De facto ‘States’ around the Black Sea: The Importance of Fear

Abstract

On 11 April 2007, the European Commission presented its Communication entitled Black Sea Synergy: A New Regional Cooperation Initiative. This Communication reflected the influence of a combination of factors that have led the European Union (EU) to consider greater engagement in the Black Sea region. Most importantly, the enlargement of the EU in May 2004 and January 2007 brought the Union geographically to the coastline of the Black Sea itself. The Black Sea raises high stakes in the EU as it works to become a foreign policy actor. The complexity of engaging in the region is exacerbated by an additional factor—the existence of four self‐declared ‘states’: the Pridnestrovyan Moldovan Republic (PMR) inside Moldovan borders, the Republic of South Ossetia, the Republic of Abkhazia, within Georgian borders, and the Nagorno‐Karabakh Republic in Azerbaijan. This article explores three questions raised by the existence of these de facto ‘states’. First, the discussion examines briefly the concept of the de facto ‘state’. Second, what has sustained these non‐recognised entities since the collapse of the Soviet Union? This section examines the particular importance of fear as a sustaining force. And third, what is the security impact at the individual, state and regional level of the de facto ‘states’? All three questions are relevant for the EU as it becomes more deeply engaged in the Black Sea.

Notes

[1] EUSR Peter Semneby speaking at METU University, Ankara, 18 May 2007.

[2] For more information on all of these policies, consult the website of the Council of the European Union: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=261&lang=EN&mode=g.

[3] The self‐declared ‘states’ do not have legal status and are not recognised. They are referred to here as ‘states’ (in inverted commas) as a reflection of their self‐proclaimed status and the essence of the aspiration of their political projects; by no means does this imply recognition by the author or even the argument that they should be recognised. Henceforth, for reasons of simplicity, these will be referred to as ‘PMR’, ‘South Ossetia’, ‘Abkhazia’ and ‘Nagorno‐Karabakh’.

[4] See discussions in Shehadi (1993); Paul (1999); Osterud (1997); Mayall (1990).

[5] For a full treatment of this question, see Lynch (2004). The discussion in this article draws on parts of this work.

[6] Pegg’s work did not consider the Black Sea separatist entities.

[7] For a full treatment of the inter‐weaving forces driving the de facto ‘states’, see Lynch (2004).

[8] Interview with the author, Sukhumi, 28 July 2000.

[9] Interview with Melkoumian, Stepanakert, 17 August 2000.

[10] Interview with author, Sukhumi, 25 July 2000.

[11] On these notions, see Smith et al. (1998: 13–19).

[12] From Evans et al. (1985), cited in an interesting article in Griffiths (1999).

[13] This point emerged from a discussion between the author and Bruno Coppietiers in November 2000.

[14] See excellent analysis of this question in Dale (1997).

[15] William Hill, 5 June 1999, reported by Basapress.