Europeanization or endogenous institutional change? The case of Turkey

Abstract

The Europeanization literature has successfully highlighted the effects of the EU impetus on Turkish domestic actors’ incentives and ability to pursue democratizing reforms. Given the on-going institutional transformation despite the loss of the EU momentum and limited internalization of democratic norms, it is argued that explaining institutional change would greatly benefit from an analytical framework fit to account for both phases of Turkey’s transformation. This study uses a rationalist analytical framework to explore the on-going process of institutional change, focusing on Kemalism as a primarily endogenous institution. Acknowledging the link between the Helsinki Summit and the launch of institutional reform, the evolution of an analytically defined Kemalism is traced and explained in terms of anti-Kemalist collective action facilitated by the instrumentally motivated AKP government.

Keywords:

• Europeanization
• Turkey
• AKP
• Kemalism
• rationality
• institutional change
• collective action

Notes

1. For Kemalism and the Turkish Independence War, see Ahmad (1993) and Lewis (2002). For a political analysis of the Revolution see Yilmaz (2008).

2. For the development of the Kemalist doctrine and a definition of the six principles see Ataöv (1981) and Ünsal (1981).

3. Reforms included the replacement of the religious school system with a secular one, banning of Sharia law, adapting the secular Swiss civic code, replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin, banning the Caliphate, establishing the directorate of Religious affairs, changing old style clothes with European ones and introducing universal suffrage.

4. For an explanation of the 1960 military coup based on instrumental considerations of TSK personnel see Heper and Tachau (1983, 20–1).

5. For inner-party divisions and the revision of statism see Wanderlippe (2005).

6. For more information see Cetinsaya (1999).

7. These state institutions are non-unitary actors and their actions can be conceived of as revealing their internal normative balance.

8. Patton (2007, 349) for instance refers to the judiciary as the ‘civilian doppelganger to the military’.

9. Patton (2007, 357) refers to former President Ahmet Sezer as a ‘key defender of Kemalist secularism’ who ‘vetoed more legislation than any preceding President with the purpose of containing the AKP’s agenda. The President holds significant influence over the composition of state institutions as he is authorized to appoint the members and chairman of the State Supervisory Council, YÖK and university rectors.

10. Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code imposed imprisonment sentences for the denigration of Turkishness, the Republic and state institutions. The article also stated that expressions of thought intended to criticize do not constitute crimes, thus leaving the Court ample room for interpretation.

11. The selection of actors is justified on the basis of historical research, presented extensively in Zaras (2012).

12. The TSK could be conceptualized as a non-unitary actor; however the scarcity of evidence on distinct preferences among its ranks renders the validation of any such explanation of TSK action impossible. This paper thus follows the bulk of work that has treated the TSK using a similar set of assumptions.

13. For the formation of a pro-EU camp transcending the Islamist-Secular division, see Öniş and Keyman (2004) and Öniş (2003).

14. State Security Courts were established after the 1982 military coup to try crimes against the security of the state.

15. The Ergenekon organization is being charged with violent acts aiming to create chaos within the Turkish society thus enabling a TSK intervention. Many prominent members of Turkish society, including prominent secularists have been charged and the trial is ongoing. In 2009, a number of military coup plans unveiled by daily Taraf have been merged with the Ergenekon trial. Until 2010 no convictions had been made.

16. The examples of Ayhan Bilgen, former President of Mazlum-Der who run as an independent candidate in 2007 under the ‘1000 hope candidates’ platform and Ali Bayramoglu, the second President of MÜSİAD who became a MP candidate for AKP in 2007, demonstrate that individual incentives to participate in anti-Kemalist action included career enhancement.

17. Sofos (2001) notes that: ‘the transitional period from 1999 to 2002 is characterized by the struggle between reformist elites ‘rallying around the banner of Europeanization’, and the elites who are ‘supporters of a statist view of Turkey under the tutelage of a suspicious and possessive military elite’.

18. Prominent secular columnist Mehmet Ali Birand has often commented on the pro-military attitude of mainstream media and repercussions of criticizing state institutions in the 1990s, see for instance Birand (2011).

19. A short profile on Fethullah Gülen (New York Times 2008) helps place the preacher’s movement within the analytical framework.

20. Tocci (2005) similarly depicts the effects of the reforms on the growth of reform-seeking civil society.

21. According to Milliyet’s report on 7 March 2010, the association is funded by the Gülen movement.

22. For a comprehensive presentation of the Kemalist coalition see Zaras (2012).

23. See Onar (2007, 280–2) for a brief presentation of the political confrontation over the abolition of Article 301.

24. Individual participation in NGOs and trade-unions is often overlapping, for more details see Zaras (2012).

25. Interview with Ahmet Zeki, Istanbul, 12 April 2010.

26. See Birand 2010a for Kemalist counter-mobilization during this time.

27. Ersanlı (2009) in a discussion I had with her referred to YÖK’s authority in imposing mainstream nationalistic analyses of Turkish history.

28. As illustrated by Hurriyet Daily News’s report on 21 February, 2009, the tax evasion case filed against Doğan was widely branded by Kemalist media as politically instigated.

29. AKP has faced criticisms for lack of resolve to consolidate democracy even from columnists of pro-AKP daily Today’s Zaman, see for instance Yılmaz (2012).

30. See Polat (2011) for a similar explanation of AKP’s unwillingness to satisfy Kurdish demands.

31. See for instance Bayramoğlu (2009).