The new political dynamics of southeastern Europe

Abstract

Southeastern Europe is going through its most profound period of change since Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow in 2000. The pillars supporting Balkan stability over the past decade – the large US military presence in the region, the promise of foreseeable EU accession, and the international consensus on agreements guaranteeing Balkan stability (such as the Dayton Peace Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and the Ohrid Accords in FYR Macedonia) – are under attack or are being increasingly questioned. Meanwhile, no new security architecture has been erected, while several new developments, including Russia’s return to the Balkans and the creation of two new states, is throwing new unknown strategic variables into the Balkan security equation. Without serious re‐engagement by the EU and the US in the region, southeastern Europe’s democratic and market transitions could still be derailed.

Keywords:

• Balkans
• EU integration
• regional security

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Alex N. Grigor’ev of the Project on Ethnic Relations, Princeton, New Jersey, Professor Franjo Štiblar of the University of Ljubljana, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on this paper. This paper is the product of several research trips the author made to southeastern Europe from 2005 to 2007. Partial funding for this research was made possible by a Harriman Institute Travel Grant in 2005. I would like to especially thank the following individuals for sharing their thoughts and views with me on several topics raised in this paper: Dušan Bataković, special advisor to the President of Serbia (Belgrade, April 2007); Vuk Draškovic, foreign minister of Serbia–Montenegro (Belgrade, June 2005); Kiro Gligorov, former president of Macedonia (Skopje, April 2007); Nikola Gruevski, president, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Party–Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity, currently prime minister of Macedonia (New York, January 2006); Vojislav Koštunica, prime minister of Serbia (Belgrade, May 2005); Antonio Milošoski, foreign minister of Macedonia (New York, September 2006); Mihnea Motoc, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations (New York, June 2007); Dimitrij Rupel, foreign minister of Slovenia (New York, September 2006); Ivo Sanader, prime minister of Croatia (New York, September 2006); Svetozar Stojanović, University of Belgrade (Belgrade, October 2006); Dejan Šahovic, former deputy minister for European Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Serbia (Belgrade, April 2007); Hashim Thaci, president, Democratic Party of Kosova, currently prime minister of Kosovo (New York, November 2006); Miodrag Vlahović, former foreign minister of Montenegro, currently Ambassador of Montenegro to the United States (Podgorica, October 2006); Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for German–American Cooperation, (German) Federal Foreign Office (New York, November 2006); Ivan Vujačić, Ambassador of Serbia to the US (New York, September 2005). I would also like to thank the following individuals and institutions for their collegiality and hospitality during recent visits to the Balkans: Sinan Alić, Foundation for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (Tuzla, Bosnia–Herzegovina); Dean Trajan Gočevski and Dr. Lidija Georgieva, Institute for Defense and Peace Studies, University of St. Cyril and Methodius (Skopje, Macedonia); Savo Kentera, Center for International Relations (Podgorica, Montenegro); Dean Milan Podunavac and Prof. Ljubica Trgovčević‐Mitrović (Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Serbia); Marin Sopta, Croatian Center for Strategic Studies (Zagreb, Croatia), Miloš Šolaja, Director of the Center for International Relations (Banja Luka, Bosnia & Herzegovina). Please note that the opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

Notes

1. This holds true throughout eastern and central Europe. F. Stephen Larrabee, for instance, has argued that ‘The recent rise of nationalist and populist forces in several countries in eastern Europe… threatens to undermine the reform process. Enlargement fatigue in the EU and growing calls for protectionism within western Europe could further hinder continued efforts to create a single European market and fully integrate the new EU members. At the same time, the balance of power is shifting on eastern Europe’s outer periphery… These changes have gone largely unnoticed by policymakers in Washington despite the important implications they have for US interests’ (Larrabee 2006).

2. Valerie Bunce makes this point well when she notes that the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia was in many ways an historical aberration; thus, ‘Regime and state dissolution is rarely so graceful as what we saw in 1989–1992. What happened in Yugoslavia is, unfortunately, the historical norm’ (Bunce 1999, 142). On the particular dangers to which newly‐emerging democracies are susceptible, see Mansfield and Snyder 2005.

3. Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) has issued a series of alarming reports on the state of mental health facilities in southeastern Europe over the past several years (especially those in Kosovo, Romania and Serbia). The MDRI reports are available at www.mdri.org.

4. For some empirical evidence from Serbia, see Pribičević 1997, 57; Antonić 2002, 76–81; and Agencija Politikum, ‘Predsednički Izbori: Tadić‐Nikolić – “Ostali” – Socioekonomski profil birača’ [‘The presidential elections: Tadić – Nikolić – “Others” – A socioeconomic profile of voters’] (http://www.nspm.org.yu/MBI/politikum6_pred_izbori2008profil.htm)

5. In Serbia, public opinion surveys conducted in November 2002 showed that over 50% of the young people would like to emigrate. ‘Serbia After Djindjic’ (International Crisis Group Balkans 2003, 7). In Croatia, a poll conducted in 2002 revealed that three‐fourths of the young people surveyed in Croatia said they would like to leave the country. Some 150,000 Croatians were estimated to have emigrated between 1995 and 2002 (see Bakšić 2002). Again in Bosnia, one estimate claims that 92,000 young people left the country between January 1996 and the end of March 2001. Former High Representative Paddy Ashdown claimed that ‘This haemorrage of the young and talented poses perhaps the greatest long‐term threat to this country’ (Ahmetasević and Poucher‐Harbin 2002). In Albania in 2001, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Emigration Office estimated that approximately 67% of educated Albanians had left that country during the preceding decade. This includes an estimated 60% of the country’s full‐time professors (see Dizdari 2001).

6. For example, a public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka in mid‐September 2005 asked 850 participants of legal voting age in a representative sample the following question: ‘Should Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia–Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo is granted independence?’ The results are as follows:

  Completely agree: 54.1%

  Generally agree: 21.6%

  Generally do not agree: 8.2%

  Do not agree at all: 6.2%

  Do not know/refuse to answer: 9.8%

As can be seen from the above, 75.7% of RS respondents agreed to some measure with the proposition that the RS should secede from BiH and join Serbia if Kosovo were to become independent.

7. See, for instance, Judah 2002. As a report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2001, 15) noted in the case of FYR Macedonia:

 [E]ach of the main ethnic communities tends to live in a relatively homogeneous world of its own. Even where members of different ethnic groups live and even work alongside each other, they often have limited contact in daily life. Although interaction is increasing, particularly among young people and the educated and professional segments of society, many members of the various groups still tend to go to different restaurants, different cafés, different stores and even different schools. The organizations and associations of civil society too, are in large part divided along ethnic lines, as are the political parties… Public debate takes place within each community rather than between communities, each receiving information about events within the community, the country and the region from media in its own language, produced by members of its own ethnic group.

See also information on ethnic segregation in the Macedonian school system in Ljubica 2007 and ‘Macedonian high‐school students’ 2008. The ethnic divide between the Albanian and Macedonian populations is not a new development. Field research and public opinion surveys conducted by the sociologist Ilija Josifovski in the 1960s and 1970s returned similar results (see Josifovski 1974).

8. For an extended discussion of the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on democratic systems, see Dahl 1971, chapter 7.

9. Along these lines, Milada Anna Vachudová and Tim Snyder have argued that in six eastern European states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) the most important determinant of their developmental paths have been what they term ‘ethnic nationalism.’ According to the authors, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are examples of states that have not exhibited high levels of ethnic nationalism; Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia have. The latter have significantly higher numbers of ethnic minorities (Vachudová and Snyder 1997).

10. See ‘Bosnian governments “utterly ineffective”’, 2008.

11. For a useful collection of essays on organized crime in southeastern Europe, see Andreas 2004.

12. For differing interpretations on the role and activities of Al‐Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups in the region, see Azinović 2007; Blumi 2003; Bodansky 2001; Napoleoni 2003; and Bardos 2002.

13. For instance, on 19 December 2007, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica specifically ruled out the use of force in Serbia’s effort to maintain sovereignty over Kosovo. See Keleman 2007. Serbian President Boris Tadić reiterated these statements on 2 January 2008 (see ‘Serbia “won’t Use Force” in Kosovo’ 2008). Even Serbian Radical Party deputy leader Tomislav Nikolić has rejected going to war in the event of a declaration of independence by Priština (see ‘Serbian radical leader rules out war’ 2008).

14. Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Accords, for instance, was the initial step in drawing up a series of regional arms control limitation agreements and implementing a number of military transparency and confidence building measures that have been continued through to the present time. Such measures did not exist prior to 1992.

15. There are several aspects to this problem. The first is that since September 11 and the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, high‐level decision‐makers’ attention in Washington and other capitals has shifted away from the Balkans. As one European diplomat noted in February 2003, ‘The problem is that the Balkans are now in the hands of middle‐ranking bureaucrats who aren’t decision‐makers and don’t cut it analytically’ (quoted in Simpson 2003). Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt have made a similar observation, noting that ‘Responsibility for Balkan decision‐making at the State Department has drifted down from the ‘7th Floor’ special envoys and political figures to the ‘6th and 5th floor’ mid‐level career officials and out to the embassies themselves – a reduction not necessarily in competence, but certainly in high‐level attention’ (Abramowitz and Hurlburt 2002, 6). A further problem with the international response to the region is that the overall quality of personnel has often been substandard. As one critique has noted, the international effort in the Balkans has been ‘hampered by a rapid turnover of often unqualified personnel, lacking relevant experience, including sometimes in senior positions’ (see International Crisis Group Report 2007, 17). Sumantra Bose has described many of the international officials working in the Balkans as ‘so many adventure seekers, missionary zealots on civilizing field expeditions and careerists from comparatively dull and boring post‐industrial Western societies’ (Bose 2002, 12). Jacques Klein, the head of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia, once noted that ‘There are more people (in Sarajevo) who know nothing about this country than in any other capital where I’ve ever served’ (quoted in Wright, Guzelova, and Bircall 2000).

16. See ‘Balkan boost for Russian gas plan,’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7195522.stm.

17. For an extensive examination of Russian policy in the Balkans with specific regard to Kosovo, see Yelena Guskova, ‘?’ [‘Does Russia have an action plan for the Balkans?’], (http://fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1124).

18. According to Antonenko, ‘now Russia is being asked to approve status before standards, with no prospect that these standards would in fact be implemented in the foreseeable future. Without such guarantees, such an endorsement would be seen by many Russians as yet another betrayal of Orthodox values – an endorsement of the destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries across Kosovo and the persecution and expulsion of ethnic Serbs. It would also contravene Putin’s approach, which relies heavily on promoting Russia’s role as de facto protector and champion of Orthodox values around the world’ (Antonenko 2007, 99).

19. See J. Tašić, ‘Moskva protiv nametanja rešenja’, Danas (Belgrade), 20 April 2007, http://www.danas.co.yu/20070420/dogadjajdana1.html#1. Putin himself reiterated this sentiment in January 2008 in a letter to Serbian President Boris Tadić, writing that ‘Serbia was and is Russia’s key partner in the Balkans’ (http://www.predsednik.yu/mwc/default.asp?c=301500&g=20080115092812&lng=cir&hs1=0).

20. The remarks were made by Ognyan Minchev, director of the Sofia office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (see Brunwasser and Dempsey 2008).