The 2017 incidents in the Aegean and Turkish foreign policy: using Q-methodology to examine Greek viewpoints

Figures & data

Table 1. The Q-sample and Z-score of the statements for each viewpoint.

	The Q-Sample (statements translated from Greek)
Items	Content	Z-score for Viewpoint 1	Z-score for Viewpoint 2
1	After Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu threatened to annul the Greco-Turkish agreement on the refugee question, Turkish Naval Forces muscled their way in Imia. This constitutes part of Ankara’s nervy response to the recent decision of Supreme Court for the Greek government to not extradite the eight Turkish Military Officers.	0.61	0.75
2	Turkey has disproportionately heavy losses in its endeavour to control al-Bab and banish ISIS from that city. An analysis of the events in the Aegean should not rule out a potential Turkish initiative to divert attention from the military-laden hindrances that Turkey has come across in Northern Syria.	−0.31	−1.51
3	The recent incident is directly tied up with Turkey’s general position about the lack of delimitation agreements in the territorial waters in Aegean and about its ‘grey zone’ theory.	1.20	1.07
4	After the defeat of the coup instigators, nationalistic features from different sides re-surface. However, whatever becomes an object of struggle in the domestic arena gains an external dimension and incorporates itself into a sui generis revisionism of Turkey’s political scene.	0.81	0.31
5	Russians may feel displeased by the Turkish incursions in the Aegean; nevertheless, they prioritize their very good cooperation with Ankara in Syria.	−0.52	−1.51
6	NATO’s presence in the Northern Aegean is disturbing Turkey because ‘it does not want the presence of an international observer supervising its plans in the region’.	0.45	0.00
7	The US is ‘neither in a position nor in the mood’ to interfere, as it did in the ‘90s. This may explain Turkey’s rally in the Aegean.	−0.81	−0.31
8	President Erdoğan has a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the EU that had not existed earlier: the refugees. By opening the doors in the Aegean, he knows that he can strike a politically mortal blow to the EU leaders.	0.71	−0.13
9	Erdoğan is not Çiller, not even Özal. He feels, even temporarily, omnipotent and deeply pressured. Between himself and his inner circle, as well as the fleet commander, there is no one else involved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and military officers have been set aside.	0.53	0.44
10	Turkey never relinquished its aspirations in the Aegean.	1.91	0.62
11	The international instability and the introversion of the crucial actors of the international system have enabled Ankara’s breaking loose from all restraints.	−0.74	−0.31
12	In Europe, the electoral cycle that was opening up at that time along with the derailment of Turkey’s EU admission perspective left a narrow margin for the EU to intervene and exert its influence.	0.25	0.58
13	Putin’s policies in reinstating spheres of influence and favouring violence or the threat of use of violence while implementing foreign policy provided a convenient environment for the Turkish behaviour.	−1.62	1.95
14	The domestic instability in Turkey fuels the tensions in Greco-Turkish relations. In April’s (2017) referendum Erdoğan sought to become the absolute dominant player of the political game. A tension with Greece rallies society around his figure and allows him to go into partnership with extremist elements.	−0.35	−0.89
15	Through a staged crisis in the Aegean, Erdoğan was offering the Turkish armed forces an opportunity to restore their image shaken after successive purges and the ineffective combat against two fronts: the PKK and ISIS in Syria.	−0.42	−1.07
16	The hard line stance taken by Turkey is also an attempt at bullying in the Cyprus reunification talks. It is further a warning and preparing of the public opinion’s climate about what will follow after the failure of the negotiations.	0.69	−0.75
17	The arms race is undoubtedly one of the reasons for Greece’s economic downturn.	−1.65	0.00
18	I do not believe that the recent tension is linked to the case of the ‘8ʹ.	0.44	0.04
19	It is much easier for Trump to cooperate with Turkey, especially with Erdoğan. He looks on him as a powerful man with similar thoughts, who can abide by agreements and comply with them.	−1.72	−1.38
20	The carrots that the EU offers Turkey, such as visa liberalization and, finally, admission, command convergence policies on behalf of Turkey; however, for Erdoğan, issues such as security and counter-terrorism are off the table.	−1.11	1.20
21	Greece is the weak link for Erdoğan, thus the first target. He throws ‘warning’ shots on Greece, not ignoring Greece only but also feeling that even the US would not interfere the way it had done in the past.	−0,72	−1.33
22	Groups of Turkish elites attempts to question international law and Greece’s rights -deriving from the latter- persists. Their objective is to contest them from the angle of a historically inaccurate revisionism.	1.60	1.20
23	Turkey does not question today whether the Greek islands have territorial zone or continental shelf rights; it constantly challenges the Greek identity of some islets and even inhabited islands.	1.38	0.83
24	The dispute between Kemalists and Erdoğanists over ‘Greek occupation of some islands in the Aegean is a squabble over an alien hayloft’, without reference to any real facts. What they actually want to do is to raise claims in order to enlarge the package of a future negotiation or justify future activities opposing international law.	0.36	−0.75

Table 2. The P-Set and the factor loadings per viewpoint.

No.	Profession	Year of birth	Viewpoint 1	Viewpoint 2
1	Diplomat	1946	0.68X	−0.04
2	Political Analyst	1984	0.57X	−0.39
3	Political Analyst	1988	0.50X	0.23
4	Military Officer	1969	0.42	0.75X
5	Political Analyst	1985	0.47X	0.25
6	Political Analyst	1988	0.51	0.19
7	Political Analyst	1989	0.10	0.27
8	Diplomat	1945	0.03	0.81X
9	Diplomat	1943	0.56X	−0.30
10	Political Analyst	1984	0.65X	−0.04
11	Diplomat	1983	0.78X	−0.05
12	Military Officer	1983	0.50	0.40
13	Political Analyst	1982	0.57X	0.16
14	Diplomat	1950	0.74X	0.24
15	Military Officer	1985	0.80X	0.10
		cum% expl.Var.^a	32	13

^aProportion of the explained variance expressed as a percentage.

Figure 1. Grid to sort statements.