Playing with fire: The Soviet–Syrian–Israeli triangle, 1965–1967

Guy Laron is a post-doctoral fellow at Northwestern University's History Department. He has recently submitted a dissertation on Israeli–Egyptian relations in the 1950s and is now revising it into a book manuscript tentatively titled: ‘Crossroad Suez: Israel, Egypt and the Superpowers in the Run Up to the Suez Crisis, 1952–1956’.

Abstract

Setting out to assess Soviet policy toward Syria and Israel in the two years that preceded the Six Day War, this article argues that the Soviets were trying to implement a policy of détente in the Middle East. Therefore, they were wary of war between Israel and Syria and did their best, albeit clumsily at times, to prevent it from erupting. Their policy moved in cross-purposes to Syrian needs and little by little they lost control over their ally. This story should be read against the backdrop of the rebellion of radical regimes in the Third World against Soviet détente policy, thus emphasizing the ability of actors in the periphery of the Cold War to undermine superpower designs.

Acknowledgements

The article was written while the author was a post doctoral fellow at Tel Aviv University. He wishes to thank Christian Ostermann, director of the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center, for facilitating a generous travel grant that enabled the author to conduct research in Prague. He would also like to thank the following individuals for reading and commenting on the draft: James Hershberg, Galia Golan, Yaacov Ro'i, Carolyn Biltoft and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

Guy Laron is a post-doctoral fellow at Northwestern University's History Department. He has recently submitted a dissertation on Israeli–Egyptian relations in the 1950s and is now revising it into a book manuscript tentatively titled: ‘Crossroad Suez: Israel, Egypt and the Superpowers in the Run Up to the Suez Crisis, 1952–1956’.

 [1] See for instance: Kornienko, Cholodnaya Voina, 167–74; Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 21–35.

 [2] See for instance: Glassman, Arms to the Arabs, 37–44; Anderson, Public Politics, 190; Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona.

 [3] Golan, ‘The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War’; Ro'i and Morozov, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War.

 [4] Galia Golan adopts a similar methodology in her Yom Kippur and After, 1–20.

 [5] A similar argument can be found in chapter 5 of Westad, the Global Cold War.

 [6] Zubok, A Failed Empire, 192–226.

 [7] United States National Archives, College Park, MD, [USNA], RG 59, Central Policy Files [CPF], 1964-66, POL-2-3 Politico-Economic Reports USSR, box 2883, ‘Annual Politico-Economic Assessment’, Moscow (D. E. Boster) to State Dept., Airgram A-965, 17 December 1965.

 [8] Dobrynin, In Confidence, 649.

 [9] Russian Governmental Archive for Modern History [hereafter RGANI according to the Russian acronym], Moscow, f. 2, op. 3, delo 45, ll. 30, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and the Efforts of the CSPU to Unite the Global Communist Movement’ [hereafter ‘The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union’], 12 December 1966.

[10] Israeli State Archive [ISA], Jerusalem, RG Foreign Ministry [FM], file no. 4049/7, Bonn (N. Hadas) to Foreign Ministry, 1 September 1966.

[11] RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 480 ll. 106–9, ‘Instructions for the Soviet Delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference’, 18 June 1965.

[12] ISA, RG FM, file no. 4049/7, Bonn (N. Hadas) to Foreign Ministry, 1 September 1966.

[13] Dobrynin, In Confidence, 651.

[14] Dobrynin, In Confidence, 650–651.

[15] Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59, 62; Anderson, Public Politics, 137-8, 140; Glassman, Arms to the Arabs, 34-7.

[16] RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 489, ll. 32-42, ‘Work Plan: Planning Guidelines for Foreign Policy Measures in the Year 1966’, 14 February 1966.

[17] ‘The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union’, ll. 25–6. See also: Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964–68, XIV, Document no. 186, Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 25 November 1966.

[18] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi konflikt, 473–75, ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Victor Semyonov, with Head of the East European Department in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, A. Doron’, 1 June 1965; ibid., 485–7, ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador D. S. Chuvachin and Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban’, 4 January 1966.

[19] ISA, Levi Eshkol papers, file no. 7935/9-A, ‘Report by Sh. Mikonis and Moshe Seneh on their Talks with Suslov and Ponemarev’, 2 February 1966.

[20] Oren, Six Days, 59.

[21] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 491–9, ‘Memorandum by D. S. Chuvachin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko’, 21 March 1966.

[22] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 489–90; ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Counselor at Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, F. N. Fedatov, and the First Secretary of the UAR Embassy in the USSR, Y[usuf] Sharara’, 7 March 1966; ibid., 490–1, ‘Memorandum Written by A. D. Shchiborin, Head of the Middle East Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry regarding the Speech of the Soviet Ambassador in Israel’, 19 March 1966.

[23] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 487–9, ‘Brief Prepared by the Middle Eastern Department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry regarding Israeli Intentions to Obtain Nuclear Weapons’, 23 February 1966; See also: ISA, Levi Eshkol Papers, file no. 7935/9-A, untitled note, 30 March 1966. Cf. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, 36–48.

[24] Rabinovich, Syria, 215–6; Zisser, ‘June 1967’, 170–8.

[25] See, for instance: ISA, Levi Eshkol papers, file no. 7935/9-a, ‘Chuvakhin-Eshkol Conversation’, 11 October 1966.

[26] RGANI, fond 5, op. 30, delo 489, ll. 216–19, ‘The Syrian Arab Socialist Renaissance Party’, 20 April 1966.

[27] RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 489, ll. 210–15, ‘Talking Paper for the Conversation in the Central Committee with the Head of the Syrian Delegation and Member of the Regional Leadership of the Ba'ath Party, Yusuf Zuayn’, 20 April 1966.

[28] USNA, RG 59, CPF, 1967–1969, POL-6 SYR, Box 2510, ‘Visit of Syrian Delegation to Moscow’, 24 February 1967.

[29] Weit, At the Red Summit, 139–40.

[30] The Dayan Center Archive, Tel Aviv, Special Ba'ath collection, ‘Regional Leadership no. 71-140', document no. 130, ‘Regarding the Visit of our Delegation to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracy of Bulgaria’, 10 May 1966.

[31] al-Munadil, ‘An analysis of the Joint Syrian–Soviet communiqué’, June 1966.

[32] The Dayan Center Archive, Special Ba'ath Collection, ‘Regional Leadership, no. 220-360', document no. 232, ‘Answers from the Regional Leadership to Questions from Branch 36’, 26 April 1966.

[33] Al-Hayat, 10 May 1966.

[34] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 503–4, ‘Telegram from the Ambassador in Syria A. A. Barkovski to Soviet Foreign Ministry’, 11 May 1966.

[35] For a similar view: Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics, 147–57; Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, 20–51.

[36] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 505–6, ‘Telegram from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Jordan’, 24 May 1967; ibid., 506–8, ‘Memorandum of Conversation Between Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, V. S. Semyonov, and Israeli Ambassador in Moscow, K. Kats’, 25 May 1966; ibid., 508–12, ‘Memorandum of Conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Jordan, P. K. Slyusarenko, and King Hussein’, 28 May 1966; ISA, Levi Eshkol papers, file no. 7935/9-a, ‘Soviet Telegram which was Delivered to Ambassador Katriel Katz on 25.5.1966’; al-Hayat, 28 May 1966, 31 May 1966.

[37] ISA, RG FM, file no. 4054/9, Washington (Nisim Yai'sh) to Foreign Ministry, ‘Soviet Arms Shipments to Arab Countries’, 25 August 1966.

[38] ISA, RG FM, file no. 4049/7, Bonn (N. Hadas) to Foreign Ministry, 1 September 1966; ibid., Paris (Y. Hadas) to Foreign Ministry, ‘The Soviet Union and the Middle East’, 7 December 1966; Ben Tzur, Soviet Factors, 94–5.

[39] Haykal, Sphinx and the Commissar, 170.

[40] Al-Hayat, 10–11, September 1966; Aharon Neumark, The Ba'th Regime in Syria, 82.

[41] Haykal, 1967: al-Infijar, 362–3.

[42] Gluska, The Israeli Military, 82.

[43] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 515–17, ‘Telegram of the Soviet ambassador in Israel D. S. Chuvachin, to Soviet Foreign Ministry’, 11 October 1966.

[44] Gluska, Eshkol, Give the Order!, 154.

[45] Intelligence and Terrorism Center [ITC], Glilot, Israel, Captured Documents Collection, RG Six-Day War, 1967, Vol. 4, ‘Syria – Intelligence’, ‘A Report by the Commander of Reconnaissance Operations in the Intelligence Branch at the South-Western Command (Qunetra)’, 22 March 1966; ibid., ‘Summary of Daily Reports Made by Syrian Intelligence Unit 211 up to 4.6.67’.

[46] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 515–17, ‘Telegram from the Soviet ambassador in Israel D. S. Chuvachin, to Soviet Foreign Ministry’, 11 October 1966; ibid., 518, ‘Telegram from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Soviet ambassador in Israel’, 11 October 1966; ibid., 518-19, ‘Telegram from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Soviet ambassador in the UAR’, 11 October 1966; ibid, 521-22, ‘Telegram from the Soviet ambassador in Syria, A. A. Barkovski, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry’, 13 October 1966.

[47] Al-Hayat, 11 October 1966.

[48] Gluska, The Israeli Military, 82.

[49] Al-Hayat, 20 October 1966.

[50] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 529–30, ‘Report of the Soviet Foreign Minister, A. A. Gromyko, to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party’, November 1966 [exact date unknown].

[51] Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 106–44.

[52] Hershberg, ‘Peace Probes’, 66; Luthi, ‘Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents’; Czech Foreign Ministry Archive [hereafter A MZV according to the Czech acronym], Prague, RG incoming telegrams, Hanoi to Foreign Ministry, telegram no. 9312, 22 September 1966; ibid, Hanoi to Foreign Ministry, telegram no. 162, 6 January 1967; ibid, Hanoi to Foreign Ministry, telegram no. 2700, 14 March 1967.

[53] A MZV, RG TO-T, Syrie, 1965–69, Box 2, folder 13 (116∖311), Damascus (M. Korselt) to Foreign Ministry, ‘Chinese activity in Syria, Political Report no. 4∖67’, 18 February 1967.

[54] Dobrynin, In Confidence, 651.

[55] al-Aqad, Ma'sat Yunyu, 1967, 205.

[56] A MZV, RG TO-T, Syrie, 1965–69, Box 2, folder 13 (116∖311), Damascus (M. Korselt) to Foreign Ministry, ‘The Visit of the Ba'th delegation in the USSR, Political Report no. 3’, 16 February 1967.

[57] A MZV, RG TO-T, Syrie, 1965–69, Box 2, folder 13 (116∖311), Damascus (M. Korselt) to Foreign Ministry, ‘The Visit of the Ba'th delegation in the USSR, Political Report no. 3’, 16 February 1967; Jundi's quote taken from: USNA, RG 59, CPF, 1967–1969, POL 17 SYR-US, Box 2511, Damascus (Smythe) to State Dept., airgram A-367, ‘New Evidence of SARG-Soviet Disillusion’, 20 February 1967.

[58] Neumark, The Neo-Ba'th, 108.

[59] USNA, RG 59, CFP, 1964–66, POL 1 Gen. Policy Background UAR-USSR, Box 2769, Moscow (Kohler) to State Dept., telegram no. 2165, 9 November 1966; ISA, RG FM, file no. 4049/7, Paris (Y. Hadas) to Foreign Ministry, ‘The Soviet Union and the Middle East’, 7 December 1966.

[60] USNA, RG 59, CPF, 1964–66, POL 1 ARAB, box 1889, Baghdad (James E. Akins) to State Dept., Airgram A-787, ‘Soviet Official Expresses Views on Arab and Iraqi Affairs’, 3 March 1965; Czech National Archive, Prague, Fond Antonin Novotny, Subject no. 2: ‘Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, Asia-Africa’, Box 3, ‘Consultation between the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Foreign Ministry’, 22–6 May 1966.

[61] Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam war, 75–7.

[62] Dobrynin, In Confidence, 140–41.

[63] Westad, The Global Cold War, 162.

[64] A MZV, RG TO-T, Syrie, 1965–69, Box 2, folder 13 (116∖311), Damascus (M. Korselt) to Foreign Ministry, ‘Chinese activity in Syria, Political Report no. 4∖67’, 18 February 1967.

[65] Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, 20; ISA, RG FM, file no. 4048/30, ‘Conversation with Shchiborin, (reported by Gideon Refael)’, 27 April 1967.

[66] Haykal, al-Infijar, 441–2.

[67] Haykal, al-Infijar, 442–3.

[68] Gluska, The Israeli Military, 105–6.

[69] al-Murtagi, Al-Fariq Murtagi, 50; Hamrush, Qisat Thawrat Yuliyu, Vol. 5, 112; Popp, ‘Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War’, 287.

[70] Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 14–17; Segev, 1967, Israel, 214–17.

[71] Morozov, ‘The Outbreak of the June 1967 War’, 46–7.

[72] Al-Hayat, 6–15 May 1967. For a similar view see: Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics, 157–61.

[73] Parker, Politics of miscalculation, 41–42, 251; Parker, The Six-Day War, 71; Dawn, ‘The Egyptian Remilitarization’, 208–9.

[74] Dawn, ‘The Egyptian Remilitarization’, 210; al-Thawra, 12 May 1967.

[75] ITC, Captured Documents Collection, RG Six-Day War, 1967, Vol. 4 ‘Syria – Intelligence’, ‘Syrian Intelligence Reports on Israeli Troops Concentrations in the North Relating to the Period from 14.4.67 to 3.6.67’.

[76] Shay, ‘The Israeli Evaluation’, 135.

[77] Naumkin, Blizhnevostochnyi Konflikt, 551–3, ‘Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, and the Chairman of the UAR's National Parliament, Anwar Sadat’, 13 May 1967.

[78] Haykal, al-Infijar, 444–5. Indeed, there are Egyptian claims that the Soviet report was given to them in more than one channel. See: Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 5–6.

[79] Sadat, In Search of Identity, 171–2.

[80] http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/CAESAR/caesar-50.pdf [accessed 2 June 2008], CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, (Caesar XXXVIII), ‘Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab–Israeli War’, 16 March 1970 [declassified June 2007], 5 (emphasis added).

[81] Al-Murtagi, al-Fariq Murtagi, 49.

[82] El-Gamasy, The October War, 21; Shay, ‘The Israeli Evaluation’, 135.

[83] On the evening of 14 and certainly on 15 May the Egyptians knew that there were no Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border. For explanations of Egypt's decision to deploy its army in Sinai nonetheless see: Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 97; Oren, Six Days of War, 64–5.

[84] Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics, 159.

[85] Haykal, al-Infijar, 611–12.

[86] ISA, Levi Eshkol papers, file no. 7920/3-A, Paris to Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967.

[87] ISA, Levi Eshkol papers, file no. 7920/3-A, Paris to Foreign Ministry, 27 May 1967, Research Department to Foreign Ministry, 24 May 1967.

[88] Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 30.

[89] Report by Brezhnev to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, ‘The Soviet Union's policy regarding Israel's Aggression in the Middle East’, 20 June 1967 in Ro'i and Morozov, The Soviet Union, 310.

[90] A MZV, RG incoming telegrams, Damascus to Foreign Ministry, telegram no. 5685, 30 May 1967.

[91] Golan, ‘The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War’, 11.

[92] Haykal, al-Infijar, 614–18; Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 30; Hewedi, 50 Aman min al-Awasif, 408–27.