Transnistrian strategy in the context of Russian–Ukrainian relations: the rise and failure of ‘dual alignment’

Abstract

The diversification of allegiances with several more powerful states is seen as a way for minor actors to improve their strategic position in the international system. The result, however, could become less than desirable when these relations are both essential and contradictory. This article intends to examine the challenges for Transnistrian foreign policy through the concepts of bandwagoning and balancing. It uses alternative neorealist perspectives to identify various types of alignment and then examines how this landlocked territorial entity attempts to use relations with Russia and Ukraine to protect its statehood and identity in the context of the ongoing threat from Moldova. This article identifies that twice in the last decade (after the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan), the strategy of ‘dual alignment’ failed. It claims that recent attempts by both the EU and Ukraine to weaken Russia’s position in the region by isolating Transnistria has led to a further strengthening of ties between this actor and Moscow.

Keywords:

• Transnistria
• Russia
• Ukrainian crisis
• EU
• Moldova
• balance of threat theory
• strategy
• frozen conflicts

Notes

1. The name of the regional parliament.

2. Soglashenie o printsipakh mirnogo uregulirovania vvoruzhennogo konflikta v Pridnestrovskom regione Respubliki Moldova. 21 August 1991 [Agreement on the Principles of a Peace Settlement in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova], Moscow.

3. Herewith and below, we discuss ‘external balancing’ rather than ‘internal balancing’, which means the accumulation of deterrence capabilities by the state on its own.

4. Aleksander Argunov i Nina Shtanski rasskazali rossijskoj radiostantsii o realizatsii gumanitarnoj pomoschi RF Pridnestrovjyu [Aleksander Argunov and Nina Shtanski tell a Russian radio station about the implementation of Russian humanitarian assistance to Transnistria]. http://eurasianintegration.ru/?q=node/522.

5. 193,6 mln $ in 2014, 202,2 mln $ in 2013 http://vestipmr.info/articles/2015/06/18/bolshe-vsego-denezhnyh-perevodov-postupaet-v-pridnestrove-iz.

6. See Glava gosudarstva: ‘Evrazijskie ustremleniya Pridnestoviya – eto osnova natsional’noj idei’ [Head of State: ‘The Eurasian aspirations of Transnistria are the foundation of our national idea’] 6 June 2012. http://president.gospmr.ru/ru/news/glava-gosudarstva-evraziyskie-ustremleniya-pridnestrovya-eto-osnova-nacionalnoy-idei.

7. For a comparison of the various plans to settle the Transnistrian conflict see (Wolff 2011).

8. A good example was the Odessa and Kiev summits of 1997 and 1998, where cooperation between Russia and Ukraine forced Moldova and Transnistria to talk to each other and to sign political documents, but not to commit to any substantive concessions (Roper 2001, 113–114).

9. The EU actually began to engage in the dispute even earlier through participation in the ‘5 + 2 Talks’ and deployment of the EUBAM operation on the Moldovan and Ukrainian borders with Transnistria (on the latter see, Dias 2013). The EU’s influence is also seen in Voronin’s decision to reject ‘Kozak Memorandum’ in 2003.

10. The Meseberg memorandum was an understanding reached by the leaders of Russia and Germany during their summit in 2010, which envisaged increased cooperation between Moscow and the EU in conflict resolution with specific provisions regarding the Transnistrian issue (see Meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Dmitri Medvedev on 4–5 June 2010 in Meseberg. URL: http://www.russianmission.eu/sites/default/files/user/files/2010-06-05-meseberg-memorandum.pdf).

11. See, for example, Nina Shtanski: ‘Peregovornoe prostranstvo dolzhno napolnyat’sya resheniem konkretnykh problem’ [Nina Shtanski: ‘The Negotiation Space Should Be Filled with Solutions to Specific Problems’] 11 April 2012. http://mfa-pmr.org/ru/DLg. The most tangible outcome of this approach appeared to be an agreement on restoring railway traffic between Moldova, Transnistria and Ukraine, signed on 30 March 2012 (Protokol’noe reshenie ‘O printsipakh vozobnovleniya polnotsennogo gruzovogo zheleznodorozhnogo soobscheniya cherez territoriyu Pridnestoviya [Protocol decision ‘On the Principles of Restoring a Full-Fledged Cargo Railway Connection through the Territory of Transnistria’] 30 March 2012. http://mfa-pmr.org/ru/xDk).

12. In May 2015 Ukrainian president Peter Poroshenko claimed that his country is in an actual war with Russia (see Ukraine’s Poroshenko talks of ‘real war’ with Russia. BBC News. 20 May 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32805555).

13. The number of accusations increased starting in early 2015 (see Soloviev V. Vlasti Pridniestroviya i Ukrainy obvinili v strel’be na granitse drug druga [The authorities of Transnistria and Ukraine accused each other of shooting on the border]. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2699052, SNBO zafiksirovala polyety bespilotnikov so storony Pridniestroviya [National Security and Defense Service recorded drones flying from Transnistria]. http://nv.ua/ukraine/SNBO-zafiksirovala-polety-bespilotnikov-so-storony-Pridnestrovya-5941.html; V Odesskoj OGA annonsirovali mery po bor’be s kontrabandoj iz Pridniestroviya [The Odessa regional public administration announced measures to fight smuggling from Transnistria]. http://nv.ua/ukraine/politics/-saakashvili-obeshchaet-vplotnuyu-zanyatsya-kontrabandoy-iz-pridnestrovya-51334.html).

14. The Transnistrian security service claims that Ukrainian officials opened fire at two individuals who tried to cross the border outside of the border post. The Ukrainian border service responded by accusing the Transnistrian border service of shooting in its own citizens (see, Zayavlenie press-sluzhby KGB PMR [Statement of KGB TMR press-service] http://kgb-pmr.com/news/362, O primenenii oruzhiya pogranichnikami PMR [About the use of force by TMR border officials]. http://dpsu.gov.ua/ru/about/news/news_6566.htm).

15. Tiraspol called this decision an attempt to undermine the peacekeeping mission in the region (Poroshenko podpisal zakon o razryve dogovora s Rossiyej o tranzite voennykh v Moldaviyu [Poroshenko signed a law denouncing an agreement with Russia on military transit to Moldova] 8 June 2015. http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2027960).

16. Although Moscow was not mentioned in the documents produced by the April summit, it was clearly used to coordinate activities aimed to at resisting Russian influence in the region (see Gaburitch: Moldova ukrepit otnosheniya s Ukrainoj dlya otveta novym vyzovam i ugrozam [Gaburici: Moldova will strengthen relations with Ukraine to respond to the new challenges and threats]. http://totul.md/ru/newsitem/755601.html). On Romanian–Ukrainian rapprochement see Kiev i Bukharest dogovorilis’ o pomoschi Kishinevu s PMR [Kiev and Bucharest agreed on assisting Chisinau regarding the TMR] http://nv.ua/ukraine/kiev-i-buharest-dogovorilis-o-pomoshchi-kishinevu-s-pmr-39360.html. On the new railroad project, see Ukraina i Moldavia dogovorilis’ vosstanovit’ zheleznuyu dorogu v obkhod Pridenstrovjya [Ukraine and Moldova agreed to restore railroad bypassing Transnistria] http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2366563.

17. Under these conditions Transnistria might prefer direct monitoring of the norms’ application by the EU, but as of July 2015 this option had not been agreed with Brussels.