The irreversibility of history: the case of the Ukrainian crisis (2013–2015)

Abstract

Today’s Ukraine figures as the land of irreconcilable differences, on the verge of disintegrating into different parts. Issues regarding nation-building processes, national identity types within the main ethnic communities, as well as regional political preferences have all become critical. Thus, this paper examines how enduring regional political preferences, embedded in a fragmented and porous national identity framework, have been serving as destabilizing factors in the eastern part of the country. The conclusions offer an understanding of the 2013–2015 crisis, while they can also be extrapolated to other regions of the ex-Soviet space.

Keywords:

• Ukraine
• nation-building process
• nationalities
• regional political preferences
• historical institutionalism

Notes

1. The ‘Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine’ stipulates that the language of the compactly settled in an administrative-territorial unit national groups holds equal status to the state language, i.e., the Ukrainian (Solchanyk 1994, 65). Moreover, it goes one step further, stipulating that ‘all citizens have the right to use the Russian language’ (Solchanyk 1994, 65).

2. At this point, special reference deserves an article in Pravda which cites Kravchuk’s, Ukraine’s first President, response to attempts at portraying the Russian minority as fifth column. In particular: ‘I want to point out that the Russians in Ukraine should not be compared with the Russians in the Baltic republics. Here they are indigenous residents, they have lived on this land for hundreds of years … And we will not permit any kind of discrimination against them. The Russian-language card should not be played. This is a dangerous game … Our republic, pardon me for saying so, is not Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia or Moldova’ (Pravda cited after Solchanyk 1994, 65).

3. Although there were a few ups and downs until Ukraine’s and Crimea’s constitutions were finally adopted in 1996 and 1998, respectively, what was stipulated in the law of 30 June remained unaltered and passed on to both fundamental laws. In particular, in Ukraine’s constitution is stipulated that ‘the territorial mode of Ukraine is based on bases of unity and integrity of state territory, combination of centralization and decentralization … taking into account their (the regions’) historical, economic,… demographic features, ethnic and cultural traditions’ (Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Article 132). Moreover, with regard to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is stipulated that ‘(it) is inalienable component part of Ukraine and within the limits of plenary power certain by Constitution of Ukraine, decides the questions attributed to its knowing’ (Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Article 134). Finally, there are further articles in both Constitutions that substantiate Crimea’s complete autonomy within the Ukrainian state (Constitution of Crimea 1998, Articles 11, 13, 18; Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Articles 136–139).

4. For these regional movements see: (Solchanyk 1994, 59-61).

5. For Russia, and the for the Putin administration in particular, two major issues were at stake: (a) the lives of many ethnic Russian’s residing in Ukraine and (b) the preservation of the country’s geopolitical influence over Ukraine (Sotiriou 2014, 217).

6. This referendum offered two choices, neither one allowing for the status quo ante, i.e., remaining within Ukraine (Saideman 2014). In particular, the questions posed were as follows:

• Are you in favour of the reunification of Crimea with Russia as part of the Russian Federation?

• Are you in favour of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?

Although the first question needs no clarification, the second would foster Crimea’s independence, while still part of Ukraine (Sneider 2014). In fact, the broad powers vested in the Crimean authorities by the 1992 Constitution would allow them to plough their own furrow, including setting independently ties with other nations, such as Russia (Sneider 2014). Furthermore, the fact that the 1992 Constitution was selected, thus excluding any possibility for maintaining the status quo ante, implies that Ukraine’s nation-building processes, as attempted after Ukraine’s and Crimea’s current constitutions were adopted in 1996 and 1998, respectively, have been met with inadequate success.

7. Crimea’s annexation as well as the large-scale deployment of Russian troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border were referred to in Russia as ‘Operation Russian Spring’ (Sutyagin 2015, 1). The Russian military operation in Ukraine was conducted in line with the Gerasimov Doctrine of ‘Ambiguous Warfare’ (Sutyagin 2015, 1).

8. On how Russia perceived the prospect of Ukraine’s federalization, and how Ukraine perceived Russia-lead projects such as the Custom Union among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, see: (Kommersant.ru 2014; SOCIS 2014).

9. Since May 2014, angry residents had been protesting for the violence and instability in the region (Herszenhorn and Roth 2014a). In the same vein, the influential businessman of Ukraine’s eastern part Rinat Akhmetov, who had been experiencing the increasing seizures by the separatists, accused the latter of attempting the ‘genocide of Donbass’ (Herszenhorn and Roth 2014a).