ABSTRACT
The EU’s work on climate change is key to the regional and international fight against the problem, and disruptions to it have global implications. When analyzing the effects of the UK’s decision to leave the EU (Brexit) on EU climate action, this paper looks at two types of impact. The first is related to UK absence from EU climate policy, finance and diplomacy following the actual UK departure from the EU. The second is related to the costs attached to the withdrawal process, including the additional costs and uncertainty created by the delayed UK departure. These latter implications of Brexit have been less explored by the literature, although the last years provide plenty of evidence for them. The paper finds that the impact of Brexit on EU climate action is mainly negative, without denying some potential positive impact and while acknowledging the limitations of a study that entails forecasting in an uncertain political context.
Key policy insights
Following Brexit, the EU will lose a member that supported its climate action internally and internationally through commitment to high emissions reduction targets at the EU level, policy solutions, and financial and diplomatic support.
The withdrawal process itself has had a negative impact on EU climate action: Brexit has hijacked the EU agenda, captured EU human and administrative resources and increased the uncertainty in which investors and businesses operate.
Planning for separate European Councils to deal with Brexit could prevent agenda hijacking. Both the EU and UK also need to provide businesses with a clear regulatory framework.
A repeatedly postponed Brexit has caused additional damage, by prolonging uncertainty.
Continuing to work with the UK on climate during the Brexit negotiations and after the UK departure should be a priority for the EU, as well as ensuring the willingness to cooperate is not spoiled by mutual resentment.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 President Donald Trump is committed to the withdrawal since 2017, but the Agreement provisions do not allow for the withdrawal to take place earlier than 4 November 2020.
2 I conducted an exhaustive review of the documents published on Brexit on the DG Clima and DG Energy websites and in their archives, using the search function available on the websites to identify all the documents that included the word ‘Brexit’ in their title and body. Senior sources from the Commission confirmed that all the key documents on Brexit that can be currently shared with the public are available online.
3 Including an exhaustive coverage of the main Brussels-based media outlets and agencies.
4 When compared to other top economic powers and emitters such as China, USA and India, whose emissions are increasing.
5 Abandoning a ‘one-sided leadership strategy, to instead combine unilateral concessions with careful coalition-building and bridge-building activities’ (Bäckstrand & Elgström, Citation2013, p. 1370).
6 President Macron himself agreed that the EU-wide CPF should be matched by social policies for areas in which jobs might be lost.
7 For instance, the UK was still in the process of setting up an agency that would replace the European Commission in its role of keeping countries in line with environmental and energy rules and, in a no-deal scenario, it was unclear who will perform this role.
8 See Andresen and Agrawala (Citation2002) for more detailed conceptual work on leaders and laggards in the climate regime.
9 The UK prime minister at the time of writing, Boris Johnson, has been inconsistent in his past climate and energy efficiency positions. Members of his Cabinet at the time of writing have demonstrated prior climate scepticism (including the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Theresa Villiers). In late August 2019, sources in the Government expressed the intention to cut fuel duty (Reuters, Citation2019) which would most likely encourage the consumption of fossil fuels.