961–63, CC.

[52] File: Ost-Kolleg 1961–64, CC.

[53] The pressure exerted by the US to force the Netherlands to leave its colony of New Guinea during 1960–63 caused much resentment amongst Dutch elites, leading to considerable effort by USIA to repair the damage. The editorial staff of the liberal papers in particular received attention in the form of exchange grants and special briefings.

[54] File: Interdoc Berlin, 1960–68, CC.

[55] “Insofern war unser Budget illusorisch.” Von Hahn to van den Heuvel, 22 May 1963, ibid., author's copy.

[56] “Seine Position und policy mit uns erheblich stärken.” Von Hahn to van den Heuvel, 22 May 1963, ibid., author's copy.

[57] File: Financiering en Organisatie 1970–73. The Guilder:Deutschmark exchange rate was about 1:1.

[58] Drs. J.M.M. Hornix and C.C. van den Heuvel, “Een Karakteristiek van de Waarden van het Westen,” September 1959, CC (no file number).

[59] Einthoven, Tegen De Stroom In, 233.

[60] Dr. Nicolaus von Grote, “What is Positive Anti-Communism?”, Tasks for the Free World Today, 42.

[61] See especially Couwenberg, Oost en West, 188–99.

[62] Einthoven, Tegen De Stroom In, 239–43; telephone interview, professor Couwenberg, 15 June 2005.

[63] Interdoc Information Bulletin, “Preparation for East–West Contacts,” Interdoc Conference, Zandvoort, 24–5 September 1965, 5.

[64] Geyer to van den Heuvel, 14 December 1965, author's copy.

[65] Rolf Geyer, “Some Thoughts on Communist Policy”, in Communist Reassessment of Capitalism .

[66] See for instance the advice provided by Interdoc to a group of Dutch businessmen for their 1964 trip to the Soviet Union, File: Nederland Map 21, SOEV, Nederlands Centrum van Directeuren, 1964, 1965.

[67] However, by 1969 Geyer was referring to the Council as a ‘palaver’ and it does not seem to have achieved its purpose.

[68] Interdoc Youth was also intended to build a solid international youth and student network to counter the growing influence of the New Left and anti-war movements. Its head, the German Uwe Holl, ran the operation from Interdoc's location in The Hague from 1968 to 1970.

[69] File: Azie Instituut, CC.

[70] See Graaff and Wiebes, “Intelligence and the Cold War behind the Dykes,” 41–58; Hoekstra, “The Dutch BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation.”

[71] The other Dutchmen were Hornix, Dr. F.J.E. Hogewind of the Government Psychological Service, Leiden psychology professor J.H. van den Berg, and chief of the railway police K.C. de Pous. Hornix, Hogewind, and van den Berg became the core group around which SOEV was formed in 1960. On the trip see Koedijk, “Van ‘Vrede en Vrijheid’ tot ‘Volk en Verdediging’,” 72–3.

[72] “1957 Annual Report,” SIHE, File: SOEV Map 1. SIHE was not on the original itinerary for the Dutch group, but they were directed there by Dr. John W. Gittinger, SIHE's ‘Field Representative’ and CIA psychologist (from 1960 the chief psychologist with CIA's Clandestine Services).

[73] “Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Influence,” van den Heuvel et al., April 1959, 41–6.

[74] C.C. van den Heuvel, “Hoofdlijnen van een Internationaal Instituut.”

[75] Einthoven to Prince Bernhard, 15 January 1962, File: Map 55 Prince Bernhard 1962–86.

[76] Einthoven to Prince Bernhard, 22 July 1963; Einthoven to Prince Bernhard, 19 August 1963, ibid.

[77] “Oost–West Instituut vh Stichting Onderzoek Ecologische Vraagstukken,” Dossier 25: 936, Philips Company Archives, Eindhoven, the Netherlands.

[78] File: Interdoc UK, Map 4, 1966, CC.

[79] “Development of Contacts in the United States,” Interdoc: Report on Activities 1967, author's copy; Van den Heuvel to Geyer, 3 May 1968, and Geyer to van den Heuvel, 13 May 1968, CC (no file number). Geyer's attitude towards American participation seems to have been ambiguous. While it could have lessened the financial burden for the BND, he never seems to have believed that a suitable arrangement with the Americans could be made. Uwe Holl (head of Interdoc Youth 1969–70), interview, 18 December 2005.

[80] In 1971 Frank Barnett, NSIC's director, did arrange a one-off grant of $30,000 via business associates at Asian–American Educational Exchange Inc. In 1972 van den Heuvel organized a successful conference at Valley Forge, Virginia, together with the American Bar Association.

[81] When Crozier established his Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) in 1969 he removed himself from this liaison role. It is worth noting that NSIC threw its weight behind Crozier's venture and not behind Interdoc. Crozier to van den Heuvel, 31 December 1968, File: Interdoc UK Map 19, Brian Crozier, Institute for the Study of Conflict 1961–1976; “Interdoc – UK,” n.d. [1964], File: Interdoc UK, Algemene Gegevens 1964; “Conflicting Accounts,” Time Out, 29 August–4 September 1975, 5–6; Crozier, Free Agent, 102; Brian Crozier, interview, London, 4 November 2004.

[82] In 1965 Ellis was interrogated by MI5 under suspicion of being a Soviet agent. Peter Wright was convinced of his guilt, but Ellis refused to confess. These revelations do not seem to have affected his relations with van den Heuvel or Einthoven. See Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery, 192–205; Wright, Spycatcher, 325–30.

[83] Ampersand was established by Leslie Sheridan, who had been named as the Interdoc contact man in Britain before his untimely death in 1964. On Ampersand see Lashmar and Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War, 100; Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 458.

[84] “Protokoll der Sitzung mit Herrn Wiggers am 2.6.1970,” File: Eind Interdoc, 1970–72, CC.

[85] Geyer to van den Heuvel, 11 May 1970, author's copy. “Ich hätte, da die Entscheidungen – trotz aller Bemühungen meinerseits – sowohl in Bonn als auch in München gefallen waren, nichts mehr ändern können.”

[86] Uwe Holl, interview, 18 December 2005.

[87] “Besprechung mit dem Prasidenten des BND am 3.12.1970, 17.10–17.40 Uhr,” File: Einde Interdoc, CC.

[88] “Memorandum m.t.b. de huidige precaire financiele situatie van Interdoc (en daardoor ook het Oost–West Instituut)”; Van den Heuvel to Ehmke, 10 August 1972; Ehmke to van den Heuvel, 26 September 1972, File: Financiering en Reorganisatie 1970–73, CC. A year later it was discovered that Ehmke had withdrawn DM50,000 from a secret fund controlled by the Chancellor's office, a day before this same amount was paid to a CDU politician in 1972 as a bribe to gain his support for the Brandt coalition. The International Herald Tribune report on the events included the strong suspicion that the fund ‘was earmarked for covert intelligence operations’ and that this was probably the reason for Ehmke's inability to fully explain his action. “Ehmke Admits Using Secret Funds,” IHT, 6 September 1973.

[89] The God That Failed (1950) consisted of six ex-communists (including Andre Gide and Arthur Koestler) explaining their attraction to and later disillusionment with communism. It was also a product of the Anglo-American psychological warfare establishment. See Saunders, Who Paid The Piper? , 64–6.

[90] It is interesting to note here the diffusion of communist theory and praxis into Western activities from the 1940s to the 1960s. While the Western intelligence services adopted the basic methods used by communist fronts early on, by the early 1960s Marxist-inspired theory had gained such a hold that the State Department's Policy Planning Staff were talking in explicitly Gramscian terms of the US adopting ‘a diplomacy of movement rather than of position’ to hold the Western alliance together. Interdoc's aim to train political cadres also had antecedents. Already in 1951 Melvin Lasky, following his role in founding the CCF, wrote that ‘the task is to help train political leadership cadres, to assist in creating an international circle of democrats with a united sense of mission’. See Wenger and Suri, “At the Crossroads of Diplomatic and Social History”, 20; Lasky to Shepard Stone, 30 August 1951, quoted in Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture, 165.

[91] This was certainly the case in the Netherlands. See for instance “Ecologie,” Vrij Nederland, 18 May 1963.

[92] Uwe Holl, interview, 18 December 2005.

[93] This point was noted by van den Heuvel in “Het gebruik van de inlicthingen van een veiligheidsdienst,” File: SOEV Map 2.

[94] Discussion document, File: SOEV Map 3, CC (emphasis added). While working for the BVD van den Heuvel had been involved in clandestine liaison with the Dutch press to release selected information for propaganda purposes. Interdoc was a means to institutionalize and normalize those relations.

[95] From 1972 onwards van den Heuvel, together with others from the Interdoc circle such as Couwenberg, continued to work towards utilizing East–West contacts to change attitudes behind the Iron Curtain. In 1974 he made his first trip to Moscow to visit, among others, Georgii Arbatov at the Institute of US and Canadian Studies (ISKAN). This Dutch group later established the Centrum voor Europese Veiligheid en Samenwerking to try and capitalize fully on the space opened up by the Helsinki Accords.

[96] On the growing debate over the importance of the transfer of ideas in ending the Cold war see the Special Issue “Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Giles Scott-Smith

Giles Scott-Smith is a senior researcher with the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, the Netherlands. His research interests broadly cover the role of ideology in international affairs during the Cold War, from psychological warfare to cultural relations and the history and practice of US public diplomacy. This article is part of the author's research project on the apparatus and activities of the Interdoc network from the 1960s to the 1980s. His study of the State Department's Foreign Leader Program in Western Europe will be published by Peter Lang in 2007.