Extraction and development: fossil fuel production narratives and counternarratives in Colombia

ABSTRACT

Colombia, a country that is very vulnerable to climate change, has played a positive role in international climate negotiations. Paradoxically, Colombia is also the sixth largest coal exporter globally, and its government has adopted policies to further increase the country’s production of coal and other fossil fuels. This article explores to what extent the national government reproduces a powerful paradigm – namely, that fossil fuel extraction is necessary for development – and how this resonates at the sub-national level. We find that the government’s narrative has evolved to accommodate Colombia’s changing national circumstances and public criticism. Though counternarratives exist, they have struggled to propose credible nationwide alternatives to extractive-based development, thus reinforcing the belief that extraction-based development is unavoidable. We describe how government narratives constitute an obstacle to both supply-side policies to restrict fossil fuel development and to transitional assistance policies to adjust to shifts in the global coal market.

Key policy insights

• The view that fossil fuel extraction is necessary for development is a powerful barrier to supply – side climate policy.

• This view also hinders the formulation of transitional assistance policy.

• Empirical evidence that fossil fuel extraction seldom leads to equitable development is not enough to overcome this view.

• Narratives on fossil fuel-based development continuously adjust to prevailing economic development paradigms and contemporary development challenges.

KEYWORDS:

• Colombia
• coal
• extractivism
• transition
• narratives

Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) through core support to the Stockholm Environment Institute. The authors would like to thank Dr. Georgia Piggot for her valuable comments and suggestions during the manuscript preparation.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 This paper’s scope is limited to narratives by governmental actors and counternarratives. More information about the narratives by fossil fuel companies in Colombia can be found in Strambo et al. (2020).

2 The main options on the table have been expanding coal-based thermopower and hydropower capacity, as well as exploiting unconventional fossil fuel reserves through hydraulic fracturing.

3 ‘Carbon lock-in’ refers to “the tendency for certain carbon-intensive technological systems to persist over time, 'locking out' lower-carbon alternatives, and owing to a combination of linked technical, economic, and institutional factors” (Erickson, Kartha, Lazarus, & Tempest, 2015).

4 The mining sector’s contributions to Colombia’s income include royalties, taxes and compensations for environmental impacts.

5 Production projections are based on the activity plans registered by mining companies.

6 The longstanding Colombian conflict has its roots in the unequal distribution of land and the lack of spaces for political participation in the country, which has led to violence and armed conflict. Guerrillas, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Colombian State have been among the main protagonists. However, other armed groups rapidly became involved, such as paramilitary groups, drug cartels and criminal bands. The conflict has thus not been about a single issue, nor between two clearly identified opposite sides. Instead it has been shaped by evolving local, regional and national dynamics and different historical processes (González, 2004). The armed conflict in Colombia has been one of the longest in the world, with hundreds of thousands of victims. Between 1958 and 2018, over 260 000 people lost their lives in this conflict, 80% of which were civilians, and over 80 000 people disappeared. There are also verified accounts of over 37,000 victims of abduction and over 15,000 victims of sexual violence (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018).

7 This report was elaborated and published in the midst of the commodity boom, which explains partly why a decline in coal production has not been considered in any of the future scenarios.

8 Legislative Act 5/2011 and Law 1530/2012 established that royalties would hence be redistributed across all sub-national entities through project financing, thus inversing the ratio according to which 80% of direct royalties were concentrated in seven producing departments, while 20% was distributed to non-producing departments (Botero Ospina, Hofman Quintero, & Hernández Chitiva, 2015).

9 The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Colombia is an independent government institution that monitors and ensures proper allocation and use of resources and public funds.

10 The real contribution of coal to public income at the national level has been subject to considerable debate and deserves more policy and academic attention.

11 Stranded assets are “fossil fuel supply and generation resources which, at some time prior to the end of their economic life (as assumed at the investment decision point), are no longer able to earn an economic return (i.e. meet the company’s internal rate of return), as a result of changes associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy” (Carbon Tracker 2017).