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Abstract
This essay assesses Greece role in determining the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s (FYROM’s) European Union (EU) accession process. Based on documentary evidence, extensive interviews with decision-makers and leaked diplomatic cables, it emerges that Skopje’s path towards Brussels has consistently passed through Athens, linked to disputes concerning the republic’s name and good neighbourly relations. When improvements in bilateral relations have been evinced (1995–2004, 2004–2006), FYROM signed a stabilization and association agreement and became an EU candidate state. During periods of diplomatic confrontation (1991–1994, 2006–2011), the new republic was non-recognized by Athens, did not accede to North Atlantic Treaty Organization and failed to get a date to begin accession negotiations. It is concluded that only if Greece’s relative gain concerns are adequately assuaged will FYROM’s Euro-Atlantic path be completed.
Notes
1. Throughout this essay the term FYROM will be utilized, which is the state’s international United Nations name according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 passed on 7 April 1993.
2. Athens submitted a memorandum on the issue at the European Political Cooperation (EPC) Ministerial meeting of 27 August 1991. See Skylakakis Citation1995, 259–60). For a perceptive analysis of Greece’s handling of the initial phase of the name dispute, see Veremis (Citation1995, 67–97). For a sustained theoretical exposition and exploration of the significance and limits of the institutional dimension that affected the dispute during that period, see Kouskouvelis (Citation2004).
3. Makedonia, 15 February 1992 [in Greek]. A huge demonstration was held in Athens in December 1992. Large demonstrations also took place in Athens and Thessaloniki in 1994.
4. Only the Greek Communist Party (KKE) did not endorse the meeting’s conclusions. For an account, see Tziampiris (Citation2000, 122–5).
5. Pinheiro’s proposals, called for the abstaining from threats and the use of violence, offered guarantees of the inviolability of the frontiers and the territorial integrity of the two countries and ensured the legitimate and unobstructed transportation of goods. For the text of the ‘Pinheiro Package’, see Valinakis and Dalis (Citation1996, 87–90). Pinheiro was representing the Portuguese Presidency.
6. For an analysis of this initiative, see Kofos (Citation1999, 243–4) and Papakonstantinou (Citation1994, 381–412).
7. On 6 April 1994, the EC decided to take legal action against Greece in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the question of the embargo. Athens responded with a thorough and impressively argued legal document. On 29 June 1995, the ECJ decided in favour of Greece. See Valinakis and Dalis (Citation1996, 241–98 and 302–27).
8. For the text of the Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the contracting parties) signed at New York on 13 September 1995, see Internet site: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/6/3/00004456.pdf.
9. It is noteworthy that by 2007, the US State Department had concluded that ‘The Greek public, and many politicians, have never been fully satisfied with the 1995 Interim Accord … progressive recognition of Macedonia by major powers (including the US) has devalued the agreement in Greek eyes. In their view, the accords (sic) have made Macedonia the gradual winner of the recognition game, and Greece the eventual – perhaps inevitable – loser’. See the US diplomatic cable that was written by Charge d’ Affaires ad interim Thomas M. Countryman on 8 August 2007. The cable’s ID number is 118180 and is classified ‘confidential’. It was made public by wiki leaks.
10. For other developments that brought FYROM closer to the EU during this period, see Republic of Macedonia (Citation2004, 31).
11. ‘Business heartbeat in Skopje’, To Vima, 25 March 2001 [in Greek].
12. See ‘FYROM: only the name remains’, Flash.gr, December 2000 [in Greek].
13. ‘Simitis in Parliament on FYROM’, Flash.gr, 2 March 2001 [in Greek].
14. See especially International Crisis Group (Citation2001, 10) and the revealing discussion of the relevant diplomatic negotiations in Lygeros (Citation2008, 263–9).
15. For an analysis of how Greece reacted to the crisis, see Tziampiris (Citation2003, 113–30) and Tziampiris (Citation2002).
16. See Kontonis (Citation2003, 92–93).
17. Declaration European Union-Western Balkans meeting, 21 June 2003, 10229/03 (Presse 163), 2) at Internet site: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/76291.pdf.
18. On 1 April 2004, the SAA also came into force.
19. This was despite the fact that Greek diplomats had been at least discussing for years at the UN, compound names that included the term Macedonia. See the indispensable account in Zaharakis (Citation2008, 724–800).
20. Based on interviews with Greek and State Department officials conducted in the Summer and Fall 2009. All interviews referred to in this essay were granted on the basis of no-direct attribution. On the US recognition, see Paquin (Citation2008, 437–458). For the decision’s key antecedent, see Boduszynski & Balalovska (Citation2008, 18–30).
21. ‘Matthew Nimetz talks to Kathimerini: “There were opportunities for an agreement”’, Kathimerini, 4 September 2011 [in Greek]. It should be noted that the text in the interview cited above in the main text refers to FYROM as Skopje.
22. US diplomatic cable written by Charge d’ Affaires ad interim Thomas M. Countryman on 8 August 2007. The cable’s ID number is 118180 and is classified ‘confidential’. It was made public by wiki leaks.
23. ‘The Prime Minister warned of a veto to FYROM’s EU and NATO accession’, In.gr, 15 November 2004 [in Greek].
24. Press Office of the Prime Minister, Press Interview of Prime Minister Mr Kostas Karamanlis after the Meeting with the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Mr Jiri Paroubek, 29 August 2005; emphasis added [in Greek].
25. ‘Compound name in the running, brake on the veto’, Eleftherotypia, 9 November 2004 [in Greek].
26. For the full text of the proposal, see ‘Nimetz proposals concerning the name issue’, Macedonian Heritage at Internet Site: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/OfficialDocuments/Nimetz.html.
27. US diplomatic cable written by US Ambassador to Greece, Daniel V. Speckhard on 5 January 2008. The cable’s ID number is 136394 and is classified “confidential.” It was made public by wiki leaks.
28. See for example, ‘Nimetz Proposal left Karamanlis speechless’, Imerisia, 15/16 October 2005. In all likelihood and despite misgivings and disappointments in both Athens and Skopje, Nimetz’s ‘series of proposals, usually contradictory to each other [aimed] to stimulate concessions by both parties’. (Kofos Citation2009, 1)
29. Based on author’s interviews with Greek diplomats and experts who have viewed Nimetz’s proposal.
30. ‘Greece rejects UN’s Macedonia name compromise’, Reuters, 8 October 2005.
31. ‘Support for FYROM’s Euro-Atlantic course depends on name issue, Deputy Minister stresses’, Athens News Agency, 14 October 2005; emphasis added. The statement was made by Deputy Foreign Minister Evripides Stylianides.
32. ‘As if it was yesterday’, Eleftherotypia, 16 October 2005 [in Greek].
33. See Nikolovski (Citation2005).
34. Parliamentary Minutes, IA Period, Session B, Meeting IH, Monday 31 October 2005, 644 [in Greek].
35. Parliamentary Minutes, IA Period, Session B, Meeting IH, Monday 31 October 2005, 647.
36. A similar recommendation was contained in the Commission’s 2005 enlargement strategy. See Commission of the European Communities (Citation2005b).
37. Based on author’s interviews with Greek decision-makers handling this issue conducted in February 2006.
38. The EP also reiterated its position on the name issue. See European Parliament (Citation2007).
39. For an analysis of why the Ohrid airport’s renaming was perceived as irredentist in Greece, see Kofos Citation2007.
40. Based on author’s interviews with Greek and US State Department officials conducted in Summer and Fall 2009.
41. Transcript of Dora Bakoyannis’ speech in parliament on 30 September 2007; emphasis added.
42. See the poll published in the newspaper Proto Thema on 10 June 2007. 61.5% of Greeks did not want the neigbouring republic to join the EU and NATO even as FYROM and 61.3% wanted a referendum conducted before any final decisions. Another poll published on 8 October in the newspaper To Vima showed 62 per cent of Greeks opposed to a compound name.
43. Transcript of the televized debate of the political leaders 6 September 2007 [in Greek]. It is noteworthy that Karamanlis did not use the word veto, but his message was not ambiguous.
44. ‘Veto in NATO and EU if we do not agree on the name’, Eleftherotypia, 19 October 2007 [in Greek].The statement was made by deputy Foreign Minister Theodore Kassimis.
45. See the US diplomatic cable written by Charge d’ Affaires ad interim Thomas M. Countryman on 8 August 2007. The cable’s ID number is 118180 and is classified ‘confidential’. It was made public by wiki leaks.
46. Transcript of Dora Bakoyannis’ speech in the Greek parliament that was made on 30 September 2007.
47. See ‘Conditions for Skopje are multiplying’, Eleftherotypia, 8 June 2007 [in Greek].
48. The proposed names were: ‘Constitutional Republic of Macedonia’, ‘Democratic Republic of Macedonia’, ‘Independent Republic of Macedonia’, ‘New Republic of Macedonia’ and ‘Republic of Upper Macedonia’. The text of the full proposal was published in To Vima, 21 February 2008 [in Greek].
49. ‘We will veto if no solution is found”, To Vima, 3 February 2008 [in Greek].
50. The poll was published on 24 February 2008 in Proto Thema.
51. US diplomatic cable written by US Ambassador to FYROM Gillian A. Milovanovic on 7 February 2008. The cable’s ID number is 140389 and is classified “confidential.” It was made public by wiki leaks.
52. Ibid; emphasis added.
53. See ‘Provocation from USA-Nimetz’, Ethnos, 26 March 2008 [in Greek].
54. See ‘We accepted Nimetz’s proposal of “Macedonia (Skopje)” says Gruevski’, To Vima, 28 February 2011 [in Greek].
55. Bucharest Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, available at Internet site: http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_202.html; emphasis added.
56. Based on author’s interviews and discussions with Greek diplomats and politicians conducted in 2008 and 2009.
57. The list of countries supporting the Greek position is taken from a recently published book by Manolis Kottakis, a Greek journalist, purporting to have been based on a series of off-the-record interviews with Kostas Karamanlis and key members of his administration during the roughly five-year period that they were in office (Kottakis Citation2011, 237). This author can attest to the fact that Greek decision-makers and diplomats have been affirming for several years now the crucial support of France at the Bucharest NATO Summit meeting. It is also noteworthy that according to Kottakis, France’s President Nikola Sarkozy came to an understanding with Greece’s prime minister that Athens would buy a number of French Rafale fighter planes as part of the ‘price’ for French support at Bucharest, although apparently the deal never materialized. See Kottakis (Citation2011, 228–30).
58. Ibid. Kottakis implies that his information was at least partly derived from Karamanlis personally, since he quotes the prime minister (apparently in an off-the-record interview) as follows: ‘“Portugal was fifty-fifty” remembers [Kostas Karamanlis]’ (ibid).
59. See ‘Slovenia and Greece Clash on Macedonia EU Bid’, Balkan Insight.com, 17 June 2008.
60. The fact that FYROM had made inadequate progress in the Accession Partnership that it had signed with the EU in February 2008 was almost certainly a contributing factor. See Bugarski (Citation2010, 85).
61. See Tziampiris (Citation2008).
62. For the text of Gruevski’s letter, see Internet site: http://say-macedonia.blogspot.com/2008/07/gruevskis-letter-to-karamanlis.html. Gruevski also argued that the rights of his country’s citizens who had fled Greece in the 1940s were also violated. For Karamanlis’ 19 July 2008 reply, see Internet site: http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=92&article=23959.
63. See also Tziampiris (Citation2011b, 70–71) and Marquand, Citation2009. The Antiquization campaign reached a symbolic visual climax with the erection in the centre of Skopje of a 24 m high statue of a mounted Alexander the Great during the Summer of 2011. Based on interviews with Greek diplomats, pressure emanating from Athens through various channels persuaded the Gruevski governmnet to merely identify the statue as that of a ‘mounted Macedonian’ though there can be absolutely no doubt whatsoever and is thus universally understood that this is a depiction of Alexander the Great. Apparently, the statue played a key role in the September 2011 celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the republic’s declaration of independence. Significantly, the Greek press was indignant and described the celebrations in a contemptuous and angry manner that bodes ill for any resolution of the dispute. For example, see ’Celebration of bad taste: Delirium of nationalism at the anniversary of independence’, Ethnos on Sunday, 4 September 2011 [in Greek] and ’Fiesta in bad- taste by Gruevski’, Ethnos, 9 September 2011 [in Greek].
64. The proposal was published in Ethnos, 10 October 2008 [in Greek].
65. See Commission of the European Communities Citation2008, 23.
66. Commission of the European Communities. Citation2009a. See also Commission of the European Communities. Citation2009b.
67. ‘Droutsas: Beginning of accession negotiations with FYROM after the solution’, Kathimerini, 10 September 2009 [in Greek].
68. See Council of the European Union (Citation2009).
69. International Court of Justice (Citation2011, 28). For the wording of the relevant paragraph of Article 11, see the previous discussion of the Interim Accord in this essay.
70. International Court of Justice (Citation2011, 47); emphasis added.
71. For a good analysis of how the ICJ ruling was perceived in Skopje, see Marusic (Citation2011).
72. Statement by the NATO Secretary General on ICJ ruling, 5 December 2011 at the Internet site http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-FD810E70-219F68FB/natolive/news_81678.htm.
73. Council of the European Union (Citation2011, 8).
74. Based on author’s extensive interviews and discussions with Greek decision-makers conducted during summer 2010, spring 2011 and in the immediate aftermath of the ICJ’s ruling.
75. See Tziampiris (Citation2011a).
76. See also Mearsheimer (Citation1994/1995, 5–49), Powell (Citation1991, 1303–20) and Snidal (Citation1991, 701–26).
77. ‘Republic of Vardar Macedonia’ appears to constitute the preferred option for Greek diplomacy, especially in its Slavic, untranslatable version.
78. Any bilateral agreement on the name issue is likely to be subject to the potentially complicating parameter of a referendum in Skopje. It is also interesting to note that although Athens would accept an agreement by any government in Skopje, there is a growing recognition that a deal with VMRO could possibly produce a more durable and legitimized outcome. The analogy often brought up by Greek decision-makers is that of anti-communist US President Richard Nixon making a durable deal with China’s Chairman Mao Zedong.