The Europeanization of national foreign policy: explaining Greek support for Turkey’s EU accession

Abstract

Europeanization has been a fashionable term over the last decade. However, when it comes to foreign policy, extant work has produced inconsistent findings and few theoretical insights. This paper aims to fill this gap by constructing a synthetic theory which integrates into a ‘thick rationalist’ approach four mechanisms of Europeanization identified in the literature (policy adaptation, normative framing, differential empowerment, diplomatic coordination), and specifies a set of mediating conditions that can explain variations in the scope and direction of Europeanization. This theory is used in order to explain why Greece has become, since 1999, an active and solid supporter of Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership prospect.

Keywords:

• bottom-up design
• Europeanization
• foreign policy
• Greece
• Turkey

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Thomas Diez, Lena Rethel and the two reviewers for their stimulating inputs and criticism which has helped to shape and refine the argument presented. I am also grateful to Laurence Cooley for his editorial assistance.

Notes

1. For the purpose of this paper, the EU foreign policy regime encompasses not only the so-called second pillar (CFSP/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)) but also the EC policies that have an external dimension (Trade Policy, Development and Cooperation Policy, and Enlargement).

2. Greek security concerns have centred on three core issues: the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus (in response to the overthrown of the island’s elected government by a Greek Cypriot nationalist group whose objective was to achieve unification (enosis) with Greece), which has resulted in the de facto division of the island in two ethnically homogeneous zones; the proliferation of differences regarding the control of the Aegean and (since 1996) the sovereignty of certain islets close to the Turkish coast; and minority questions in particular with respect to the status of the Greek minority in Istanbul and of the Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace.

3. Between 1992 and 1999, Turkey received ECU 2.2 billion in Official Development Assistance on a bilateral basis from the EU member states. This assistance was reduced by more than a third in the period leading to the start of accession negotiations (EUR 192 million a year), thus leaving the total amount of aid that Turkey received from the EU and the member states relatively stable (author’s own calculations based on the OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/geographical-distribution-of-financial-flows-to-aid-recipients_19962525 (accessed 2 May 2011).

4. Whereas, the Christian Democrats held a principled opposition to Turkey’s EU membership on a civilizational argument and were, therefore, willing to offer tacit support to a Greek veto at the 1997 Luxemburg European Council, the Schroeder government favoured closer EU–Turkish relations and actively endeavoured to reopen the issue of Turkey’s accession. This ensured that Turkey had the backing of the ‘big three’, making attempts to block its candidacy very difficult. For more details, see Muftuler-Bac and McLaren (2003).

5. This trinity rationale emerges clearly from several historical accounts of that period (see Heraclides 2010, 197–198; Ker-Linsday 2007, 2–3; Simitis 2006, 99–101; Tsakonas 2010, 80–83) as well as the analysis of public debates that took place before and after the Helsinki summit (see Greek Parliament 1999).

6. This campaign included meetings of the Greek PM Costas Simitis with the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (October) and the French President Jacques Chirac (November); a tour of European capitals by the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, including London (18 October), Madrid (19 October), Rome (20 October), Paris (8 November) and The Hague (9 November); numerous meetings of Simitis’ close advisors Nicos Themelis and Christos Rozakis and ambassadors Aristidis Agathocles and Theodore Sotiropoulos with their counterparts from other European Governments (see Ker-Lindsay 2007a; Simitis 2006).

7. According to Prime Minister Simitis, the first Greek condition regarding Cyprus had been accepted by Britain while the second condition on the ICJ had been endorsed, somehow reluctantly, by France.

8. The decision of the New Democracy government to forego the 2004 deadline for the referral of Greek–Turkish disputes to the ICJ and the introduction of the qualifier ‘if necessary’ in the reference made in the Negotiation Framework has been interpreted by several analysts as a ‘betrayal’ of the Helsinki spirit. However, one has to take such assessments with caution. Although there is significant evidence that the exploratory talks conducted after Helsinki had produced significant progress, it is unclear if the agreements reached in the convivial atmosphere of confidential negotiations would have survived the tests of open deliberation and public approval. Moreover, although there is evidence that Simitis and Papandreou sincerely sought a comprehensive solution of Greek–Turkish conflicts, it is unlikely that in the event of a deadlock, they would have taken the risk to block the start of accession negotiations and plunge the Greek–Turkish relationship into unpredictable turmoil.

9. By the end of 1999, Greece had effectively met the Maastricht criteria with the exception of the debt to GDP ratio, which remained exceptionally high. The request for participation in the last phase of the EMU was submitted on 9 March 2000 and a positive decision was taken by the European Council on 19 June, just six months after the Helsinki summit.

10. Given that the question of EMU membership was inherently political, one may counter-argue that the Greek Government wanted to clear the way in order to bargain freely on the EMU. However, this essentially reinforces the Europeanization thesis, inasmuch as such a calculation is revealing of excellent knowledge of how the EU decision-making works.

11. According to Eurobarometer data at the time of the Helsinki summit the Greek public supported Turkey’s EU accession by 20% while 70% opposed such a prospect. The following year (2000), we observe a significant increase in positive answers (37% in favour 54% against). However, over time, opposition to Turkey’s membership has reverted back to pre-Helsinki standards (80% in 2005).