The Transformation of Turkey's Relations with the Middle East: Illusion or Awakening?

Abstract

In light of recent developments in the Middle East, in particular, the Arab revolts in the first few months of 2011 and the AKP's June 2011 election victory, this article aims to define the changing parameters of Turkey's new “Middle Eastern policy” under the AKP government, which is based on a new civilizational discourse and a differentiated geopolitical approach. It also discusses the basic dynamics and ideological and doctrinal background of Turkey's new Middle Eastern policy in order to understand the opportunities and constraints of its potential “facilitator and conciliator” role in the changing political circumstances of the region following the recent Arab uprisings. Despite the limits of Ankara's new civilizational and geopolitical orientation in both discourse and policy, which have at times undermined Turkey's neutrality on intra-Arab or Iranian–Arab axes and its facilitation role between Israel and its regional adversaries, Turkey's new regional posture for the Middle East represents an awakening rather than an illusion.

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Paul Kubicek for his valuable comments and suggestions that he provided on the earlier versions of this article.

Notes

Barçın Yinanç, “PM poses as a Middle Eastern rather than a European leader,” Hürriyet Daily News, June 13, 2011.

George Protopapas, “Turkey's geopolitical interests and the Middle East,” International Affairs Magazine, August 8, 2011. Available at http://en.rian.ru/international_affairs/20110808/165624344.html.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, “We in Turkey and the Middle East have replaced humiliation with dignity,” The Guardian, March 15, 2011.

Semih Idiz, “What did Davutoğlu mean?” Hurriyet Daily News, February 14, 2011.

For a further analysis on Davutoğlu's views about the civilization, see Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Medeniyetlerin Ben İdraki,” Divan İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1997), pp. 1–53. See also Ayşegül Taşkapu, “A Key Text to Understanding the Mindset of the Architect of the New Foreign Policy: Civilizational Self-perception,” Turkish Review, November 1, 2010. Available at http://www.turkishreview.org.

Hasan Kösebalaban, “The Permanent Other? Turkey and the Question of European Identity,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2007), pp. 95–96.

The Sevres Syndrome refers to the Treaty of Sevres (1920), the peace treaty between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire which envisioned the partition of Anatolia. This “syndrome” exists in light of the perception by some that Turkey is surrounded by enemies and still faces possible partition by the great powers.

Bülent Aras, “Turkey's Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-Building in the Periphery,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2009), pp. 31–32.

Dietrich Jung, “Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), p. 7.

Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Islam and Foreign Policy: A Turkish Perspective,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 12, Nos. 1–2 (1985), pp. 70–72.

Andrew Mango, “Turkey and the Middle East,” Political Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1957), pp. 150–151.

Jung (2005, p. 5).

Meliha Benli Altunışık, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008), p. 41.

Ibid., p. 42.

Ibid., p. 41.

Jung (2005, p. 12).

For further information, see Jung (2005, pp. 1–17).

Turkey's favorable stance toward Great Britain and France during the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 notwithstanding, its participation in the Baghdad Pact in 1955 paved the way for increasing tensions between Turkey and leading non-aligned Arab states in the region such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and led to a gradual rapprochement between non-aligned Arab states and the Soviets. The Baghdad Pact led to not only the emergence of new divisions in the Middle East but also expansion of Soviet zone of influence in the region.

With the emergence of the Johnson letter crisis between Turkey and the USA in 1964, Turkey gradually started to diversify its foreign policy by developing relations mostly with Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe and Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East and Africa. See Emel Parlar Dal, Les relations turco-américaines 1945–1980 (Turkish–American Relations 1945–1980) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011), pp. 236–240. See also Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (London: C. Hurst & Company, 2003), pp. 241–249. Ankara's political support of its Arab neighbors in the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 started to change Turkish–Middle Eastern relations, and Turkey tried to revive its economy, which had been badly affected by the oil crisis and the American embargo brought on by its active engagement in the OIC and the normalization of its relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. See Didier Billion, La Politique extérieure de la Turquie, une longue quete d' identité (Turkish Foreign Policy, a Long Search of Identity) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), p. 223.

As a reaction to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the US Congress decided to impose an arms embargo on Turkey. Supporters of the arms embargo stated that Turkey had violated US law by employing US arms and equipment in its military intervention in Cyprus contrary to the provisions of the agreements signed between the USA and Turkey. The embargo had been lifted completely on September 26, 1978 during the Presidency of Carter. For further details, see Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish–American Relationship between 1947–2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), pp. 92–94.

The first and the most important research center of the organization, Center for Economic, Statistical and Social Research for the formation of Islamic states was established in Ankara. For further information about Turkey's economic, financial and commercial relations with the Middle East, see Selim İlkin, “Les relations financières, commerciales et économiques de la Turquie avec les pays arabes” (Financial, commercial and economic relations of Turkey with Arab states), in E. Picard (ed.), La Nouvelle Dynamique au Moyen-Orient-Les Relations entre l'Orient Arabe et la Turquie (The New Dynamics in the Middle East-Relations between the Arab Orient and Turkey) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), p. 79.

Tayyar Arı and Ferhat Pirinççi, “Turkey's New Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East and the Perceptions in Syria and Lebanon,” Akademik Bakış, Vol. 4, No. 7 (2010), p. 3.

Robins (2003, pp. 384–385); William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 125.

For a further analysis about Turkey's Middle Eastern policy in the Cold War, see Robins (2003, pp. 241–249).

Jung (2005, p. 10). For further discussions, see L.G. Martin, “Turkey's Middle East Foreign Policy” in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, L.G. Martin and D. Keridis, eds. (Cambridge: MA MIT Press, 2004).

Although the RP emerged the winner of the 1995 elections, it could not become a member of the government until June 1996, when the party formed a coalition with the DYP. The Refahyol government served only for a year (1996–97) until the resignation of its leader Necmettin Erbakan in June 1997 during the 28 February process which was undertaken by the military.

Hasret Dikici Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2008), p. 418.

For a further analysis on Necmettin Erbakan's foreign policy, see Philip Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1997), pp. 82–100.

The first tour was Erbakan's Asian tour to Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and the second tour was an African tour to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. For further details, see Robins (2003, pp. 154–160).

See Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, “Modernity, Identity and Turkey's Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2008), pp. 55–76.

Necmettin Erbakan, Turkiye'nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri (Turkey's Problems and their Solutions) (Ankara: Semite Ofset Matbaacılık, 1991), p. 11.

Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür (eds.), Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (New York and Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2005), p. 90.

Robins (2003, pp. 155–160).

İlter Turan, “Turkey's Iran Policy: Moving away from Tradition?” GMF Analysis on Turkey Series, 25 June (2010), p. 1.

Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakyapolat, “Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of the New Geographic Imagination,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4 (2007), p. 477.

Tarık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?” Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), p. 6.

Ibid., p. 7.

Davutoğlu (2011), 15 March.

For a critical analysis on the AoCs initiative and clash/AoCs dichotomy, see Ali Balcı, “The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 95–108. According to Balcı, the AoC initiative emerged from the clash/alliance dichotomy and was founded on dialog-based ideas. The real motivation behind the establishment of the initiative was the Madrid train bombings by Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists that killed 191 people on March 11, 2004. The idea of AoCs which aims to correct the negative drift experienced between the Western and Arab-Islamic Worlds was established in 2005, at the initiative of the Governments of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the UN. In April 2007, the United Nations' Secretary-General appointed Jorge Sampaio, former President of Portugal, as High Representative for the Alliance. The UNAOC is supported by a Group of Friends—a community of 100 member countries and some 20 international organizations and bodies. For further details about the content of the initiative, see http://www.unaoc.org/ibis/about/who-we-are-un-alliance-of-civilizations/

Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)order,” Perceptions (Ankara), Vol. 2, No. 4 (1997–98). Available at www.sam.gov.tr/volume2d.php

In his speech, Davutoğlu (2011, 15 March) indicated that “our region has been the center of civilization for millennia in which multicultural environments flourish and there are sufficient economic resources today to make our region a global centre of gravity.” He also criticized the frequent usage of the Middle East as an “Orientalist” term which connotes conflicts and underdevelopment and underlines the centrality of Islamic civilization.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), pp. 536–550.

In his article, Davutoğlu (1997, pp. 15–20) criticized the dominant self-centered illusion in Occidental civilization, which, owing to its strong and rigid civilizational self-perception, seeks to protect its hegemony by adopting exclusionary policies. Davutoğlu strengthens this argument in this article by emphasizing the strong need for Europe to pursue a universal understanding of culture, which is intermingled with all cultures and amalgamated with universal and human accumulation. In his view, the flexibility of the Turkish–Islamic civilizational self-perception can help Occidental civilization embrace a universal culture by penetrating its rigid and hierarchical structure. See Taşkapu (2010) and see also Ahmet Davutoğlu's speech delivered on the occasion of European Day on 8 May (2009). Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-9-mayis-avrupa-guvu-vesilesiyle-ab-buyukelcilerine-verdigi-yemekte-yaptigi-konusma_-8-mayis-2009.tr.mfa.

Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 20–49, and Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

Balcı (2009, p. 98).

Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey's Middle East Policy Reloaded: Rise of Pragmatism?” GMF Analysis on Turkey, 11 October (2011), p. 2.

Ibid., pp. 2–3.

Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), p. 47.

In terms of Kemal Kirişçi, the “trading state” is a state whose foreign policy becomes increasingly shaped by economic considerations and a country in whose GNP foreign trade acquires an important place. See Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40 (2009), pp. 29–57.

F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey's New Geopolitics,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2010), p. 158.

F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (2007), p. 106.

For a detailed analysis on Turkey's changing foreign policy toward Northern Iraq, see Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey's New Engagement in Iraq,” Special Report 237, United States Institute of Peace (2010). See also Aylin Ş. Görener, “Turkey and Northern Iraq on the Course of Rapprochement,” SETA Policy Brief, No. 17, June (2008).

Aras and Karakyapolat (2007, p. 477).

Aras (2009, p. 40).

“Davutoğlu: Türkiye düzen kurucu bir ülke (Davutoğlu: Turkey is an Order-Instituing Country),” Hürriyet, June 23, 2009. See also Şaban Kardaş (2011, p. 2).

See Nuh Yılmaz, Kılıç Bugra Kanat, “Turkish Foreign Policy after the Elections,” Foreign Policy, 21 June (2011). Available at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/21/turkish_foreign_policy_after_the_elections.

Serhat Ekmen, Bilgay Duman, and Oytun Orhan, “The Perspectives of the Political Parties in Turkey towards Middle East in the Manifestos for the General Elections June 12, 2011,” ORSAM, April (2011), and İbrahim Kalın, “June 12 Elections and Turkish Foreign Policy,” Today's Zaman, April 21, 2011.

İbrahim Kalın (2011), Today's Zaman, 21 April.

Judah Grunstein, “Turkey and the Arab Spring,” World Politics Review, May 6, 2011. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8764/turkey-and-the-arab-spring.

Kemal Kirişçi (2009, p. 49).

For a further analysis on the Turkish model for the Middle East, see Alper Y. Dede, “The Arab Uprisings: Debating the ‘Turkish Model’,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2011), pp. 23–32.

Ömer Taşpınar, “The Arab Spring and the Duality of Turkish Model,” Today's Zaman, August 7, 2011.

Ibid.

“Harmonising immutable values and ever-changing mechanisms,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, Issue No.716, November 11–17, 2004. Available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/716/focus.htm.

Paul Salem, Turkey's Image in the Arab World, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV) Foreign Policy Programme, May (2010). Available at http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/Paul_Salem_FINAL.pdf. See also Ahmet Davutoğlu, Talk to Jazeera, Television programme, Al-Jazeera, Ankara, 14 February (2011).

Jashua W. Walker and Emiliano Alessandri, “Turkey's Emergence as a Middle Eastern Stakeholder and what this Means for the West,” GMF Analysis on Turkey, 10 October (2011), p. 1.

The 2010 TESEV survey (second of its kind) was conducted by KA Research Limited between August 25 and September 27, 2010 with the contribution of TESEV's researchers. The 2010 survey was conducted in seven Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In total, 2267 people were surveyed by telephone or face to face. For further details, see http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/OrtadoguENG_II.publication.pdf.

Mensur Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Jonathan Levack, Gökçe Perçinoğlu, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2010-Foreign Policy Programme, TESEV, p. 12. Available at http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/OrtadoguENG_II.publication.pdf.

Kirişçi (2009, p. 36).

Arab Public Opinion Poll, Brookings (2010). Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami/0805_arabic_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf.

According to Kirişçi (2009, pp. 33–55), the “demonstrative effect” makes the Turkish model of interest to the Middle East and this effect is a function of three developments: the rise of the “trading state” which makes Turkey visible through commerce, investment and trade; the diffusion of Turkey's democratization experience as a “work in progress” and, lastly, the positive image of Turkey's “new” foreign policy.

Mohammed Ayoob, “Beyond the Democratic Wave: A Turko-Persian Future?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2011), p. 116.

For further information about the Turkish–Israeli strategic partnership established in the second term of the 1990s, see Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Turkey and Israel Strategize,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2001), pp. 61–65. See also Meltem Müftüler Bac, “Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership,” Ariel Center for Policy Research Policy Paper, No. 47 (1998). Available at http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp047-xs.html.

Turkey is hardening the tone of its discourse on Israel by manifesting the latter's illegal actions such as its Gaza's blockade and by starting initiatives to put the UN General Assembly in motion and to seek collective action in the UN to apply to the International Court of Justice for a legal deliberation on the legitimacy of the blockade. See “Turkey Slams Israel with Last Minute Deal Dead,” Hurriyet Daily News, September 2, 2011.

Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints, Europe Report N.203, International Crisis Group, 7 April (2010), p. i.

Kirişçi (2009, p. 51).

Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, 20 May (2010). Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?hidecomments=yes and see also http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352745.

“Syria Crisis: Erdoğan Steps up Turkey Pressure on Assad,” BBC.com. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-15745199.

Kardaş (2011), 10 October, pp. 3–4.

Şaban Kardaş, “Quest for Strategic Autonomy Continues, or How to Make Sense of Turkey's ‘New Wave’,” GMF Analysis on Turkey, 28 November 2011, p. 4.

Joshua W. Walker, “Turkey's Bold about-Face on Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 November 2011. Available at http://www.gmfus.org/news_analysis/news_article_view?newsarticle.id=2842.

Elias Vahedi, “Arab Spring and Double Standards in Turkey's Foreign Policy,” Iran Review, 13 December (2011). Available at http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Arab_Spring_and_Double_Standards_in_Turkey%E2%80%99s_Foreign_Policy.htm.

Kardaş (2011), 10 October, pp. 1–4.

Kardaş (2011), 28 November, pp. 3–4.

Helen Pidd, “Ahmet Davutoglu: Regional Power Broker or Dictators' Go-between?” The Guardian, June 8, 2011.

İbrahim Kalın, “A roadmap for Libya,” The Guardian, May 12, 2011. The fact that Muammar Gaddafi did not listen to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's calls in April and May 2011 to immediately step down in order to facilitate Libya's peaceful transition to democracy and that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad seems to continue to ignore Ankara's pleas for administrative reforms illustrate Ankara's difficulties and limitations in managing the Middle East.

Kirişçi (2009, p. 50).

Emiliano Allessandri, “Turkey and the West Address the Arab Spring,” GMF Analysis on Turkey Series, 8 June (2011), p. 1. See also Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey Diverges from Western Position on Libya,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 44 (March 4, 2011).

Emel Parlar Dal, “La Turquie et l'ambivalence des relations transatlantiques: ses marges de mainoeuvre après 2003,” (Turkey and the Ambivalence of Transatlantic Relations: The Limits of its Manoeuvres since 2003), in La nouvelle politique extérieure turque entre le mythe européen et la nostalgie ottomane (The New Turkish Foreign Policy between European Myth and Ottoman Nostalgia), Revue française Eurorient, Emel Parlar Dal, ed., N.34–35, October (2011).

Allessandri (2011), 8 June, p. 1.

Mohammed Ayoob, “Beyond the Democratic Wave: A Turko-Persian Future?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2011), p. 111.

For further information about the USA's selective engagement strategy, see Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics updated :The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1998–99), pp. 79–113, and Kenneth W. Stein, “The Bush Doctrine : Selective Engagement in the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2002), pp. 52–61.

Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints (2010), p. i.

Larrabee (2007, pp. 103–114).

Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints (2010), p. 22; 29.

İbrahim Kalın, “Arab Public Opinion and the World System,” Today's Zaman, January 21, 2010.

Ibid.

İbrahim Kalın, “A Democratic Arab World Makes Turkey Stronger,” The Daily Star, 8 June (2011). Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2011/Jun-08/A-democratic-Arab-world-makes-Turkey-stronger.ashx#ixzz1Uqeb4Dfq

See Yılmaz and Kanat (2011). See also İbrahim Kalın, 21 April (2011).