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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the evolution of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)’s civilizational outlook vis-à-vis the West as a discursive instrument that justified its Muslim democracy practices as well as its nativist authoritarian practices. The former practice entails that the AKP appear as a Muslim democratic political force, reconciling Islam and democracy, falsifying the Orientalist essentialism prevalent in the West and resolving the crisis in Turkey’s Western identity. After relieving the secular establishment of its guardianship roles in 2010/2011, the AKP’s nativist practices have aimed at redefining Turkey as a Muslim nation by using a civilizational discourse. As such, the AKP’s nativism was characterized by an attempt at resetting the legitimate parameters of Turkish politics to reject the validity of the universal norms of democracy and the legitimacy of their domestic and international proponents. This naturally entailed a populist anti-establishment stance in foreign as well as domestic policy realms.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Menderes Çınar is professor of political science at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Başkent University, Ankara. He is a former Giorgio La Pira research fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, and a visiting scholar at Boston University and Harvard University. His main research interests are comparative Islamism and Turkish politics. His recent publications include ‘From Moderation to De-moderation: Democratic Backsliding of the AKP in Turkey’ in The Politics of Islamism: Diverging Visions and Trajectories, edited by J. L. Esposito, L. Z. Rahim and N. Ghobadzadeh, (New York: Palgrave, 2017) and Vesayetçi Demokrasiden ‘Milli’ Demokrasiye [From Tutelary Democracy to ‘National’ Democracy] (İstanbul: Birikim, 2015). He has previously published work in journals such as Orient, Political Science Quarterly, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, New Perspectives on Turkey, Muslim World, and South Atlantic Quarterly. A selection of his articles is collected in Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak Islamcılık [Islamism as a Political Question] (Ankara: Dipnot, 2005).
Notes
1. Cizre-Sakallıoglu, “The Anatomy,” 152–6.
2. After containing the military and taking over the Presidency in 2007, a package of Constitutional amendments rendering the last bastion of the establishment, the judiciary, a more heterogeneous and friendly institution were accepted by popular vote in a referendum in 2010. This, as well as the AKP’s election victory and the Arab uprisings in 2011, marked a turning point, signifying a new attempt at redefining the AKP’s/Turkey’s identity in terms of ‘our civilization.’
3. Esen and Gumuscu, “Rising competitive authoritarianism”; Özbudun, “AKP at the Crossroads”; and Öniş, “Monopolizing the Centre.”
4. White, Muslim Nationalism and Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, “Nationalism and Foreign Policy.”
5. Mude, Populist Radical Right Wing, 18–30, and Betz, “Against the ‘Green Totalitarianism’,” 35–8.
6. A. Karakuş, “Bürokrasi ve Yargı Karşımıza Dikiliyor,” Milliyet, December 18, 2012; “Başınızı Dik Tutun,” Hürriyet, September 2, 2014.
7. On Turkey’s double election in the summer of 2015, see Cizre, “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.”
8. For the identity constituting nature of foreign policy discourse, see Campbell, Writing Security.
9. For an illustrative statement by Erdoğan, see “Türkiye’nin Bölge’de Güçlenmesini Kimse İstemiyor,” Sabah, September 29, 2012.
10. ‘Their duty is to prepare the report and ours is to go our own way’ Erdoğan once stated, cited in Kubicek, “Democratization and Relations,” 44. Also, counter-reports dismissing the EU’s criticisms were written, see “AB Bakanlığından Toz Pembe Rapor,” Radikal, January 1, 2013. For Edoğan’s most recent rejection of a European Parliament report on the declining state of democracy, see “Eninde Sonunda Dokunulursunuz,” Hürriyet, April 20, 2016.
11. As it is intended to be a part of a special issue dedicated to Turkish Foreign Policy, this paper addresses only foreign policy-related aspects of the AKP’s degeneration into a populist nativist authoritarian force aiming at redefining Turkey’s identity. A more comprehensive account of the AKP’s degeneration, addressing such factors as the intra-party dynamics and the legacy of the past interaction with the secular establishment can be found in Çınar, “From Moderation to De-moderation.”
12. Mardin, “European Culture,” 18.
13. İnalcık, “Turkey Between Europe,” 15.
14. Cizre, “Rethinking the Connections,” 13.
15. Keyder, “The Dilemma of Cultural,” 23.
16. Bilgin, “Securing Turkey,” 113–14.
17. I thank Bill Park for bringing this point to my attention during the Populism and Turkish Foreign Policy Workshop held at TOBB Economy and Technology University, Ankara on 18 May 2017.
18. Erogul, “The Establishment of Multiparty,” 103.
19. Keyder, “Moving In,” 75–7; Cizre, “Rethinking the Connections,” 13.
20. Cizre, “Rethinking the Connections,” 4.
21. Lowry, “Betwixt and Between,” 25–8.
22. Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism,” 33.
23. Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms,” 23.
24. Jung and Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads, 141–3.
25. Yanık, “The Metamorphosis,” 534–5.
26. Duran, “Islamist Redefinition(s),” 125.
27. Cizre and Çınar, “Turkey 2002,” 310–15.
28. Cizre and Çınar, “Turkey 2002,” 314.
29. Dağı, “Transformation of Islamic,” 24.
30. In his address to the First Congress of the RP’s successor the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi – FP), held on 14 May 2000, the interim leader Recai Kutan stated that ‘nobody can appreciate the value of a real, full democracy as much as we do.’ See “Kutan: Kopma Olmayacak,” Accessed March 10, 2017. http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/5360.asp.
31. Dağı, “Rethinking Human Rights,” 140–3; for a critical evaluation of the Islamists’ instrumentalization of democracy and human rights, see Dursun, “The Struggle Goes On.”
32. Cited in Tanıyıcı, “Transformation of Political Islam,” 477.
33. Duran, “Islamist Redefinition(s),” 140.
34. Duran, “Justice and Development Party’s,” 87.
35. For the invalidity of Turkey’s depiction as a torn country, see Göl, “The Identity of Turkey”; Robbins, “Turkish Foreign Policy.”
36. Davutoğlu, Alternative Paradigms, 195.
37. Davutoğlu, Civilizational Transformation, 78.
38. Yanık, “The Metamorphosis,” 541–3; Yankaya, “The Europeanization of MÜSİAD,” 51–4.
39. The Framework for Turkey introduces the possibility of permanent derogations and a privileged partnership, makes the implementation of reforms a precondition for closing the chapters of the accession negotiations, and seeks the unanimous decision of the EU members for opening and closing chapters.
40. Çınar, “Turkey’s Transformation,” 477.
41. Duran, “Understanding the AK Party’s,” 95.
42. Özpek and Demirağ, “Turkish Foreing Policy,” 343.
43. Cited in Erşen, “Geopolitical Codes,” 93.
44. Oğuzlu and Dal, “Decoding Turkey’s Rise,” 618.
45. Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine,” 952–3; Yeşiltaş, “The Transformation of Geopolitica,” 663–6.
46. Davutoğlu, Civilizational Transformation, 92–3; Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 11, 23, 29–30.
47. “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi Akademik Yılı Açılış Töreni’nde Yaptıkları Konuşma,” October 11, 2014, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2947/recep-tayyip-erdogan-universitesi-akademik-yili-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma.html.
48. The Blue (Mavi) Marmara Flotilla was designed to draw attention to Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza in 2010. As it entered Israeli territorial waters, Israeli authorities wanted to redirect the flotilla to another port by force. Nine Turkish citizens were killed during the skirmishes between the protestors and Israeli soldiers, for which Israel agreed to pay damages.
49. Aras, “Davutoğlu Era,” 407.
50. Davutoğlu, Alterntive Paradigms, 202.
51. “Dünyayı Değiştireceğiz,” Türkiye, January 23, 2012.
52. Ibid. Likewise, Erdoğan claimed that the vacuum left by our civilization and values have been filled by others’ clumsy, oppressive, divisive, heart-breaking and bloody hands. The Sykes–Picot Agreement after World War I has only brought trouble, unease, pain, tears, and oppression to the Middle East. For Erdoğan’s speeches, see “Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Uluslararası İyilik Ödülleri Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma,” March 13, 2016. http://www.cumhurbaskanligi.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/40144/turkiye-diyanet-vakfi-uluslararasi-iyilik-odulleri-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma.html and “‘100. Yılında Dünya Savaşının Belgeleri’ Sergisi ve Dünya Arşiv Yöneticileri Kongresi Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma.” March 19, 2015. https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/29806/100-yilinda-dunya-savasinin-belgeleri-sergisi-ve-dunya-arsiv-yoneticileri-kongresi-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konusma.html.
53. Demirtaş, “Turkish-Syrian Relations,” 116–17.
54. Ennis and Momani, “Shaping the Middle East,” 1128; Tuğal, “Democratic Janissaries?” 14–17.
55. Moudouros, “Rethinking Islamic Hegemony,” 184.
56. Sedat Ergin, “Muhteşem Yüzyıl Dizisine Neden Kızıyor,”Hürriyet, November 30, 2012.
57. A Freedom House report drawing attention to deteriorating freedom of press in Turkey was portrayed as a colonialist exercise, its Eurocentric approach was found problematic and those who took the report seriously were categorized as the internal Orientalists molded by the values of the Enlightenment. It was impossible for a country that inherited an imperial (Ottoman) legacy to not question the [ill-intended] motivations of the Freedom House.
58. Yenigün, “The New Antinomies,” 237–43.