‘The association that dissociates’ – narratives of local political resistance in Kosovo and the delayed implementation of the Brussels Agreement

ABSTRACT

The existing literature on the EU’s transformative role in the Balkans looks at EU conditionality as a unidirectional system of rewards that is expected to motivate local elites to comply with EU rules. This article raises a different question: how do local actors bypass the implementation phase of EU conditionality and what kind of political resistance narratives do they use for this purpose? The analysis attempts to tackle these inter-related questions by focusing on the delayed implementation of the Brussels Agreement between Belgrade and Pristina as a case study, using the interpretive method of narrative analysis. The article aims to link fieldwork empirics with theoretical discussions in the field of EU compliance literature by stressing the importance of local actors’ resistance to EU incentives. Three levels of analysis will be conducted in order to address the research question: (1) mapping different types of actors at the local level and stressing their heterogeneity; (2) understanding how local resistance to EU pressure evolved in the period 2013–2016; and (3) showing how their policy narratives influenced the implementation phase and the maintenance of the status quo. In conclusion, the analysis shows that the EU’s mediation strategy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ favours local actors’ political resistance, particularly in the implementation phase. The main findings show that ‘dividers’ outnumber ‘connectors’ in local actors’ narratives, thus strengthening political resistance to EU pressure.

KEYWORDS:

• Brussels agreement
• European Union
• dialogue
• Kosovo
• mediation
• Serb municipalities
• Serbia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

Research for this article was partly funded by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS) within the framework of the project ‘Building knowledge of new statehood in Southeast Europe’.

Notes on contributor

Miruna Troncotă is a lecturer and researcher at the Department of International Relations and European Integration in the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA), Romania. She held research fellowships in Berlin and Ljubljana, and conducted field research in Sarajevo and Pristina. The most recent book is Post-conflict Europeanization and the War of Meanings: the Challenges of EU Conditionality in Bosnia and Kosovo (Tritonic Publishing House, 2016). Her research interests are: EU enlargement policy, Europeanization, democratization in the Western Balkans, post-conflict societies, post-Yugoslav space.

Notes

1. This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

2. I would like to thank to Arolda Elbasani and to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

3. The ACSM would include the following municipalities – the part of Northern Kosovo composed of: Leposavić, North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvečan and the other municipalities spread over the territory of Kosovo (so-called Enclaves): Gračanica, Klokot-Vrbovac, Novo Brdo, Parteš. Ranilug, Štrpce and possibly Dragaš. There is no official document that specifically mentions the municipalities to be included in the ACSM.

4. The metaphor is taken from Fitim Salihu, The association that dissociates: on the Kosovo-Serbia Agreement, available at http://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/the-association-that-dissociates-on-the-kosovo-serbia-agreement/.

5. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

6. The dialogue was launched following the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 (2010).

7. It is also important to mention that not only the legal framework of this new body creates divisions, but also its name, which also illustrates the ‘war of meanings’ in this mediation process. While Belgrade insists on the term ‘Community’ (Заједница српских општина/Zajednica srpskih opština), suggesting a legal entity with executive powers, Pristina insists on the term ‘Association’ (Asociacioni i komunave serbe), implying that the entity should have the status of other municipalities in Kosovo as a local association, which is an NGO.

8. Author’s informal discussion with Government official, Pristina, 26 October 2016.

9. Author’s interview with a representative of the Kosovo Government, Ministry of European Integration, unrecorded, Pristina, 28 October 2016.

10. Author’s interview with representative of the Kosovo Government, Ministry of Local Governance, (LDK), Pristina, 26 October 2016.

11. Author’s interview with a representative of the Kosovo Government, Ministry for Dialogue, (LDK), Pristina, 27 October 2016.

12. Author’s interview with a representative of AAK, political party in the opposition, Pristina, 26 October 2016.

13. Author’s interview with a representative of AAK, political party in the opposition, Pristina, 26 October 2016.

14. Author’s interview with student members of the movement Vetevendosje, focus group, Pristina, 24 October 2016.

15. Author’s interview with student members of the movement Vetevendosje, focus group, Pristina, 24 October 2016.

16. Author’s interview with representative of AAK, political party in the opposition, Pristina, 26 October 2016.

17. Author’s interview with representative of Vetevendosje, political party in the opposition, Pristina, 27 October 2016.

18. Author’s interview with representative of Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Pristina, 24 October 2016.

19. Author’s interview with representative of Institute of Development Policy (INDEP), Pristina, 24 October 2016.

20. Author’s interview with representative of Youth Initiative for Human Rights, Pristina, 24 October 2016.

21. It should be however noted, that this description holds only partially as the turnout rate prior to 2012 was indeed higher than in the North but was still quite low in comparison to the turnout of Albanians. Also, since 2013, the Serbs in the north have also increased their elections turn out, mostly under pressure from Belgrade. Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers who helped me with this information.

22. Author’s interview with a representative of the Advocacy Center for Democratic Culture (ACDC), unrecorded discussion, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

23. Author’s interview with representative from the business sector in Zubin Potok, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

24. Author’s interview with representative of NGO Aktiv, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

25. Author’s interview with representative of NGO Aktiv, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

26. Author’s interview with representative of NGO Aktiv, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

27. Author’s interview with representative of the EU Info and Cultural Center in Mitrovica, North Mitrovica, 26 October 2016.

28. Author’s interview with a representative from the business sector in Zubin Potok, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

29. Author’s interview with a representative from the business sector in Zubin Potok, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

30. Author’s interview with a representative of NGO Aktiv, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

31. Author’s interview with a representative of the Advocacy Center for Democratic Culture (ACDC), unrecorded discussion, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

32. Author’s interview with a representative NGO Aktiv, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.

33. Author’s interview with a representative of the EU Info and Cultural Center in Mitrovica, North Mitrovica, 26 October 2016.

34. Author’s interview with a representative from the business sector in Zubin Potok, North Mitrovica, 25 October 2016.