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ABSTRACT
In recent years, closer Turkish-Russian relations have captured the attention of both academics and policymakers, but also seem rather paradoxical as the two countries find themselves on opposite sides of conflicts in Syria, Libya, and the Caucuses. This paper evaluates how effective neo-realist (structural) and ideational (constructivist) theories of international relations are in explaining the Turkish-Russian relationship. Ultimately, this paper finds more merit in accounts grounded in neo-realism that can capture aspects of both cooperation and conflict/competition in the relationship.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Sener Aktürk, Emre Erşen, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the initial draft of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The final draft of this article was completed in late March 2022, a month after Russian forces invaded Ukraine. This development has global implications, including on the Turkish-Russian relationship. These are discussed more fully in this article’s conclusion.
2 For an accessible review of main developments in both Russian-Turkish ties and the Putin-Erdogan relationship, see The Economist, “The odd couple.” For a more scholarly review, see Balta, “From Geopolitical Competition.”
3 See Özcan, Balta, and Beşgül, Türkiye ve Rusya, and Baev, “Turkey’s ambiguous.”
4 Liberal approaches in international relations, which often emphasize economic ties and interdependence, can also give one some purchase on Russian-Turkish relations, but, as noted later in the paper, I argue that their utility may be limited. For an approach that relies more heavily on “complex interdependence” between Russia and Turkey, see Kelkitli, Turkish-Russian Relations as well as Öniş and Yılmaz. “Turkey and Russia.”
5 The locus classicus for neo-realism remains Waltz, Theory of International Politics.
6 For a review of Soviet-Turkish relations, see Kubicek, “Turkey’s Relationship.”
7 One can debate when the “unipolar moment” ended, but certainly the opposition to the American invasion of Iraq, which eventually became a significant drain on US power, is an important event. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail,” suggests 2016, with Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, as marking the end of unipolarity.
8 Bilge, “An Analysis,” 92, and Trenin, “A Cure,” 57.
9 Aktürk, “Turkish-Russian Relations.”
10 Sezer, “Turkish–Russian Relations.”
11 Ibid.
12 Aktürk, “A Realist Reassessment.”
13 Baev and Kirişçi, “An ambiguous partnership.”
14 For a useful review of complications in Turkish-Western relations, see Kirişçi, Turkey and the West.
15 See, for example, Steven Cook, “Turkey: Friend or frenemy? A tangled relationship keeps getting worse,” Salon.com, November 12, 2017.
16 Dursun-Özkanca, Turkey-West Relations.
17 Sezer, “Turkish–Russian Relations.”
18 This was a common topic in analyses of Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the 2010s. See, for example, Kubicek, Dal, and Oğuzlu, Turkey’s Rise.
19 Kubicek, “Strictly Pragmatism?” and Candar, Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Moment.
20 Öniş and Kutlay, “The dynamics.”
21 Zarakol, After Defeat.
22 Kubicek, “Turkey’s Relationship.”
23 Hill and Taşpınar, “Turkey and Russia.”
24 For the latter, see Aktürk, “A Realist Reassessment” and “Turkey’s Grand Strategy.” In particular, Turkey aims to keep rival powers out of its immediate neighborhood, an ambition that clashes with Russia’s greater assertiveness in the post-Soviet space and Middle East.
25 One could hypothesize, of course, that the costs of working with Turkey (perhaps temporarily) are low and the potential gains in both pacifying parts of Syria and driving a wedge between Turkey and its NATO partners are worthwhile. The endgame in Syria is yet to be known, and Russia, with its military advantage, may be able to press forward against Turkey, although that could be a risk Moscow wishes to avoid.
26 Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” 915.
27 Both of these terms have been widely used in academic and policy-oriented writings on Turkey, often linked with the “Strategic Depth” doctrine of former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. However, not all observers agree on their usefulness both as clear analytical concepts and in capturing the empirical reality of Turkish foreign policy. For extended treatment of these topics, see Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire; Murinson, Turkish Foreign Policy; Hintz, Identity Politics; Candar, Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Moment; and Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu.”
28 Öztürk, “Turkey’s Post-2016.”
29 Kutlay and Öniş. “Turkish foreign policy.”
30 Hoffman, Werz, and Halpin, “Turkey’s ‘New Nationalism’.”
31 A useful review of Eurasianism can be found in Aktürk, “The Fourth Style.”
32 Gurcan, “The Rise,” and Erşen, “The Return.”
33 Erşen, “The Return,” 43-44, and Balci, “L’eurasisme.”
34 Erdoğan himself acknowledged this in the aftermath of the coup attempt, stating that support from his “dear friend” [Putin] has been a “strong psychological factor” for restoration of an “axis of friendship between Moscow and Ankara”. See “Erdogan praises 'dear friend' Vladimir Putin in Russian-Turkish détente,” The Telegraph, August 9, 2016,
35 For a skeptical view, see Baev, “Turkey’s ambiguous.”
36 For example, in March 2020, after dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed in Syria by Russian-supplied Syrian forces, Erdoğan was summoned to Moscow to meet with Putin, but was left awkwardly waiting in an antechamber prior to his meeting. The episode was filmed by Russian state television and included a timer in the corner of the screen to show how long Erdoğan had been kept waiting. See Williams, “The Uneasy Alliance.”
37 Anna Borshchevskaya, “Is Erdogan a Russian Ally or Putin’s Puppet?” Forbes (on-line), January 27, 2017, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/annaborshchevskaya/2017/01/27/is-erdogan-a-russian-ally-or-putins-puppet/#6c50084f1596
38 Erşen and Köstem, “Introduction,” 8.
39 Aleksandr Khramchikin, ‘Kem v deystvitel’nosti yavliaetsia Turtsiia dlia Rossii,’ Nezavisimaia gazeta, April 14, 2017.
40 Zaman, “Will Turkey?”.
41 An application of these concepts to Russian-Turkish relations can be found in Kelkitli, Turkish-Russian Relations.
42 Data from the United Nation’s Comtrade database, available at comtrade.un.org.
43 Similarly, Aktürk (“A Realist Assessment”) downplays the liberal/interdependence argument but noting that trade ties grew in the late 2000s-early 2010s even as overall ties worsened.
44 Özel and Uçar, “The Economics,” p. 25. Figures from UN Comtrade database. In 2018, Russia ranked 12th among Turkish exports markets.
45 Özel and Uçar, (“The Economics”), for example, note that Turkish exports to the EU are ten times the value of exports to Russia and overall foreign direct investment (FDI), at least from 2007-2016, amounted to under 3 percent of FDI stock in Turkey and less than 1 percent of FDI in Russia.
46 The Russian choice to promote the Turkstream pipeline occurred after Moscow, in a spat with the EU, scuttled plans for a South Stream pipeline that would have transported gas directly to the EU through Bulgaria, and Turkey’s choice of Russia to construct a nuclear power plant occurred after numerous other countries, including the United States, France, and Japan, had declined to work with Turkey on such a project.
47 “Erdogan seals pact with Ukraine over trade and drones,” Financial Times, February 3, 2022.
48 “Why drones pose a threat to Russia-Turkey relations as Ukraine crisis develops,” Financial Times, February 17, 2022,
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Paul Kubicek
Paul Kubicek is Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies at Oakland University. He has published widely on Russian and Turkish politics and has taught at Koç University, Boğaziçi University, and Antalya Bilim University in Turkey. He is the editor of Turkish Studies.