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Abstract
This article seeks external determinants of patterns of convergence or non‐convergence in EU’s periphery by considering the selection strategies of the EU for the inclusion of various countries in different sets of policies as a powerful and understudied driver of convergence. The existing sets of policies form two different EU policy tracks, loosely termed ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ – their main difference being that only the former leads to EU membership, thus offering strong incentives for compliance that result in convergence. The question that is, therefore, posed is: What drives the selection by the EU of countries for inclusion in the proactive track? The article contrasts two different answers to this key question: the ‘differentiation by performance’ theory, and that of ‘differentiation by design’. The former argues that selection and inclusion of transition countries in the intensive ‘proactive’ policy track, and therefore in more expensive policies, followed their transformation efforts. The comparison of EU policies towards countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, however, supports the rival and less established differentiation‐by‐design thesis. The conclusion is that EU selection and inclusion practices seem to have largely reflected the EU’s own preferences and were therefore selectively responsive to transformation efforts from different groups of countries, thus providing evidence in support of the differentiation‐by‐design thesis.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for providing generous support that made possible research for this article.
Notes
1. To simplify presentation, I will follow the convention of using the term ‘EU’ even for the period prior to 1994, when the term ‘European Community’ would be more accurate.
2. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
3. Clearly, Bulgaria, and Romania were less advanced than the rest of the group, which partly explains why they joined the EU three years after the remaining eight CEECs. But the group of 10 CEECs was undoubtedly ahead of the remaining transition countries. Existing literature has placed emphasis on the differentiation among front‐runners, i.e. the CEECs (see for example Vachudova Citation2005; Agh Citation1998, Citation1999), but has not put sufficient emphasis on the differentiation between front‐runners and laggards, i.e. the CEECs and CIS, respectively.
4. Or ‘“return” to their specific historical trajectories interrupted by communist rule’, as Ekiert and Hanson (Citation2003, 2) propose.
5. For an interesting analysis of the new East–East divide that draws the line between the Baltic and the CEECs on the one hand, and the remaining Former Soviet Republics (like Ukraine) on the other, see Fritz Citation2000.
6. Although, as Haggard and Kaufmann (Citation1993a, Citationb) and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (Citation2005) would argue, the basic requirement for initiating reform is a determined reform group; however, to sustain the pace and consolidate change, reforms must eventually resonate with society.
7. See also Maresceau (Citation1997) for a similar view.
8. Although later he seeks to moderate this claim: ‘Overall, however, the policy of the European Union was supportive to the challenges of reform, especially in the first years after 1989, even though it left much to be desired. The answer to the question of whether there was any clear overall strategy governing this policy and whether there is any clear policy today is much less clear’ (ibid., 12).
9. For a thorough discussion of this point, in particular with regard to the legal aspects of unilateral EU policy, see Muller‐Graff (1997).
10. According to Smith (Citation1999, 198), the community’s policy resembled Christopher Hill’s ‘power bloc model’ of European foreign policy, according to which the community/EPC used its economic strength for political purposes, rather than rely on persuasion and negotiation, as the civilian model would predict.
11. There is a continuity of policy from the Cold War era in this regard. Ever since the days of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the policy of the EEC was to deal with CEE countries not as a bloc but as individual countries. Relations with each CMEA member state would allow the community to take into account that state’s specific characteristics (‘specificity’ according to Smith Citation1999, 31).
12. This is not the place to expand on the question of German reunification; however, the Strasbourg summit did a have a reference to it in its Declaration on Central and Eastern Europe: ‘We seek the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity through free self‐determination. This process should take place peacefully and democratically, in full respect of the relevant agreements and treaties and of all the principles defined by the Helsinki Final Act, in a context of dialogue and East–West cooperation. It also has to be placed in the perspective of European integration’ (Citation1989 Strasbourg European Council Conclusions, 15; emphasis added).
13. Regarding the evolution of the European Communities, as early as December 1989 the Strasbourg Summit Conclusions note that in search for a ‘future European equilibrium’: ‘Construction of the Community must therefore go forward: the building of European Union will permit the further development of a range of effective and harmonious relations with the other countries of Europe’ (Citation1989 Strasbourg European Council Conclusions, 16; emphasis added).
14. This development has been widely hailed as a historical point in the role of the Commission as an international actor. Mayhew (Citation1998) suggests that Germany was offered the role of leading the group, but declined, preferring to offer the role to the Commission. Smith (Citation1999) suggests that this could have been Bush’s or Kohl’s idea.
15. ‘A new Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era’, address to Berlin Press Club, 12 December 1989, US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC; reference from Smith (Citation1999, 238, endnote 17).
16. On the politics of the creation of the EBRD, perhaps one of the most authoritative accounts comes from Haggard and Moravcsik (Citation1993).
17. More than 30% of the assistance was in the form of debt restructuring, i.e. not funds that end up in support of the countries’ reforms. Another 20% was in the form of export credits. Based on these figures, Mayhew concludes that approximately 15% of the ECU 90 billion were ‘real’ grants.
18. Although, according to Mayhew, ‘it took a whole year’ (ibid., 22, emphasis added). Not everybody was happy with Europe Agreements, and powerful interest groups were against them. For example, the EC‐level interest groups COPA and COGECA objected to the proposed consensus (Smith Citation1999, 95), and in July 1991 went as far as to suggest that, instead of Concluding Europe Agreements, the EC should encourage the resumption of agricultural trade between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries! (ibid., 215, endnote 77).
19. A note on semantics: here, the Commission introduces the term ‘Europe agreements’ (p. 59), changing the term ‘European Agreements’ that was previously used in summit Conclusions. ‘Europe agreements’ eventually prevailed as a term to describe the association agreements with the CEE countries.
20. Source: EC Bulletin number 3, 1992 points 1.3.5, 1.3.11–12.
21. On 7 February 1994, the Council and the Commission recommended that Europe Agreements with the Baltic States be negotiated as soon as possible. The December 1994 European Council stressed that Europe Agreements would be concluded with the three Baltic states (and Slovenia) and that they would be included in the pre‐accession strategy. Negotiations were indeed opened in December 1994 and the agreements with the Baltics were signed half a year later, in June 1995.
22. That explains much of the analysis on the distribution of TACIS funding over countries and sectors, discussed later in the article.
23. Until 1998, PHARE was demand‐driven, in the sense that it financed projects proposed by the associated countries that were in accordance to the general principles of the Copenhagen criteria. After 1998, it became a more focused pre‐ and post‐accession tool for the adaptation of the candidate countries to areas more relevant to the accession requirements that were determined by the EU (supply side). For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the PHARE programme and its core areas, as well as the problems associated with its performance over time and especially in the early years (mainly from the point of view of the EU), see Bailey and de Propis (Citation2004).
24. After 1999, two additional financial arms were added to PHARE for the 10 candidate countries: ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre‐accession) and SHAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development). ISPA focused on transport and environmental infrastructure; SHAPARD focused on rural and agricultural development, and the implementation of the acquis concerning the CAP. Its priorities are defined in the Accession Partnerships. By the end of the accession negotiations, ISPA and SHAPARD were committing funds similar to those of the PHARE programme: for example, in 2001 PHARE allocated [euro]1641 million, SAPARD [euro]539.6 million, and ISPA [euro]1109.3 million (EC 2003, 22). Since 2004, PHARE involves the programming of projects for only two countries: Bulgaria and Romania.
25. Mongolia was removed from TACIS in 2003.
26. Since 1997, technical aid programmes to Belarus have been stopped on the grounds of human rights violations; in 1998 and 1999, diplomatic sanctions were imposed on the country (Smith Citation2003, Appendix 1). Similarly, Croatia was suspended from PHARE in 1995 for violations of human rights, peace agreements, and democracy; aid resumed partly in 1996, and fully since 2000 (ibid.). In Serbia, diplomatic and economic sanctions were leveraged between 1992 and 1996 because of the 1992–1995 war; following violations of human rights in Kosovo, technical and reconstruction aid was halted in 1998 and economic sanctions imposed; aid resumed and most sanctions were cancelled in October 2000 (ibid.). TACIS aid to Tajikistan was halted in 1997 and only resumed partially in 2000 and fully since 2001 (ibid.).
27. According to Vachudova (Citation2005), the fact that Europe Agreements did not contain any explicit references to membership allowed the EU members to be more flexible towards Bulgaria and Romania when they asked them to comply with the five PHARE conditions.
28. One should nevertheless keep in mind that ‘The West and international organizations could not provide assistance to Ukraine prior to 1994 because only in that year was the nuclear weapons question resolved and Ukraine launched its first reform programme’ (Kuzio Citation2001, 465).
29. It appears that the marginal utility – to use a term from economics – of adding one member state like Ukraine is substantially lower compared with the other CEECs.
30. A point that was bluntly summarized to me by a Slovenian ambassador as: ‘forget principles, this was Realpolitik’.
31. The concept belongs to Haggard and Moravcsik (Citation1993).