The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Warning of Aggression

Abstract

This article introduces and includes the Nicoll Report – a previously classified document written to assess the performance of the British Joint Intelligence Committee in warning about foreign acts of aggression. The Nicoll Report is a hugely significant document for four main reasons: it provides detail on intelligence estimates for case studies which have not yet been released into the archive; it provides an examination of the JIC's failures and in doing so it is far more candid than the ‘open’ investigations conducted by Lord Franks and Lord Butler; it provides an exploration of how intelligence must be relevant to policy-makers in order for it to be useful; and finally, it identifies general lessons for the future and which are immensely revealing with the benefit of hindsight.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Pete Davies, Peter Hennessy and Michael Herman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this.

Notes

 [1] In a sense the Cabinet Office Advisory Group on intelligence records continues this role in the way that it suggests areas for proactive release.

 [2] Cradock, Know Your Enemy, 261. For more explanation of the role of intelligence within the British government, see http://www.intelligence.gov.uk.

 [3] Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands War, Vol.I, 219–21 and Vol.II, 720.

 [4] See (Cmnd.8787) Lord Franks, The Falkland Islands Review; (HC 898) Lord Butler, Review.

 [5] Cradock. Know Your Enemy.

 [6] Available at: http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/central_intelligence_machinery/joint_intelligence_committee/jic_terms.aspx.

 [7] For more detail see Goodman, “Learning to Walk”.

 [8] In times of crisis the Committee would meet more frequently. In addition, when necessary the Current Intelligence Groups could issue urgent assessments on their own authority.

 [9] Freedman. The Official History of the Falklands War.

[10] Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Michael S. Goodman

Dr Michael S. Goodman is a lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, where he teaches various courses on intelligence. He is the author of numerous articles on intelligence, and of the forthcoming book Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2007). From September 2007 he will be seconded to the Cabinet Office as the Official Historian of the Joint Intelligence Committee.