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Abstract
This article discusses how and why South Korea tried to develop its own nuclear programme in order to safeguard its national security after the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia in 1975 and 1976. Because Washington did not want nuclear proliferation in East Asia, the South Korean leadership decided to use its fledgling nuclear programme as a trump card in negotiations with the US. This article will demonstrate the process in which the client states of the US came to understand how to negotiate with Washington in order to further their own national interests in the Cold War era.
Notes
1 US Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Centre, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decision Making, June 1978, declassified for release October 2005, p. 1, at: www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001254259/DOC_0001254259.pdf.
2 ‘Korea and US Policy in Asia’, 1976. 1, US Policy toward South Korea, Box 135, Jimmy Carter Papers – Pre Presidential, 1976 Presidential Campaign Issue Office-Noel Sterrett, Clippings-Foreign Issues, Jimmy E. Carter Library and Museum.
3 Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 143.
4 The core of this programme was the introduction of the M16 rifle as a standard issue in the South Korean army and of the F-4 Phantom to the South Korean air force.
5Weekly Chosun, Issue 2028, 12 January 2010.
6 Christian F. Ostermann and James F. Person, eds., The Rise and Fall of Détente on the Korean Peninsula, 1970–1974 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011).
7 ‘Korean Policy Reconsideration: A Two-Korea Policy’, 29 May 1973, Pol 32-4 Kor/UN, Subject-Numeric Files, National Archives; Shin Wookhee, ‘Giheo‘eseoGyochkSangtae‘ro [From Opportunity to Stalemate]’, Korea politics and diplomatic history collection 26 (2005): 269.
8 ‘President Park Assassination Attempt, 1974’, 1974, Vol. 2 Negotiation with Japan, Class Number 701,Diplomatic Archives, Republic of Korea.
9 Report from the GDR Foreign Ministry, ‘On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 1975’, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin (PolA AA), MfAA, 300/78. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.
10 For instance, in his diary, he wrote, ‘… by our own eyes, we witnessed that the people who believed that the other countr[ies] will save them and did not prepare to keep their own nation lost their country. …’ This statement could be interpreted as: ‘Heaven helps those who help themselves.’ Yet in some sense, this also sounds like: ‘The other country, i.e. the US, betrayed South Vietnam and did not save it.’
11Donga Ilbo, 1 January1975.
12 Memorandum from Richard Smyser and David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, 28 February 1975, Korea 4, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific,National Security Adviser, Ford Library; ‘ROK Plans to develop nuclear weapons and missiles’, Dos cable, 4 March 1975, secret /nodis (declassified 1997), quoted in Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Washington: Basic Books, 2002), 74. These documents suggested that the US embassy in Seoul had studied the capabilities and intentions of the Blue House with regard to the development of nuclear weapons since 1974.
13 ‘Agreement between ROK and Canada for peaceful nuclear development and application, 1975–77’, Class Number, 761.64 CN, Diplomatic Archive, Republic of Korea. The ROK government considered that American pressure influenced MacEachen's decision.
14 Memorandum from Richard Smyser and David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, 28 February 1975, Korea 4, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
15 ‘Agreement between ROK and Canada for peaceful nuclear development and application, 1975–77’, Class Number, 761.64 CN, Diplomatic Archive, Republic of Korea.
16 ‘Korea and US Policy in Asia’, January 1976, US Policy toward South Korea, Box 135, Jimmy Carter Papers- Pre Presidential. 1976 Presidential Campaign Issue Office-Noel Sterrett, Clippings – Foreign Issues, Jimmy E. Carter Library & Museum.
17Donga Ilbo, 19 March 1975.
18 President Park Chunghee electronic library, The Presidential Instruction at the Commencement of Military Academy 1975, 28 March 1975, http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr/search.html.
19 ‘North Korean Premier Kim Ilsung's visit to China (former Communist China) 18 April 1975- 26 April 1975’, Class Number 725.31 CP, Diplomatic Archive, Republic of Korea.
20 ROK Presidential Secretary's office, ‘Presidential Special Statement on National Security and the Present Situation’, 29 April 1975. The tone and contents of this statement are very similar to present North Korean statements regarding its national security.
21 ROK Presidential Secretary's office, ‘Presidential Special Statement on National Security and the Present Situation’, 29 April 1975. The tone and contents of this statement are very similar to present North Korean statements regarding its national security
22ChosunIlbo, 13 May 1975.
23The Korea Times, 16 May1976.
24Department of US State Bulletin, 8 Sept. 1975, 382–84, especially clause 3.
25 ‘Review of US Policies toward Korea’, Telegram 2807 from Seoul, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, Korea, Box 11, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
26 ‘Review of US Policies toward Korea’, Telegram 2807 from Seoul, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, Korea, Box 11, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library
27The Washington Post, 12 June 1975.
28 ‘US policy towards Korea’, Emb. Cable, 24 June 1975, secret (declassified 1996), quoted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 66.
29 ‘US policy towards Korea’, Emb. Cable, 24 June 1975, secret (declassified 1996), quoted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 66
30 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 67.
31 Gerald R. Ford, ‘The President's News Conference’, 25 June 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid = 5021.
32 Gerald R. Ford, ‘The President's News Conference’, 25 June 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid = 5021
33Donga Ilbo, 26 June 1975.
34 Shin Wookhee, ‘Giheo'eseogyochksangtae'ro [From chance to stalemate]’, Korea politics and diplomatic history collection 26, no. 2: 280
35 ‘Visit of Allan J. MacEachen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada’, Class Number 724.32 CN, Diplomatic Archives, Republic of Korea.
36 Reprocessing facilities were necessary to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons. Based on Oh Woncheol's recommendation to use plutonium for a South Korean nuclear warhead, the ROK government might have decided to import reprocessing facilities from France.
37 ‘Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing, Department of State,’ Memorandum for the Assistant President for National Security Affairs from Robert S. Ingersoll of DOS, 2 July 1975, Ford Library.
38 ‘The National Security Council Memorandum on persuading Seoul’, Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Jan M. Lodal and Dave Elliott, 24 July 1975, Ford Library.
39 Cho Kabje, Park Chunghee (Seoul: Chogabje.com, 2007), Vol. 11, 274.
40Kyeonghyangsinmun, 27 August 1975.
41 ‘Meeting between President Park and Secretary Schlesinger, 26 August, 1975’, Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, 27 August 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library. Regarding Schlesinger's comment on the Democrats, Don Oberdorfer indicated that he might not have known that Jimmy Carter had begun to discuss the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. For details, see Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 71. Regarding ROK-French cooperation, the South Koreans argued that they were afraid that they would suffer a serious loss of face and pay the penalty if they cancelled the purchase of the French reprocessing plant.
42 Cho Cheolho, ‘Park Chunghee‘eui Jaju Gukbang‘gwa Haekgyebal [President Park Chunghee's National Defence Policy of Self-Reliance and the Development of Nuclear Weapons]’, Yeoksa bipyeong 80 (2007): 13
43 ‘ROK plans to develop nuclear weapons and missiles’, Dos cable, 4 March 1975, secret /nodis. quoted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 70.
44 Cho, ‘Park Chunghee‘eui Jaju Gukbang‘gwa Haekgyebal [President Park Chunghee's National Defence Policy of Self-Reliance and the Development of Nuclear Weapons]’, 12.
45 Oh Woncheol, Park Chunghee's neunudukegyeongjeganggukmandleotna [How Park Chunghee could Build a Strong Economy], (Seoul: Dongsumuhwasa, 2009), 334. The South Korean nuclear plants were constructed in Gori and Wolseong in the mid-1980s.
46 And as Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, this fear came true.
47 Henry Kissinger and Allan MacEachen talked about the South Korean contract with Canada for the reprocessing plant and shared their concerns about it in December 1975. See Memorandum of Conversation, conversation between Secretary of State and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17 December 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
48 ‘Korean Reprocessing-Next step’, Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 18 November 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
49 ‘Korean Reprocessing-Next step’, Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 18 November 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library
50 ‘Korean Reprocessing-Issues and options’, Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 18 November 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
51 ‘Habib's visit to Seoul’, Memorandum for the Department of State and Pacific Affairs from the embassy in Seoul, 5 December 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Ford Library. The record of the conversation between the two diplomats has not yet been declassified.
52 This doctrine formally guaranteed that the US would stay in Asia. For the ROK, however, this was not new: Washington reiterated the same commitment several times. Moreover, there was no tangible plan for this commitment. See Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 143.
53Dong-aIlbo, 9 December 1975.
54 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 72.
55 Emb.Cable, 16 December 1975, nodis (declassified, 1998), quoted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 72.
56 Cho Kabje, Park Chunghee, 278.
57 ‘Conversation between Secretary of State and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs’, Memorandum of Conversation, Brussels, 24 January 1976, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
58 ‘Conversation between Secretary of State and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs’, Memorandum of Conversation, Brussels, 24 January 1976, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library
59 ‘Information Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (Bergold) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’,Washington, 16 March 1976. OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, Korea, 092, 1976, Washington National Records Centre.
60 Cho Kabje, ‘Interview with JaenaeSohn’, Monthly Chosun, August 1995.
61 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 72–73.
62 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 74–83.
63 Charles K. Armstrong, ‘Juche And North Korea's Global Aspirations’, North Korea International Documentation Project, Working Paper 1, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2009)
64 Kim Jeongryeom, Cheobinguk'eseo seonjingukmunteok'ggaji [From the Poorest Country to the Entrance of a Developed Country], (Seoul: Random House Chungang, 2006), 442. However, according to East German foreign documents, the incident was not planned, and Pyongyang did not intend to provoke the US because it wanted direct talks with Washington. See ‘Report on the “Axe Murder Incident” from the GDR Embassy in North Korea’, 31 August 1976, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin (PolA AA), MfAA. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.
65 ‘Meeting with President Park’, Telegram 206084 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of Korea, 19August 1976, 0110Z, Korea, Box 10, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library.
66 Kim Jeongryeom, From the Poorest Country to the Entrance of a Developed Country, 443–444.
67Dong-a Ilbo, 20 August1976.
68 Paul Bunyan is a mythical lumberjack in North American tradition.
69 Yet Kim Jeongryeom indicated that Park intended to advance to Gaesung if the DPRK escalated the tension. In fact, the ROK forces hid firearms below their vehicles. See Kim Jeongryeom, From the Poorest Country to the Entrance of a Developed Country, 446.
70 Kim Jeongryeom, From the Poorest Country to the Entrance of a Developed Country, 445.
71 This statement can be proved by historical fact: Park revived his nuclear plan after Carter urged the withdrawal of US armed forces from South Korea.
72 Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 143.
73 Considering the limited operation, the US did not want to escalate the tension more than it could control. In other words, Washington did not expect PRC intervention in this conflict between the DPRK and the ROK-US unless the UN soldiers used heavy firearms. The intention of the US was revealed by Stillwell's rage after the mission was completed. The US commander got angry when he became aware that the ROK special forces were armed with rifles and grenades, hidden below vehicles before the operation was launched. See New Daily, ‘Interview with Park Huido’, 25 November 2009. http://www.newdaily.co.kr/news/article.html?no = 36779.
74 Reed R Probst, Negotiating With the North Koreans: The U.S. Experience at Panmunjom (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1977). Retrieved 17 December 2009.
75 Kim Jeongryeom, From the Poorest Country to the Entrance of a Developed Country, 445.
76New Daily, ‘Interview with Park Huido’, 25 November 2009. http://www.newdaily.co.kr/news/article.html?no = 36779.
77 Memorandum of Conversation of Brent Scowcroft, Richard Sneider, William Gleysteen, 15 September1976, Korea 19, Box 10, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security Adviser, Ford Library. Gleysteen sent the memorandum of the conversation to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, of 17 September, recommending his approval, which Scowcroft initialed.
78 Cho Kabje, Park Chunghee, 282.